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CHAPTER V'

TACTICS

INTRODUCTION
1. SOVIET TACTICS PRIOR TO 1942

At the beginning of the Russo-German War, June
1941, the Red Army tactical doctrines, which had
developed from a mixture of Western European
practice and original thinking, were still largely
theoretical and untried. It is true that Red Army
leaders had made careful studies of World War I,
the Russian and Spanish Civil Wars, and the first
year of World War II. As early as 1933, Red Army
officers had formulated basic concepts of tank and
moto-mechanized warfare. At Nomonhan and in
the Finnish War, they gained experience in the
strengths and weaknesses of armor. The critical
importance of small-unit infantry tactics, the necessity of coordination and flexibility in maneuver and
fire power, and the methods of artillery-infantrytank rupture of a powerful fortified position also
had been clarified in the Finnish War. But these
lessons were not fully digested, even by higher officers. Rapid mobilization between 1937 and 1941
had brought great numbers of inexperienced leaders
into service. The tactical modernization of the Red
Army had just begun when the Germans invaded
the U. S. S. R.
In 1941, command was concentrated in the infantry staff, although artillery was receiving continually increasing responsibility. The basic operational unit was the powerful infantry division,
nearly 18,000 strong, with two regiments of artillery
and a battalion of tanks. Except in the Far East,
the corps was the highest organized command structure.
Full emphasis upon combat intelligence was not
yet evident, although notable beginnings had been
made in the development of aerial phototopography,
special maps, and photographic ground reconnaissance; and sound ranging was in an advanced stage.
Schemes of maneuver and combat dispositions in the
offensive were conventional, featuring a predominance of frontal terrain objectives and deeply echeloned infantry assault forces.

Sound defensive doctrines existed. These showed
thorough appreciation of the importance of depth?
all-around security, successive obstacle systems covered by fire, and the employmerit of artillery in
counterpreparation and antitank action. Staff
work was detailed and slow, with written orders being employed as low as the regiment. Coordination presented a notable weakness; commanders
overstressed personal leadership to the detriment of
control. Supporting arms were not fully exploited.
Signal planning and techniques-especially the employment of radio-were deficient.
In infantry tactics, the concepts of fire, maneuver,
infiltration, and encirclement were beginning to
crystallize. Mixed teams of infantry, engineers, and
direct-fire artillery for special missions were not
yet in evidence. However, rapidly prepared field
fortifications, excellent camouflage, and the mass
use of specialized snipers were standard practices.
Throughout the years prior to World War II, the
Red Army concentrated attention on artillery tactics and techniques. By 1941, considerable progress
had been made in analyzing artillery capabilities;
developing observation and fire direction; employing destruction fire, barrages, and concentrations;
and in handling artillery organizations. Four artillery divisions existed. The lack of heavy mortars and of massed mortar fire was an important
deficiency.
Large-scale employment of armor was still in its
infancy, with experimental tank divisions being the
most powerful mechanized units. Technical equipment was not fully developed, while the roles of infantry, engineers, and supporting fire power in armored operations were incompletely understood.
In contrast, large horse cavalry units had not been
neglected; a powerful cavalry arm, coordinated with
artillery and armor, existed at the beginning of the
war.
The Finnish War provided excellent experience
in winter operations and in the assault of fortified
positions.
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The first phase of the Russo-German War, June
to November 1941, was a costly delaying action by
the initial protective forces of the U. S. S. R. It
revealed the tactical weaknesses of the prewar army;
at the same time, new techniques were improvised.
Deep obstacle systems justified themselves thoroughly, as did artillery-especially in the new role
of direct fire. Combat in encirclement and partisan warfare proved effective.
By November 1941, the mobilized reserves of the
U. S. S. R. were ready, and could be thrown in for
powerful counterattacks at Tikhvin, Rostov, and
Moscow. Between November 1941 and May 1942,
the Russians engaged in a winter-spring offensive
which nearly broke the German lines, but at great
cost. The soundness of husbanding reserves for
counteroperations at the critical time and the effectiveness of infiltrating ski units and large-scale cavalry raids were fully proved. Yet many weaknesses
were evident. At Rostov (November 1941), the
absence of motorized infantry, self-propelled artillery, and motorized bridging equipment prevented
the Red Army from annihilating the encircled German forces. On the Central Front (January-April
1942), lack of air cover led to the destruction of the
cavalry supply lines and nullified the offensive. At
Kharkov (May 1942), inadequate flank protection
for the advancing mechanized salient produced disaster.
2. NEW TACTICAL DOCTRINES

The High Command of the Red Army studied the
reverses of 1941 and 1942 assiduously. By the autumn of 1942, it had assimilated the combat lessons
of the war, formulated radically new combat regula.
tions for the arms and the staffs, developed new
organizations, and begun mass production of fully
modern equipment.
As a result of this tactical evaluation~ command
responsibilities were specifically divided between
the commander and staff of combined arms, and the
chiefs of arms and services. The Commander became responsible for plans of maneuver and direct
control of critical phases of an operation. His staff
assumed the function of coordination, while the
chiefs of arms and services were charged with detailed planning and control of their particular elements. The army became the basic planning and
command group; army group and even several
headquarters coordinated major operations. Uncompromising thoroughness of reconnaissance was
required, both by combined and specialized arms.

V-2

Operation procedures were developed for systematically disseminating intelligence directly to using
agencies. New tactical schemes were brought forward: converging double envelopment, parallel pursuit, and centralized and decentralized defense. The
major development in staff work was the required
employment of precise tables of combat coordination, which assured continuous, systematic cooperation of all arms. Such cooperation was further
aided by advances in tactical signal communications,
including the formation of special command, staff,
cooperation, and other nets.
Reserves were committed in concentrated blows to
exploit successes. The maneuverability of infantry
was now organized and exploited to the utmo·st; the
employment of small, mixed teams with heavy fire
power facilitated infiltration, encirclement, and
hasty defense. Deep echelon systems were replaced
by wide frontal formations which promoted better
lateral control and more flexible maneuverability.
Artillery became the main striking force of the Red
Army. The new concept of the "artillery and air
offensive" embodied the responsibility of the artillery to coordinate all supporting fire power and
to provide overwhelming fire power in anticipation
of infantry requirements. To achieve this goal,
large numbers of artillery organizations-artillery
divisions, mortar divisions, antiaircraft artillery divisions, artillery brigades, etc-were formed. Direct fire became a normal function of all types of
artillery. In general, artillery was used with great
aggressiveness.
To implement deep mechanized operations, two
basic types of mobile corps were created: the tank
corps and the mechanized corps. * The tank corps,
operating with infantry, had a high proportion of
tanks and great shock power suitable for penetrations. The mechanized corps, with a large motorized infantry component and fewer tanks, was best
fitted for exploitation. In addition, some ordinary
infantry was motorized for special operations; shuttling by motor increased the mobility of still other
units. The cavalry corps, aided by strong armor
and artillery, retained a major role in special operations.
Engineers operated in immediate conjunction with
assault waves, not only breaking gaps through minefields and obstacles, but also providing immediate
*The Red Army "tank corps" has no U. S. equivalent, but
a U. S. armored division. The "mechanized
corps" resembles the German Panzer Grenadier Division and
incorporates both armored and motorized infantry with tanks.
(See ch. III.)
approxiJlIatf'~
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defense of newly won positions. Balanced, powerful tactical antiaircraft gun units (12.7-mm, 37-mm,
and 8S-mm), operating in close coordination with
friendly fighter aircraft, helped prevent repetition
of earlier disasters from hostile air action.
In special operations, the technique of river crossings especially was perfected. Crossings on a wide
front, powerful artillery suppo~t~ use of improvised
as well as table-of-organization equipment, and
rapid construction of timber bridges were characterIStIC.
Tactical surprises such as underwater bridges
were introduced. Defensive and offensive fighting
in cities received careful attention. The Soviets
clearly realized the importance of detailed reconnaissance, direct-fire artillery, and aggressive and
rapid action by infantry well equipped with submachine guns and grenades.
3. TRENDS SINCE STALINGRAD
The basic tactics of the present Red Army were formulated in 1942 and were revealed for the first
time in the victory of Stalingrad.
Following the Stalingrad campaign, modifications
of Soviet tactics were governed by the need of destroying deep, bitterly defended German positions,
and by the availability of increasing quantities of
modern materiel and well trained officers. Consequently, heavy mine-clearing, bridging, and flamethrowing tanks have been introduced; assault engineer-pioneer brigades have been developed; artil-

TM 30-430
lery has been reinforced by superheavy equipment;
and mobile corps have been provided with stronger
echelons of self-propelled artillery, mortars, and
rockets. As a result of these measures, operations
even against powerful positions can progress rapidly.
At the same time, mobility and flexibility of control
have increased. Greater motorization and the use of
ducks and amphibious tanks have speeded operations. Partial decentralization of control from army
to infantry corps, has facilitated more rapid reactions to unexpected situations.
A number of future trends are foreseeable at
present. Undoubtedly, the main patterns of current Soviet tactics will continue. But even more
aggressive tactics may be promoted by light, powerful weapons for the infantry-particularly of the
recoilless type-with such conservative motorization as will not reduce maneuverability. Also, improvements in engineer equipment may facilitate
rapid exploitation by mechanized forces. The continuous dominating role of artillery will probably
be maintained, especially by coordinated employment of very long range weapons (V -type) and selfpropelled types. The trend toward decentralization
of operating control to units of moderate size, such
as corps, will probably continue. The tendency toward concentrating GHQ units (tanks, artillery, engineers, etc.) into large, specialized organizations
for commitment in main efforts will, most likely, be
maintained.

P ART I. EXERCISE OF COMMAND: COMBINED ARMS
Section I. THE COMMANDER, THE
STAFF, AND THE CHIEFS OF ARMS
AND SERVICES
1. COMMAND
The command doctrine of the Red Army is characterized by specific definition of the responsibilities
of the Commander of Combined Arms, his Chief of
Staff, the staff, the chiefs of arms and services, and
command liaison officers. The Commander of Combined Arms is the senior officer of the primary mobile arm-infantry, tanks, or cavalry-in the formation. * He is responsible not only for over-all
*The Red Army "formation" (Soyedinenye) has no exact
U. S. equivalelit but approximates a large-scale combat team,
being a division, brigade, or comparable organization of normal, reduced, or reinforced strength. A stable, tactical grouping of necessary arms anG minimum services, a Red Army
formation is deSigned to execute one phase of a large operation, such as a penetration, an exploitation, a delaying action,
or a counterattack. Hereafter "formation" is used in the
Soviet sense.

success or failure, but also for direct personal control of reconnaissance and operations in critical
areas and phases of combat. The initial scheme of
maneuver and the employment of reserves are especially his responsibilities.
The Chief of Staff, second in command, is responsible for all secondary and routine operations.
The staff assists him in over-all planning, reconnaissance, coordination, combat security, signal communications, and supply control of operations. The
chiefs of arms and services are charged with the detailed planning and supervision of the operations of
all elements of their arms or services within the
combat team. They command those elements of
their arms or services which are not attached to
subordinate units.
Command liaison officers are senior officers, often
members of the staff or chiefs of arms and services,

V-3

1:

~

COMMANDING ...............
GENERAL

~

POLITICAL ArrARATUS

~
Q

STAFF

r----------------~------~Ihll.---~----~----~-----

.....
2!

COMMAND CHANNEL

e
<

-----~ ALTERNATE COMMAND OR ATTACHMENT
<F==--~

COORDINATION

Fi~u,.e

J. Channels

of command and control, forces of combined arms

t;

1 Nov 45
who represent the Commander in controlling operations along axes of secondary effort (fig. 1).

2. STAFF OPERATIONS
Contrary to U. S. practice, the staff in the Red Army
is an advisory body to the Chief of Staff and not to
the Commander. With data supplied by the staff,
the Chief of Staff prepares the estimate of the situation and makes conclusions and recommendations
for the approval of the Commander.
One of the fundamental functions of the staff,
repeated 1y stressed in Soviet doctrine, is to organize
and assure uninterrupted coordination between all
arms and services throughout all combat phases.
The staff, chiefs of arms, and commanders of subordinate and reserve units participate in developing
coordination, their basic objective being to provide
continuous and effective artillery, mortar, aviation,
engineer, and other support for the infantry and
tanks.
The staff of a Red Army formation of combined
arms, down to corps level, consists of the following
sections: Operations, Intelligence, Signal Communications, Statistical Control, Rear Services,
Topographic and Headquarters Administration.
(No Topographic Section is found in the division.)
Occasionally Training and other special sections are
added.
a. Operations Section. The Operations Section is the senior section of the staff. Its chief is
concurrently deputy to the Chief of Staff. He is
fully informed of the situation at all times; he personally prepares field orders and the more important combat reports.
The Operations Section secures and compiles data
on the situation, estimates the comparative strength
of friendly and opposing forces, and prepares field
orders, operations, summaries, and situation maps.
It plans coordination between arms, and is therefore
responsible for all liaison with other units, and for
the coding service. It directs combat training. It
is specifically charged with ensuring operational
security by organizing antitank, antiaircraft, and
antigas defense; traffic control and camouflage discipline; and defense of the rear echelon and the
command post.
In the Operations Section, the first assistant is
deputy to the chief of the section and is charged with
controlling the operations of the subordinate units.
The second assistant organizes coordination with
higher headquarters and adjacent units, as well as
within his own staff. The third assistant is respon-
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sible for all matters pertaining to combat security
and training. In formations without a chief of the
air arm, an air subsection is generally maintained
in the Operations Section. A meteorological subsection may also be maintained.
The Operations Section directly controls the staff
coding service and the headquarters commandant.
h. Intelligence Section. The Intelligence Section is charged with the planning and preparation
of orders, and to some extent with the conduct of
operations pertaining to the collection, evaluation,
interpretation, and dissemination of information of
the enemy. Its primary function is to keep the
Commander, and all others concerned, informed regarding the enemy's situation and capabilities. It
usually includes subsections or teams for order-ofbattle studies and prisoner-of-war interrogation.
All intelligence is reported by the chief of the section to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Operations Section.
c· Signal Section. The Signal Section organizes and maintains all necessary signal communications, and allots signal equipment to troops. It
assigns radio frequencies and prescribes signal pro·
cedure. In cooperation with the Operations Section, it prepares radio-signal charts and systems of
transmission, and organizes a time-signal service.
It also plans, installs, and supervises the aircraft
warning net; organizes postal and air mail services;
and operates the message center. Furthermore, it
conducts signal reconnaissance--particularly interception of communications and survey of locally
available facilities. It submits signal summaries as
necessary. The Chief of the Signal Section also
commands the signal troops of the formation.
tl. Topographic Section. The Topographic
Section gathers and analyzes all terrain data. It organizes geodetic, topographic, and photogrammetric
services. providing troops with maps and catalogues
of benchmarks. The work of the Topographic Section is closely linked with the parallel duties of the
artillery staff, which takes over all topographic
functions on divisional and lower levels.
e. Rear Services. Since 1944, the Rear Services, Statistical Control, and Headquarters Administration Sections have normally been removed from
the staff, and placed under the Deputy Commander
for Rear Services.
The Rear Services Section organizes, maintains,
and provides for the security of rear echelon installations and lines of supply and evacuation. It
provides transportation facilities for the timely de-
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livery of supplies in accordance with the polities of
the Commander and instructions of the Chief of
Staff. It coordinates transportation, supply, and
evacuation requirements of the arms and services;
prepares summaries; and regulates traffic. It requests from higher headquarters the additional facilities necessary for efficient operation of its installations, and allots these facilities to subordinate
units as required.
The Statistical Control Section deals with personnel matters, tables of organization and equipment, strength reports, and replacements. It keeps
records of all personnel, animals, equipment, casualties, captured equipment, and prisoners of war.
The Headquarters Administration Section keeps
records, provides quarters and food for headquarters
personnel, and controls military police and all administrative matters pertaining to the formation.
3. CHIEFS OF ARMS AND SERVICES

The chiefs of arms and services in a formation of
combined arms have administrative and planning
responsibility for all organic and attached units of
their arms or services.
They command all such units not attached to subordinate organizations. As command liaison officers, they generally supervise the performance of
key missions within the scope of their arm or service. As assistants to the Chief of Staff, they advise
the Commander on matters pertaining to tactical and
technical employment of the arms and services.
Each l:hief of an arm or service develops operations,
reconnaissance, and rear-area plans for his arm or
service. In accordance with the requirements and
within the limits set by the commander, each initiates requisitions for the procurement of equipment
and supplies for his particular arm or service within
the formation.
In addition to the responsibilities which are common to the chief of every arm or service, certain
other responsibilities are specifically allocated. The
Chief of Artillery is responsible for the organization
of antitank and antiaircraft defense and for the procurement and distribution of all ammunition. The
Chief of the Signal Service is responsible for the
designation of coordination signals. Together with
the Chief of Staff, he must be present at the announcement of the command decision. Together with the
Chief of Artillery and the Chief of the Air Service,
he establishes the aircraft warning service. The
Chief of Engineers is responsible for camouflage and,
together with the Chief of Artillery, for antitank de-
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fense. The Chief Chemical Officer is responsible
for the defense of the entire formation against
chemical warfare.
4. LIAISON

Liaison is handled by the liaison officers' service
organized by the Chief of Operations under instructions of the Chief of Staff. In divisional and corps
headquarters, officer personnel of the Operations
and the Intelligence Sections are as a rule assigned
to this task. Liaison duties are divided between
"command liaison officers" and "liaison officers."
a. Command liaison officer. A command
liaison officer is dispatched from a higher commander of his headquarters to a subordinate unit.
He must be a responsible senior officer (often the
commander of an arm or a service) authorized by
the Commander to supervise the execution of a
combat mission. He is appointed and briefed personnally by the Commander or the Chief of Staff.
The principal duties of a command liaison officer
are to transmit his commander's orders to the subordinate unit, and to inform his commander of the
actual situation, condition, and requirements of the
unit. He must be thoroughly familiar with the
mission and plan of operations and subsequent
plans of his commander, which are fully described
in the card given him personally by the Commander
or the Chief of Staff.
Whenever necessary, the command liaison officer
visits the troops to check on the execution of orders;
he reports his findings both to his chief of staff and
to the commander of the subordinate unit. If the
decision of the subordinate commander is obviously
inexpedient and threatens to disrupt the general plan
of action, the command liaison officer must report
this decision to his own commander before it is
carried out.
h. Liaison officer. A liaison officer is an officer of a subordinate. unit dispatched to a higher
or a cooperating headquarters. He is dispatched
by the Chief of the Operations Section, either for
a definite period of time during a battle, for purposes of exchanging information and of intercommunication, or from time to time to carry out
individual assignments. He remains with the Op.
erations Section of the higher unit and is subordinate to its chief. He also reports to the Chief
Signal Officer.
c. Lateral and support liaison. Liaison between adjacent units {lateral liaison) is maintained
as a rule by direct communication. Between a

I Nov 45
battalion headquarters and a right flank battalion
a direct telephone line is used, while contact with
other battalions passes through the regimental
headquarters.
Liaison between supporting and supported units,
if established, is the function of the supporting unit.
Field artillery habitually establishes liaison with
supported units for the primary purpose of obtaining information as to the needs for supporting fire.
For example, liaison is established by direct-support
artillery battalions with the supported infantry battalions and also with the infantry regiment.

Section II. COMBAT INTELLIGENCE
1. OBJECTIVES

The elements of intelligence essential to a command
decision in the offensive are, according to Red Army
doctrine, the enemy combat dispositions and feasible approaches to the deep flanks and to the rear
of the enemy main body. On the defensive, the
Soviets consider it fundamentally vital to know the
possible approaches to the main battle position, the
direction of the enemy main effort, and the location
and composition of his reserves. In every type of
operation, precise determination of critical orientation points is essential for combat coordination.
2. RESPONSIBILITY

a. The Commander. On the basis of personal
reconnaissance of the general situation, supported
by information supplied by higher headquarters,
the Commander initiates reconnaissance by advising his staff, through the Chief of Staff, as to what
information is required, when it is desired, and what
units may be employed. During the subsequent
preparation for battle and during the course of
battle, the Commander conducts command reconnaissance and gives additional missions to the reconnaissance agencies. The Commander is also
responsible for the continuous training and coordinated employment of the Intelligence Staff and
intelligence agencies, and for cooper~tion between
staff sections.
h. The Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff is
responsible for carrying out the Commander's orders
and for initiating necessary reconnaissance in the
absence of instructions from the Commander. He
develops the essential elements of information designated by the Commander, translates these into reconnaissance missions, combines these missions with
the directives of the higher headquarters, and per-
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son ally assigns them to the Chief of the Intelligence
Section. The Chief of Staff designates time limits
for reporting information. He insists on continuous exchange of information between Intelligence
and other staff sections. All intelligence plans and
summaries are signed by the Chief of Staff.
c. Chief of the Intelligence Section. The
Chief of the Intelligence Section presents on demand the enemy situation, together with his evaluation of enemy capabilities and the validity of each
source of information. He supervises the work and
training of the Intelligence Staff. He is personally
responsible for dissemination of intelligence to interested officers and headquarters, and for notifying
the higher and neighboring headquarters of the
composition, time schedules, and zones of action of
his reconnaissance units. Jointly with the Chief
Signal Officer, he prescribes the signal codes for
reconnaissance units.
d. Intelligence Staff. The Intelligence Staff,
under the supervision of the Chief of Intelligence,
formulates the intelligence and observation plans,
and evaluates, collates, and disseminates the resulting information in periodic and special intelligence
summaries. The staff also insures maintenance of
contact and exchange of information with subordinate units, and it is responsible, with the cooperation
of the Operations Staff, for the establishment and
functioning of observation and listening posts.
INTELLIGENCE PLANS. In drawing up all intelligence plans, the following general steps are
applied:
Determination of objectives which would
yield required information.
Disposition of reconnaissance units according to the principle of concentration of
forces on salient problems.
Assignment of single specific tasks to each
reconnaissance unit (further tasks may be
assigned after the completion of the initial
one) .
Installation and maintenance of communications with the reconnaissance units.
Maintenance of a reconnaissance reserve to
replace missing units and to retain operational flexibility of the intelligence plan.
The intelligence plan, an operational document of
headquarters, is approved by the Chief of Staff and
is not disseminated. Intelligence plans of the specialized arms and services vary in detail. Every
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intelligence plan, however, must indicate the following:
The mission of the formation.
All available information on the enemy.
Nature, source, and schedule deadline of
required information.
The composition of each reconnaissance unit,
its mission, and its zone of action.
Time limits for reports, the route back, and
the area where prisoners have to be captured.
Means of communication with reconnaissance
units.
Order of relief of-reconnaissance units.
The composition, strength, and possible
tasks of the reconnaissance reserve.
The observation plan is prepared by the Operations and Intelligence Staffs. It shows the location
of each observation post with the sector of responsibility and dead areas. In terrain and weather
which are unfavorable for observation, the observation plan is augmented by a "listening plan."
The Intelligence Staff coordinates its combined
intelligence plan and the intelligence plans of subordinate headquarters in accordance with directives
from higher echelons. For example, the Intelligence Staff Section of an army coordinates the intelligence plan of the army and its subordinate units
(infantry divisions and units of specialized arms
and services attached to the army) with the intelligence plan of the army group. The chief of intelligence of each arm and service coordinates the
intelligence plans of his own and all subordinate
staffs with the plan of the formation of which he
is a part, and with the directives of the next higher
echelon of his arm or service. For example, the
chief of intelligence of army engineers coordinates
the intelligence plans of all engineer units of the
army in accordance with the directives of the chief
of engineer intelligence of the army group. This
plan is then submitted to the Intelligence Staff of
the army which modifies it in accordance with the
combined intelligence plan (fig. 2) .
COMMUNICATIONS. The establishment of signal
communications with reconnaissance elements is the
responsibility of intelligence staffs. Each intelligence observation post must have wire communications with the command post. Radio communications are established with mobile reconnaissance
units. In the event of prolonged operations over a
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sector considerably removed from the command
post, a forward information collection station is
established, with reliable wire or radio communications with the command post. Wide use is made
of intelligence liaison officers for the collection of
information and control of reconnaissance patrols.

e. Information collecting agencies. Intelligence is obtained from higher echelons and from
neighboring units; raw information is collected in
the lower echelons through ground reconnaissance,
air reconnaissance, technical reconnaissance, and
special agents.
Ground reconnaissance is carried out by specially
trained troops which are organic to all units down
to regiments of combined and specialized arms. Air
reconnaissance is carried out by observation squadrons and by combat aviation. Technical reconnaissance-such as sound and flash ranging, radio location, and ground photography-is carried out by
technical troops and by specialized arms and services. Special agents, operating in rear areas of the
enemy, are controlled by armies and higher echeIons; these agents collect information which is
usually related with strategic tasks.
In addition to collecting essential elements of information which are ordered by the Commander or
the Chief of Staff, the agencies are continuously responsible for the following:
Location of concentration areas and the
number and type of troops which occupy
them.
Location of antitank and antipersonnel obstacles and minefields.
Location of firing points and sectors covered
by them.
The system of defense.
Information on routes and system of supply
and evacuation.
Location of flanks and weakly held sectors.
Capture of prisoners and documents disclosing the groupment and intentions of the
enemy (sectors in which the prisoners are
to be captured are often designated by the
Commander) .
Information on the condition of terrain and
road nets which would influence the employment of technical equipment and
armor.
Information indicating probable directions
of attack, counterattack, and withdrawal.
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determine the size of the reconnaissance and supporting units. Red Army doctrine emphasizes that
in organizing reconnaissance in· force too much importance cannot be given to the selection of personnel; to thorough planning and coordination of the
operation; and to detailed rehearsal in daylight and
at night under conditions similar to those of the

Figure 5.

Plan

0/ reconnaissance in force.

actual operation by both the reconnaissance and the
supporting units. Reconnaissance in force must be
undertaken only if othe~ methods do not produce the
required results. In addition, the terrain must be
favorable for surprise, and sufficient time must be
allowed for thorough preparation and rehearsal.
Success depends on surprise and originality of action
rather than on the number of troops employed (figs.
Sand 6).
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The establishment of continuous observation is a
responsibility of all headquarters. During offensive
operations and reconnaissance in force, command
observation is mandatory. Observation posts must
be selected by staff officers, and these posts must have
independent wire communications with the command post. An observation diagram showing the

location, sector of responsibility, and field of vision
of each observation post is prepared jointly by the
Intelligence and Operations Staffs. Each observation post is required to keep a journal and to submit
an observation report (fig. 7).
At night and when the terrain and weather interfere with effective observation, observation recon·
naissance is augmented· by listening reconnaissance.
Listening posts are selected as carefully as the ohser-

1 Nov 45

Tl\I 30-430

Figure 6.

Execution 0/ reconnaissance in jorce.

Figure 7.

Obse/'1Jation plan.
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vation posts. They are manned by trained personnel who are required to keep a journal and to submit
a report at the end of their tour.

b. Reconnaissance by specialized arms and
services. The general principles of infantry reconnaissance discussed above hold true for the intelligence and reconnaissance activity of the other arms
and services. However, each arm and service has
special forms and techniques of reconnaissance.
Reconnaissance is initiated by the chiefs of branches,
and coordinated and controlled by their intelligence
staffs. Reconnaissance units of specialized arms
and services operate either independently or with
reconnaissance units of combined arms. Their objectives are to determine the quality and strength of
the technical forces of the enemy, and the factors
which may affect the employment of friendly technical troops.
ARTILLERY RECONNAISSANCE. Artillery reconnaissance is an integral and specialized part of
combined reconnaissance. It demands exceptional
accuracy, timeliness, and continuity. The objectives
of artillery reconnaissance are the location and analysis of targets, evaluation of terrain, and the location
and activity of friendly front lines. Artillery intelligence agencies are grouped into three categories:
troop, instrumental, and air.
Troop reconnaissance is a primary responsibility
of commanders and intelligence sections of artillery
regiments, groupments, battalions, and batteries.
Paired battalion observation posts are fully equipped
with accurate optical instruments. When equipment
is available, artillery observation posts augment their
orientation and panoramic sketches with panoramic
photographs. In addition to observation, artillery
employs scouting parties which infiltrate behind
enemy lines to observe targets and control fire.
Instrumental reconnaissance is conducted by a
group of small, highly specialized units equipped
with accurate optical, photographic, sound.ranging,
meteorological, and other instruments. Soundranging batteries, normally operating in pairs, may
be employed either in support of large artillery formations, or attached to counterbattery or countermortar groupments. One battery, deployed behind
the firing line, reconnoiters targets such as medium
and heavy mortars, and infantry and antitank guns.
The other battery, deployed on the flanks of the firing positions, reconnoiters deep targets. The photogrammetric battery, attached to army and higher
echelon artillery staffs, develops and interprets
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aerial photographs and coordinates them with
ground survey data. It controls friendly camouflage through photographic interpretation; takes,
develops, and interprets ground photographs; and
prepares and disseminates map substitutes. At least
one artillery meteorological post is attached to each
artillery regiment, groupment, separate battalion,
and sound-ranging post. It provides the firing battalions and sound-ranging posts with current, local
meteorological data by ground measurements and
radiosonde.
Red Army artillery air reconnaissance closely approximates standard U. S. practice. Both artillery
and combat aircraft are used. Outstanding emphasis is placed on comprehensive briefing of flying
personnel, including visits to key ground observation posts, and on extensive use of air liaison officers.
ENGINEER RECONNAISSANCE. Staff procedure in
the planning and conduct of engineer reconnaissance
is the same as that for reconnaissance of combined
arms except that the regimental engineer, rather than
a staff officer, is personally responsible for the establishment of observation posts.
Engineer reconnaissance has a two-fold purpose:
to reconnoiter terrain with a view to facilitating the
movement and employment of friendly troops; and
to determine the location and nature of enemy engineer construction, with a view to disclosing his system of defense. Specific objectives of the first task
include the following:
Quantity and condition of local resources
available for use by engineers.
Condition and capacity of roads and bridges.
Supply of drinking water.
Type of soil.
Possible location of observation posts, defensive constructions, and means for camouflage.
Specific objectives of the second task include:
The location, type, and camouflage of enemy
defensive installation.
Demolitions, antipersonnel~ and antitank obstacles and minefields.
Nature of engineer construction in progress.
Safe avenues of approach to enemy positions.
Engineer reconnaissance is conducted by reconnaissance patrols, by observation, by interpretation
of ground and air photographs, by study of topographic, geological, and hydrographic maps, and by
interrogation of prisoners.
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ARMORED AND MOTORIZED RECONNAISSANCE. In
all armored and motorized units it is mandatory
that command reconnaissance be mede of all areas
in which armor may be employed; also, a group of
engineers must accompany each armored patrol.
Because the employment of armored and motorized
units is affected by terrain, especially in winter, the
attention of intelligence staffs and reconnaissance
units is concentrated on terrain, soil, roads, and
bridges which are likely to be used during approach,
deployment, and battle. In this connection, friendly
as well as enemy minefields and antitank obstacles
receive special attention. During the course of battle, or on the march, mobile observation posts are
established with radio communications to the command post. Communications between the command
posts and armored reconnaissance patrols are almost
exclusively by radio. In preparation for a breakthrough of a fortified position, foot reconnaissance
patrols of armored units operate independently or as
parts of combined reconnaissance.
SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE.
Signal intelligence is
charged with gathering information about the enemy
and about existing military or civil signal communications in the region of prospective operations. Signal headquarters of armies and higher echelons are
provided with technical means for collecting signal
intelligence of the enemy, including radio-intercept
and radio-direction-finding units. In static situations, lower echelons monitor enemy radio nets, and
signal patrols endeavor to tap enemy wire nets.
Utilization of local signal equipment is considered
in every signal plan, and it is the responsibility of
the intelligence section of the signal staff to organize
reconnaissance of existing facilities for signal communications. Specific objectives of this type of
reconnaissance are centers of communications, telephone and telegraph lines, and other equipment.
Estimates are made of equipment and time needed
to make it usable; extent of demolitions and sabotage
are determined; and measures are formulated to protect signal equipment from enemy agents and the
local population. In connection with signal liaison
service, signal reconnaissance investigates the condition of existing landing strips and possible sites
for new ones.
AIR RECONNAISSANCE. The two principal functions of air reconnaissance are aerial photography
and obsenation. Air observation is carried out by
special observation planes and by combat planes. It
is organized by the air arm commander either inde-
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pendently or at the request of ground units. Observation missions are often coupled with photographic
mISSIOns. Communications are established so that
radio messages from air observers are received
simultaneously by the air intelligence staff, the airdrome of the observation squadron, and headquarters of all supported formations down to and including corps. Some of the objectives of air observation
include:
Areas where the enemy is retreating.
Directions of enemy attack or withdrawal.
Phase lines reached by friendly troops.
Signs of regrouping of the enemy in his rear
areas.
Control of friendly camouflage.
The work of air photoreconnaissance is closely
integrated with photo-interpretation and topographic
serVIces. Results of photoreconnaissance are interpreted and entered on topographic maps at the headquarters of each reconnaissance squadron. This information is then sent to the topographic service of
the army group, where it is evaluated and reproduced on maps and map substitutes for the use of
ground formations and units. Special overlays containing a specific type of 1nformation-such as
enemy defenses, artillery positions, or command
posts-are prepared for the use of the general and
special staffs. Ground photo-panoramas are supplemented with vertical and oblique stereopairs. Artillery units are given special distribution which, in
major operations, includes firing battalions.
SPECIAL SERVICE RECONNAISSANCE. In addition
to the reconnaissance agencies of the arms and services, the Red Army employs several specialized services which perform reconnaissance tasks beyond the
scope of technical units of combat troops. The reconnaissance parties of these special services check
existing topographical, hydrographical, geological,
meteorological, and soil survey data with actual conditions; and prepare, reproduce, and disseminate the
resulting intelligence by means of standard and
special maps, studies, and surveys. For example,
the photogrammetric service develops and interprets
aerial photographs and coordinates them with
ground survey data. The military topographic service prepares, reproduces, and disseminates standard
and special maps such as tank, mortar, visibility,
river-crossing, and mountain march maps. The
hydro-meteorological service prepares hydrographic
maps and long-range weather forecasts. The geological service makes soil surveys.
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4. EXPLOITATION OF CAPTURED PERSONNEL
AND MATERIEL
a. Prisoners of war. In Soviet reconnaissance, the capture of prisoners plays such a prominent part that commanders often specify in their
reconnaissance directives the sectors from which
prisoners are to be taken. Detailed instructions for
processing prisoners are found in all handbooks
issued to the various arms and services.
Standard operating procedure for handling prisoners of war is as follows: Prisoners are grouped according to their unit, officers being separated from
enlisted men. Prisoners are conducted as soon as
possible to the next higher headquarters, where each
prisoner is interrogated alone; each echelon limits
interrogations to subjec~ of immediate interest.
Results of each interrogation are entered on a special form which accompanies each prisoner, and
results of interrogations are forwarded to the next
higher headquarters regardless of the final destination of the prisoners. Whenever possible, the interrogating officer is of the same arm or service as
the prisoner; in regimental and higher echelons,
prisoners of a particular arm or service are questioned by the chief of the intelligence section of the
corresponding arm or service.
h. Captured documents. All Red Army reconnaissance personnel are impressed with the
importance of documents found in areas occupied
or recently vacated by the enemy. Document exploitation in the lower echelons follows the same procedure as that applied to the interrogation of
prisoners. Each headquarters extracts applicable
information immediately and then forwards the
documents to the next higher echelon. At the army
level and higher, thorough classification and study
of the documents are made by a special staff of the
Information Section of the Intelligence Staff.
c. Captured materiel. Captured enemy arms
and equipment are collected by the headquarters
section of the formation or by a special detail appointed by the Commander. The collected materiel
is studied by the technical intelligence sections of the
army and higher echelons. Primary tests, such as
armor penetration, are undertaken in the forward
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area by locally available technical officers. All personnel are taught to report the performance and
employment of new enemy weapons and equipment.
d. Reports. Reports from intelligence agencies
are collected through the intelligence channels, but
intelligence is generally disseminated through the
operations sections of the various staffs.
Reconnaissance reports are submitted by each reconnaissance unit, and must indicate the following:
Addressee (surname of the Commander
only) , location of the reconnaissance unit,
and time of the message.
Information on the strength, location, and
activities of the enemy.
Information on the terrain.
Other pertinent information such as casualties and prisoners.
Future action of the patrol, number of the
message, and signature.
Observation reports are submitted by the commander of each observation post. They include the
number of the post; names of the observers; and
the time, date, azimuth, and range of each significant
item observed. Reports may be given as a summary,
as a plane or panoramic sketch, or as a combination
of the two (figs. 8 and 9) .
Intelligence summaries may be periodic or special.
They are authenticated by the Intelligence Officer
and by the Chief of Staff, and disseminated to the
higher, subordinate, and neighboring headquarters.
Intelligence summaries must include the following:
General nature of enemy activities.
Disposition of the enemy from right to left,
accompanied by sources and time of the
information.
Enemy air activity.
Information on the enemy rear areas as disclosed by air reconnaissance, prisoner-ofwar statements, and other reports.
Conclusions as to the significance of the
enemy's actions.
A list of items of information which should
be verified or clarified, and the means by
which this could be accomplished.
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Figure 8. Observation report.

V-17

I Nov 45

TM 30-430

Figure 9.
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Observation report combined with panoramic sketch.

1 Nov 45

Section III. BASIC TYPES OF
TACTICAL PLANS
In Soviet practice, the forms of maneuver and
organization of operations consistently follow Ii limited number of hasic patterns; the infantry offen~ive,
the tank and mechanized offensive, the meeting engagement, the pursuit, the centralized and decentralized defense, the mobile defense of mechanized
forces, the withdrawal, and the disengagement from
encirclement.
1. mE INFANTRY on'ENSIVE

The Soviet infantry offensive is made by infantry
supported by artillery, tanks, engineers, and aviation
as the situatiotI demands. It is generally in the
form of simultaneous attacks on a broad front with
concentrations of artillery and, particularly, tanks
in the break-through area. The attack seeks to
penetrate the enemy defenses in two or more sectors
and converge on a limited objective; its mission is to
encircle or envelop enemy groupings and destroy
them hy simultaneous attacks from all directions.
This scheme of maneuver is fundamental for the of·
fensive operations of units of every size from the
platoon to the army group_
A typical plan of attack (fig. 10) is formulated in
the following manner:

To destroy enemy forces which are
guarding tbe approaches to communication center X_
F orees availtlble: Nth Infantry- Di-I.ision.
Ellemy forces; Two infantry regiments and
two artillery regiments.
Plan of maneU'ller; lst Regiment to advance
to Ohjective A through breach made by the
neighhoring division. 2d Rf'giment, using the same breach, to advance to Objective B, leaving one battalioll to deal with
points of resistance C and D. lst Battalion, 3d Regiment to penetrate enemy
defenses and join 2d Reghneut at Objective
C. Provide flank security for 2d Regiment. 3d Battalion, 3d Regiment to penetrate enemy defenses and join 2d Regiment at Objective E, 2d Battalion, 3d
Regiment to penetrate enemy defenses and
join 1st Regiment at Objective A,
Mi.'sian;

SOVlet offensive theory stresses the importance of
combined or coordinated operations. Supporting
arms are usually uude-r the senior commander of
that ann until such time as the predetermined phase
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in the combat plan directs subordination of the supporting arms directly under the command of the
supported unit. Coordinated attacks are planned
and rehearsea with the utmost care, and great attention is given to the smallest details. Daring and
initiative on the part of small!"r unit commanders is
imperative.
In the offensive, a given situation may call for
certain types of specially trained troops, In cases
where columns of tanks make an assault of a fortif1€'d
position, spe<:ial detachments .of combat engineers,
thoroughly trained for their particular assignment,
may be used to facilitate the assault or may even be
assigned a combat mission such as seizing and securing bridges and water crossings.
Soviet tactical practice prescribes the use of liTI(~,
wedge, inverted wedge, or echeloned arrangement of
forces in the attack. Except for special operations,
such as assault ot a fortified position, columns will
1I0t be u:>cd.
Normally, in preparation for a penetration, attacking forces are placed well forward,
while mobile units used for the purpDse of exploitation of a penetration afe brought up from the rear,
To utilize maximum shOCK power, the Red Army
normally limits the uncommitted reserves to oneninth of the infantry combat strength_ On difficult
terrain this may be increased up to one-sixth.
Offensive operations are accomplished in five distinct phases:
a. Concentration of forces. This phase is
characterized by intensive r~onnaissance and observation, secret concentration and l'egroupment,
elaborate rehearsals, and deception. Detailed reconnaissance is conducted by units which are alreadv
in line, and is combined with command reconnai~
sauce by units designated for the break· through,
In the final stages of preparation, reconnaissance in
force is conducted in several sectors, At times, reconnaissance is staged to resemble a major offensive
ill order to deceive the enemy as to the real direction of attack and to throw him off balance.
ConccntratiDn and rf'.{7oupment of forces is ac·
complished with great secrecy. Elaborate precautions are taken to prepare in advance camouflaged
dispersal areas for troops, especially armor and artillery. Units are grouped according to the tactical
plan, and further suhdivided into teams, one team for
each ohjective. These teams stage day and night
rehearsals over ground which has been specially prepared to resemble that of the contemplated break4
flu-ough. Artillery fire is rigidly controlled and is
limjted to the minimum consistent with antiaircraft
V-19
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Figure 10. The coordinated attack-Soviet tactical concept.

and counter battery defense requirements. Fire is
conducted only by duty and roving batteries.
Meanwhile staffs, often augmented by special
teams from General Headquarters (Stavka Gl.avnogo
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Komanduishchego) , prepare field orders, artillery
fire plans, tables of combat coordination, and other
necessary papers. If the Commander judges that
the troops and staffs are not sufficiently well prepared
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for the operation, he prescribes a special trammg
schedule which may extend over the preparatory
period. Soviet preparation for an assault of prepared positions is deliberate, extending from several
days to 6 or 10 weeks depending on the caliber of
enemy resistance and the state of preparedness of the
assault troops.
h. Fire preparation. In the second phase, the
air forces seek to isolate the enemy by destroying his
communication lines. Artillery undertakes the destruction of located fire positions. Finally, every
available weapon, centralized under one command,
concentrates a brief but extremely violent barrage
immediately preceding the assault.
c. The assault. In the assault phase of the
break-through or penetration, artillery is allotted to
the various assault teams for direct support. Movement of units and fire of supporting arms are controlled on the initiative of local commanders. Artillery must observe the movement of supported units,
executing firing missions on the request of assault
team commanders or according to tables of combat
coordination.
In order to maintain continuous control, the overall commander must observe the movement of units,
especially in the decisive direction. Command liaison officers are delegated to supervise the execution
of the assault in secondary directions and to transmit
changes in combat plans which necessitate changes
in tables of combat coordination.
d. Securing the offensive. After the objective in the enemy's rear has been reached, the attacking units consolidate their positions, secure their
flanks against counterattacks, and prepare for the
exploitation of the penetration. For example, in an
attack made by tanks, combat engineers are used
for the special purpose of protecting the tanks from
counterattack by throwing out contact and controlled
mines at the moment the assault is stalled or otherwise stopped for consolidation or regrouping. After
regrouping or repelling a counterattack, the tanks
continue the attack, passing over the areas covered
by controlled mines. The mines are picked up and
the operation is repeated at the next forward limit
of the advance.
e. Exploitation. Mobile formations pas s
through the gap in parallel columns, pursuing the
enemy. Motorized light artillery, engineers, and
infantry from the assault units are attached to them
as needed and available. The remaining infantry
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units attack encircled enemy forces, continuing also
to provide flank security. Air and artillery units
reinforce the fire of self-propelled and mobile artillery on call from mobile formations striking in the
enemy rear. On call from the infantry, they destroy
encircled enemy remnants. Calculated risks are
taken to secure bridgeheads and commanding terrain and to prevent the enemy from organizing a
defense on intermediate positions.
2. THE TANK OFFENSIVE

A frontal attack by tank forces, normally a tank
corps, differs from the coordinated assault of infantry with supporting arms. Tanks attack in deeply
echeloned formation on a narrow sector, using their
fire and shock power to achieve penetration. Resistance is by-passed in order to avoid full deployment and protracted local combat. Infantry and
artillery mop up enemy strong points and provide
flank security for the tank unit against enemy counterattack. The tank forces are assigned specific
terrain objectives in the enemy rear rather than
mission-type orders.
The tank forces themselves cannot hold territory,
but must rely upon the following infantry and, sometimes, cavalry. Tank units destroy enemy rear installations and supply lines, and attempt to encircle and
destroy the enemy by coordinating their penetration
with adjacent units in a wide turning maneuver or
by a double envelopment by two converging tank
penetrations (fig. II).
3. MEETING ENGAGEMENT

In general, Soviet and U. S. doctrines as to meeting
engagements are virtually identical (fig. 12). Specifically, however, certain differences may be noted.
According to Soviet doctrine, speed of maneuver,
seizure of favorable terrain, and quick deployment
of main forces and artillery upon contact are essential. Aggressive reconnaissance, ground and air, is
continual throughout the operation. Usually, a
strong advance guard is utilized. An attack upon
the flank is sought. The fullest use of artillery at
the earliest possible moment is made. The advance
guard uses its organic artillery support to stall the
forward movement of the enemy in order to enable
the artillery of the main forces to be brought to bear
on enemy firing positions. In one case in an operation northwest of Orel, artillery was brought into
direct fire action from the march.
Soviet doctrine states that the speed of deployment
by artillery units decides the outcome of the battle.
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Figure 11. Bobruisk encirclement by large tank unit.
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Figure 12.
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Meeting engagement, showing scheme of deployment of the point, advance party, and main body when
contact with enemy occurs.

4. PURSUIT
The Red Army, as a general rule, pursues the enemy
in a double parallel column, usually by mechanized
units closely followed by infantry. Great care must
be taken by the Commander in organizing for the
pursuit; his planning should be detailed, but speed
in this is essential.
A typical pursuit plan (fig. 13) includes the following elements:

Mission: To destroy retreating groups and
advancing reinforcements of the enemy,
and to leave small groups to block avenues of escape of by-passed enemy garrisons.
Forces available: Two tank brigades and
one motorized brigade with supporting
units.

Enemy forces: Advancing reinforcements,
retreating groups, and by-passed garrisons.
Plan of maneuver: Group to advance in two
parallel columns, a tank and a motorized
brigade on the right, and a tank brigade on
the left. Right column to exploit the
break-through along the road T-R, to envelop S from south and southwest, to block
advance of reinforcements from the north.
Left column to exploit the break-through
along the road I-L-S, to assist in the capture of S. The group to continue the advance to O.
The Soviets seek decisive combat with the main
retreating forces, avoiding direct contact with enemy
rear guards or other special units charged with the
mission of slowing down the pursuit. When strong-
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Figure 13. Pursuit.
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points are found to be impeding forward progress
of the pur~uing forces, these points are by-passed
and detachments of assault troops are assigned to
surround and to destroy them.
Extensive use is made of engineers to facilitate the
forward movement of the pursuing forces. Engineers clear enemy mines and other obstacles from
the avenues of approach and mobilize the local popu-
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lery, and antiaircraft-so as to be able to withstand.
absorb, or shatter mass attacks by enemy infantry
supported by tanks, artillery, and aviation.
The use of reserves in the Soviet defense varies,
depending on the type of defense, terrain, and objective. Usually the Soviets concentrate the overwhelming bulk of a unit's strength on the main line
of resistance. The reserve is limited to appro xi-

Figure 14. Centralized defense for destroying the attacking enemy, using massed artillery and counterattacks.

lation for constructing and rebuilding rpads and
bridges.
5. DEFENSE

The strength of Red Army defensive tactics lies in
the determination of the troops, coordination of all
types of fire with all systems of antitank and antipersonnel fortifications and obstacles, skillful organization of the ground, and decisive counterattacks.
The defense should be deep-antitank, antiartil-

mately one-ninth of the total combat strength. In
certain situations, however, when decisive results can
be gained, an extremely large mobile reserve is
maintained. A tank corps, for instance, may act as
a reserve for an infantry division. Such a tank unit
is kept concealed well in the rear, with careful preparation made to facilitate its rapid commitment on
the flank of the attacking force.
Depending on the situation, the Commander's obj ective, and available forces, the defense may be
either centralized or decentralized.
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a. Centralized defense. The centralized type
of defense seeks, by employing obstacles or by
maneuver, to channelize the enemy attack in a given
direction in order to gain a more favorable position
for a decisive counterattack with heavily armored
units and concentrations of massed artillery (fig.
14). Dummy positions and false fortifications are
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takes position for close all· around protection. Favorable terrain is sought for the development and
fortification of strongpoints and islands of resistance. Each unit uses its assigned artillery and other
organic weapons for its own protection. In decentralized defense, strongpoints and islands of resistance frequently will be surrounded or cut off from

Figure 15. Decentralized defense for denying terrain to superior enemy forces by strongpoints with close·in, all·
around defense.

used extensively. A favorite Soviet maneuver is to
allow the enemy to penetrate deeply into the lines
and trap him in a fire sack. The counterattack takes
the form of a large-scale ambush on the deep flank,
the counterattacking units being supported by
massed, registered artillery. The counterattack is
under the direct control of the over-all troop commander. The mission of this type of defense is
destruction of the enemy.
h. Decentralized defense. The objectives of
decentralized defense are to deny the enemy use of
terrain, to divide his attacking forces, and to destroy
him by numerous local counterattacks on the initiative of the local ground commander (fig. 15). In
this type of defense each unit down to the smallest
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other friendly troops. Only on specific orders from
the senior troop commander is the position abandoned. This particular type of defense is especially
effective against tanks and mechanized units.
c. Defense hy cavalry and mechanized
forces. Mobile forces may assume either decentralized or centralized defensive positions. But, in
order to retain the advantages of their mobility, they
usually adopt more elastic tactics, particularly in
terrain affording good concealment.
Avenues of approach are covered frontally by
artillery and infantry (dismounted cavalry) road
blocks. Other small groups, usually including selfpropelled tank destroyers, prepare flanking positions
to ambush enemy mechanized units. Finally, a pow-
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erful mobile reserve is held out with the mission of
counterattacking the deep flank or rear of the forces
stopped by the road block.
In general, this type of defense seeks to trap and
destroy advancing enemy columns successively. In
the face of a coordinated attack which threatens to
destroy the road block and expose the rear of the
mobile reserve, a withdrawal is executed to the next
favorable position.
6. WITHDRAWALS

Retrograde movements are not heavily stressed in
Red Army tactics; regulations state that a disengagement will be undertaken only on direct order from
higher authority. The techniques of retrograde
movement employed in day and night operations are
virtually identical with those of the U. S. Army.
7. DISENGAGEMENT FROM ENCIRCLEMENT

In 1941 and 1942, the Red Army suffered heavy
casualties due to encirclements of large units by German forces. As a result, specific procedures in disengagement from encirclement were incorporated in
Red Army tactics.
When any unit is in danger of encirclement, the
Commander designates troops to secure the flanks
and rear, and then counterattacks in order to stall
the enemy. Additional tactical measures to be taken
include holding fa:vorable terrain along the enemy
approach routes, designating strong detachments
with antitank weapons to threaten enemy flanks, coordinating his efforts with adjacent friendly units,
closely supervising the expenditure of ammunition
and other supplies, and locating and holding terrain
favorable for supply by air.
When encircled, the Commander insures allaround defense, making especially sure that his
forces are not under direct artillery fire. He is
careful to conserve his strength, and makes sure that
the hostile force does not destroy him by dividing
his forces. He places the artillery at the most strategic positions, guarding approaches, vulnerable
areas, and sectors of probable attacks. He insures
signal communication with higher headquarters.
The Soviets emphasize that even though a unit is
encircled, the Commander is required to accomplish
his mission. The disengagement from encirclement
is undertaken only on specific orders from higher
authority.
Disengagement from encirclement aims at the
penetration of a given sector of the enemy circle
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and the retirement of the unit under great pressure
from a numerically superior hostile force. Periods
of impaired visibility-night, fog, rain, snowstorms-are the most favorable periods for this
maneuver. Prior to undertaking the operation, the
Commander should determine the general situation
and disposition of neighboring friendly units and
partisan detachments. By aggressive use of reconnaissance he determines enemy strength and groupings. He insures great secrecy in making preparations for the disengagement. Planning must be
detailed and thorough, since disengagement from
encirclement is considered the most difficult of operations. The more direct the maneuver, the fewer
are the casualties.
The general rules for an assault are followed in a
daytime attempt to break out of encirclement. Artillery fire in preparation for the assault is exceptionally heavy. At night, however, the technique
differs. The advance to the line of departure is
made under the strictest secrecy. A large portion
of the artillery moves in the infantry column; the
chief offensive weapons are the bayonet and hand
grenades. Rifle fire is used only when resistance is
encountered.
Having made the penetration, the general rules
covering retirement prevail. Counterattacks by
rear-guard units, security against parallel pursuit,
and, if possible, tank attacks at the enemy rear, are
prescribed.
The Soviets recognize that disengagements from
encirclement are unsuccessful in many cases. When
all hope of success has been abandoned, an order may
be issued by competent authority to infiltrate through
the enemy lines by small units, taking care that no
materiel falls into enemy hands. Surrenders en
masse or by individuals, except when wounded, are
expressly forbidden. Infiltration parties are instructed to join or form partisan detachments in the
enemy rear.

Section IV. TACTICAL STAFF
DOCUMENTS
1. GENERAL

Translation of broad command decisions into specific, coordinated troop actions requires the preparation of a large series of staff documents. In Red
Army practice, such paper work is concentrated primarily in the army; it is also especially necessary
for the efficient performance of the technical arms
and services, such as artillery (fig. 16). In con-
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trast, documentation in infantry and cavalry units
is held to a minimum. Those arms never issue formal written orders below divisional level, but make
maximum use of oral orders, overlays, and fragmentary orders.
Tactical field documents are divided into two
classes: those disseminated for action or information, and those prepared for the use of the issuing
headquarters only. The first class includes field
orders, fragmentary and warning orders, administrative orders, summaries (intelligence, rear services,
signal, operational I , instructions, replies, and inquiries.
The second class includes orders and summaries
of higher headquarters; general, special, and preliminary orders and directives pertaining to the
work of the headquarters itself; copies of field orders and summaries of subordinate headquarters;
and journals with attached documents and copies of
conversations. A journal of field operations is kept
separately.
2. FIELD ORDERS

U. S. Army and Soviet field orders are basically
similar. The Soviet field order consists of the following:
Disposition and activities of enemy forces.
Missions of own unit and of adjoining units,
and boundaries.
Command decision.
Special missions of principal subordinate
units.
Missions and attachments of arms, services,
and special units which are controlled by
the Commander.
Location of the service area.
Location and order of displacement of the
command post, axis of signal communication.
Time sequence of reports in relation to each
phase of combat.
The field order is authenticated by the Chief of Staff
and may be countersigned by the Commander.
Tables of combat coordination constitute the basic
annexes to the Soviet field order. They contain
time and space schedules for active cooperation between each arm during the various phases of combat
operations; critical reference points for assembly
areas and control of fire; schedules for forward displacement of artillery units; and coordination of
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signal communications between the arms. For example, an offensive of an infantry division may be
supported by additional artillery and tanks. The
tables of combat coordination for such an operation
would show which artillery and tank units would
operate under centralized control and which would
be attached to an infantry unit for direct support
during the first and subsequent phases. The tables
would indicate whether the phase lines are determined by time schedule or by terrain features, and
would designate the signals to be used for the start
of each phase.
The plan of coordination between artillery and
aviation, one of the most important tables of combat
coordination, anticipates immediate infantry requirements and includes the organization of a unified system of fire preparation, support, and security of infantry maneuver. The artillery-aviation plan is developed according to time, space, and targets by the
staffs of artillery and aviation. It is signed by the
Chief of Staff, Chief of Artillery, and Chief of the
Air Arm, and is confirmed by the commanders of the
cooperating units (fig. 17).
3. SPECIALIZED PLANS AND ORDERS

The staff of the chief of each arm prepares specific
plans and field orders which are forwarded to the
lower echelon of that arm, after approval by the
Commander of Combined Arms.
The artillery order is based on the artillery fire
plan developed under the direction of the highest
artillery commander engaged in the offensive operation (army or army group). Consisting of a bI ief
text and annexed operational documents, it includes:
Information of the enemy.
Missions and boundaries of neighboring
units.
Mission of the supported unit (infantry,
tanks, etc.) and of cooperating units (air,
engineers, etc.).
Combat groupments of artillery, instrumental reconnaissance, and attached aviation
( including missions, position areas and
observation sectors, and primary and
emergency sectors of fire) .
Time of readiness for opening fire.
Duration of registration.
Ammunition allowances.
Location of command post and axis of signal
communications.
Location of supply points.
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The engineer plan includes missions assigned to
each unit during progressive combat phases; assignment of engineer personnel and allocation of materiel; time schedules; division of responsibilities;
and individual missions executed by order of the
chief engineer (army or army group).
4. FRAGMENTARY AND ORAL ORDERS

Fragmentary orders are used when speed in delivery and execution is imperative. These orders are
issued successively as the situation develops. They
consist of separate instructions to one or more subordinate units prescribing the task each is to accomplish in the operation or in the separate phases of
the operation.
5. REPORTS AND SUMMARIES
Reports are classified as periodic reports and field
reports. The schedule of reports, prepared by the
Chief Sigpal Officer in cooperation with the Chief
of Operations, is approved by the Chief of Staff.
Field reports are promptly submitted on the initiative of the subordinate commanders or of headquarters. Signed by the Commander and the Chief
of Staff, they include:

All operations taking place on the ground and
in the air.
Location and condition of the troops.
Intensity and outcome of the engagement.
New information about the enemy.
Enemy strength, technical equipment, and
activities.
Decisions of the Commander with reference to
the situation.
Summaries are submitted at fixed times and give
an account of events which have occurred since the
last summary was sent out. Summaries are classified as operations, intelligence, rear area, and signal
summaries. The operations summary is prepared
by the Operations Staff and is signed by the Chief of
the Operations Section and by the Chief of Staff. It
contains the following information:
Ground and air operations and changes that
have occurred in the situation since the
last summary was forwarded.
Nature of combat operations carried out by
subordinate units.
Condition of units, losses, and their present
combat efficiency.
Captured materiel.
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General nature of the situation and enemy
action.
Activities of Soviet air force.
Soviet front line.
Adj acent units and supporting troops.
Communications, weather, visibility, and condition of roads.
Location of command posts.
The intelligence summary is prepared by the Intelligence Section and is signed by the Chief of Staff
and the Chief of the Intelligence Section.
Rear service summaries must give a clear account
of the condition of the rear services. Signed by the
Chief of Staff and the Chief of the Rear Services Section, they contain the following information:
Location of supply stations.
Transportation and evacuation roads (if
changes have taken place).
Status of transportation.
Equipment shortages.
Status of evacuation (men and animals).
Amount of ammunition and fuel on hand.
Food and fodder in daily rations, reserve supply on hand or in transit.
Local resources and how they can be used.
Medical and veterinary situation in rear districts.
General conclusions.
Signal summaries are prepared by the Signal
Section and are signed by the Chief of Staff and the
Chief Signal Officers. They provide the following
information:
Equipment available.
Types and requirements for signal communications between the command post,
subordinate units, and the staff (commanders) •
Requirements for signal communications between chiefs of arms and the commanders
of directly subordinated units.
Requirements for signal communications for
coordination between subordinated units
and the various a::-ms and between the second echelon of the staff, the command post,
and rear units.
Organization of the air warning system, with
indications of the location of posts and
the method of communication between
them.
Signal equipment reserve and its location.
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Copies of summaries and reports are forwarded
for the information of subordinate and adjoining
units. In urgent cases, special conversations may
be conducted over the telephone personally, or
through liaison officers.
6. CODING SERVICE AND HANDLING OF DOCU·
MENTS

Responsibility for organization of the coding service in the field is assumed by the Commander and
the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff organizes the
coding service in the field through the Chief of the
Operations Section. The latter selects the Commander's code keys, the conversation chart, map
coding orientation points, and time of change. He
controls the functioning of the coding service at his
and subordinate headquarters.
Conversations concerning operations cannot be
sent in the clear. Field orders and reports on decisions, from division and higher, may be transmitted by radio, in code, only if no other means of
communication is possible. Violations may be
made the basis of a court martial for disclosing military secrets. Clear text by radio is permitted in artillery to direct fire; in aviation, to transmit field
orders in flight or, in case of forced landings~ to report damage, when time does not permit use of code;
and in the tank corps, to transmit field orders during combat. In all clear text messages, unit numbers are referred to --by previously established code
names.
Before opening a radio conversation, an officer
must have at hand a coded situation map, a code
conversation chart, radio-signal chart, pad of entry
forms, pencil, compass, and watch. Conversation
opens with the calling party stating his code name.
Field documents are divided into groups, based on
urgency, as follows:
Group "G." Documents requiring immediate
dispatch, urgent or operational priority. Field orders are always included in Group "G." The Commander and the Chief of Staff are the only persons
who may classify documents as Group "G."
Group "K." Documents which are to be opened
and read by the addressee only. Such documents
are received and dispatched personally by the Commander and the Chief of Staff and are forwarded
",.-ith the same priority as those in Group "G."
Group "B." All operational field documents, orders, and reports pertaining to combat organization
and security. On these documents~ group designation, time of delivery, and addressee are indicated.
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Group "B" classification may be designated by an
chiefs of sections at headquarters and the chiefs of
arms and services.
All other documents bear no group designation
and are forwarded by air and field mail.

Section V. COORDINATION AND
CONTROL OF COMBAT
1. GENERAL

The Operations Section of the staff is responsible for
the uninterrupted coordination of arms during combat, and for the organization of signal communications and liaison to insure this. Upon receipt of the
mission, coordination of all arms is obtained by
tables of combat coordination which are developed
by the Operations Section together with the chiefs
of arms. The main tactical controls-forward positions, artillery positions, line of departure, and barrage phase lines-are determined. The exact time
schedule, missions, and areas of operation for each
arm (artillery, tanks, aircraft, and chemical warfare)
are established in accordance with the decision of
the Commander.
Execution of coordination and adjustments in the
tables of combat coordination are made possible by
the direct control of the Commander, and by continuous intercommunication with subordinate units
and between arms. The most important channels
of intercommunication are through signal communications and liaison officers.
2. SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS

The Chief Signal Officer is the immediate director of
the Signal Service. He is fully responsible not only
for the efficient and timely organization of signal
communications and their uninterrupted operation,
but also for the prompt transmission and delivery of
all orders. Collaborating with the Chief of the Operations Section, on the basis of instructions received
from the Chief of Staff and reconnaissance data, the
Chief Signal Officer prepares a signal plan specifying
the organization of communications throughout the
projected operation. This plan is submitted to the
Chief of Staff and issued with the field order.

a. Planning principles. Red Army signal
communications systems are laid out in conformity
with certain fixed principles. Rigid centralization
and strict signal discipline are required to integrate
the circuits of the various arms and subordinate
units, eliminate unnecessary traffic, and maintain
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signal security. Concentration of signal equipment
to facilitate execution of the main effort is achieved
by ruthless economy in secondary sectors; service
and administrative nets, except for ammunition supply, are virtually nonexistent. At the same time,
duplicate facilities and signal. reserves are always
built up in critical areas. For instance, the passing
of barrage phase lines by infantry is verified by
radio voice, radio telegraph, and rocket as well as
by observation from a dense network of infantry
and artillery observation posts (fig. 18). To provide absolutely reliable communications with the
artillery in support of the main effort, the normal
artillery nets are split, with separate forward
switchboards, double wire communications, and
radio circuits being provided. The rest of the artillery uses the basic nets.
Similarly, 1.5 to 2 reserve battery sets must be
maintained for each division or corps radio station,
with 2.5 to 3 sets for each mobile detachment or
flank unit. Two or three alternate channels must
be provided for each major radio circuit. Reserve
equipment for wire communications is similarly
maintained.
Communications are established down and to the
left, and supporting units are responsible for communications with the supported units. Liaison officers provide their own communications.
Another important factor is the timely organization of communication centers in the progressive
displacement of the command and other staff posts.
This is achieved by the echeloned forward movement of radio equipment according to a plan designating the order of setting up and closing down the
specific radio stations; by the echeloned forward
movement of wire circuits in coordination with the
main phase lines; and by notifying all subordinate
staffs as to the new main axis of communication and
the location of forward message centers and secondary communication centers.
The full utilization of captured signal equipment
(especially wire for duplicating lines) has become
part of Soviet signal doctrine, and special reconnaissance groups are sent out on the personal initiative of the chief signal officers of regiments and
higher units to collect usable equipment left by the
enemy.
h. Signal nets. The signal doctrine of the Red
Army stresses reliable and often duplicated communications, which are deemed necessary for operational control and coordination of combat units
at the expense of administr_ative circuits. This is
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well illustrated by the types of signal nets which are
habitually established in all formations of combined
arms (fig. 19).
Two types of command nets are established. One
command net connects the command observation
post of the Commander of Combined Arms with the
command post, the command observation posts of
all immediately subordinate units, and those of the
chiefs of arms. The second command net connects
the command observation post of the chief of a particular arm with the chiefs of that arm in subordinate units. Both wire and radio are used. When
radio is used, a set is assigned to each commander
within the net and follows him wherever he may go.
The establishment of the combined command net is
often facilitated by the proximity of the principal
command observation posts in units larger than the
regiment. The command posts of regiments and
higher units are often equipped with public address
systems connected with the command net. This arrangement insures the dissemination of key decisions
to all staff divisions, expedites transmissions of orders, saves time, and eliminates several circuits
within the command post.
The staff net connects the command post of a formation with the command posts of immediately subordinate units. Staff nets are used for all routine
staff operations. Wire, duplicated by radio, is used.
The cooperation net is established to insure synchronized action of all participating arms. Both
wire and radio communications, supplemented by
visual signals and liaison officers, are established
through the forward message center to the command
posts of the units participating in a given operation
or in a phase of this operation.
The artillery fire control net is distinguished from
the artillery command net in that, in addition to the
command posts of each organic and attached artillery unit, it includes the command post of each
supported unit, artillery forward and paired observation posts, and firing positions. Provisional mortar battalions (formed by grouping regimental mortar batteries) are included in the artillery fire control
net. Wire communications are duplicated by radio,
liaison officers, and messengers.
The reconnaissance net provides direct communication between each reconnaissance element and the
command posts of the responsible headquarters.
Dissemination of the results of reconnaissance is accomplished through the staff net. While radio is
normally used, wire is often laid to forward information-collecting centers which are set up when recon-
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LINE STARTS ON TIME SCHEDULE
LEGEND
SIGNALS FOR LIFTING FIRE:
I - I ST PHASE "EAGLE" YELLOW ROCKETS,
RADIO III

2-20 PHASE "LION" GREEN ROCKETS.
RADIO 333
3-30 PHASE "TIGER" RED ROCKETS.
RADIO 555

~

t INTERDICTION FIRE BY CORPS

o
c::::J

ARTILLERY
VOLLEY FROM ROCKETS
SPECIFIC TARGETS

4-4TH PHASE "BAT" WHITE ROCKETS,
RADIO 666
Figure 18.
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Plan oj coordination of artiller'F support of an infantry attack in depth.
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naissance elements operate for long periods at a
considerable distance from their headquarters.
In large formations a distinct antiaircraft and
antitank warning net is established. In smaller ones
the air and tank raid warning net is superimposed
on one of the other nets, with the highest priority
being given to "flash" messages.
In armies and other formations which have organic air support, an air liaison net is set up. Wire,
duplicated by radio, connects the headquarters of the

TK CORPS

ARMY STAFF

ARMY STAFF NET
FOR MAIN EFFORT
(CORPS COOPERATION
NET, MAIN EFFORT)

formation of combined arms with the headquarters
of the supporting air unit.
c. Signal elements. The communications system is organized according to the following elements:
Signal centers.
Primary and secondary axes of signal communications.
Intermediate stations.
Message centers.
Multiple-station and two-station radio nets.
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CG 3 DIV CO AT
REGT

1ST R DIV 20 R DIV 3D R DIV

C. INTELLIGENCE OFFICER

AT REGT

E. HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT

D. CHIEF OF ARTILLERY
Figure 20. Rifle corps radio net (simplified).
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The signal center is the point of concentration and
intersection of primary and secondary axes of signal
communications. The main centers are established
at the command posts and provide staff and cooperation channels in all directions (fig. 20). Reserve
signal centers are set up in the areas of reserve command posts, and maintain communication in the
event of displacement of headquarters from the main
to a reserve command post. Auxiliary centers are
points where communication can be made with flanking communication lines. Artillery signal centers
are also habitually established.

to enable the command to communicate with subordinate command posts, with the rear, with cooperating arms, with neighboring units, and with headquarters of reinforcing units.
Intermediate stations are established along primary and secondary axes of communication. The
chief function of these stations is to maintain communications with separate units. Subordinate unit
headquarters either utilize intermediate stations or
connect these stations with their communication axes
(fig. 21).
Message centers circulate necessary field docu-

PRINCIPAL LINES - - - - - - -

A

AUXILlA'RY LINES

FROM ADJACENT UNIT

Figure 21.

--l~--II---

Rifle division wire net (simplified).

The primary axis of communications is the base
for all other communication lines to subordinate and
cooperating headquarters. Normally it consists of
an all-wire circuit from the main switchboard at the
command post to a forward switchboard near the
command observation post; for emergencies, one or
more switch lines provide alternate circuits. Primary axes provide a foundation for the entire Red
Army communications system, especially during the
displacement of command posts in the course of
combat.
Secondary axes of communication are developed

ments among subordinate headquarters, and collect
and deliver reports emanating from them.
A multiple radio net comprises a group of radio
stations operating in accordance with general instructions concerning their employment. A two-station net constitutes two radio stations maintaining
communications on a fixed wave length. This twostation net is used most frequently for command,
reconnaissance, and lateral liaison circuits.
d. Equipment. In infantry units, wire is the
primary means of signal communications in all
except mobile situations. All-wire circuits are used
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for major circuits. Telegraph is used extensively for
routine signal traffic at divisional and higher level,
and teletype is used by armies and army groups.
Except in extremely mobile situations, wire communications only are maintained with the rear services
and installations.
While the organic wire facilities of the Soviet rifle
division are only slightly greater than those of a
U. S. infantry division, they are heavily reinforced
for operations. In an offensive situation, 150 command and observation posts were set up in one rifle
division sector by the division and supporting artillery. Approximately 30 switchboards were used to
connect some 700 circuits joining the various command observation posts.
During the preparatory phase of an offensive,
wire communications are established with the tank
and mobile infantry units at their advance command
posts (near the line of departure). Mobile observation posts maintain wire communications with the
supporting artillery and mortar units.
The organic allotment of radios in a Soviet rifle
division is a little over 10 percent of that of the U. S.
infantry division; radio is used as an auxiliary to
wire, principally in command and artillery fire control nets. In Soviet tank and mechanized units,
however, the allotment of radios is about 30 percent
of that of similar U. S. units. In special situations
large quantities of additional radio equipment are
furnished from higher echelon signal reserves. For
example, 27,174 radios were used in the Belorussian
operation in June-July 1944.
Centralized control of radio frequencies and
grouping of available radios into radio nets insure
efficient use of allotted equipment. Strict regulation
of frequencies and economy of messages simplify
technical employment of radios and also aid in maintaining signal security. The use of sky-waves even
for short distances (up to 180 miles) reduces the
number and types of radio sets necessary to maintain
adequate communications. Radio centers at army
and higher levels and allocation of prior.ities to messages reduce the number of necessary sending sets.
Auxiliary methods of signal communications are
visual signals (rockets, blinkers), public address
systems, liaison planes, and messengers.
e. Responsibilities of Commander, Staff,
and Chiefs of Arms. During combat, the Commander must be at the command observation post,
from which he can observe and control the main
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effort. In order to assign missions during the course
of combat and to direct coordination between arms
efficiently, he must have at all times complete knowl·
edge of the capabilities of each arm and of the equip.
ment and supplies available to both his own and
enemy forces.
Normally, some members of the staff, the chiefs
of the arms, and the Chief Signal Officer are with
him. The staff at the command post maintains con·
trol over secondary operational areas and rear services. Liaison with neighboring and higher com.
mands is continuous.
The tactical plan is prescribed in the field orders
and annexed tables of combat coordination, issued
by the Commander. Supplementing these are the
orders and plans of the various arms (artillery, in·
fan try, engineers, tanks, etc.) , the primary responsi·
bility for which rests with the chief of each arm.
It is the duty of the Commander, either by means
of personal reconnaissance or through his staff, to
check on the execution of these combat plans. During the course of operations, maneuvers may deviate
from the preestablished tactical plans. Wide latitude is permitted subordinate commanders (of arms
and lower units) to use their full initiative in attaining assigned mISSIOns. Over-all responsibility,
however, remains with the Commander, who observes the progress of maneuvers, orders support.
and commits reserves.
The appropriate staff sections conduct incessant
observation and reconnaissance from ground and
air, constantly collect and correlate incoming reconnaissance and observation reports from subordinate
units, submit reports to the commander concerning
front· line developments, suggest appropriate steps to
be taken, and organize the coordination demanded
by the development of new situations according to
the commander's decisions.
When the Commander or Chief of Staff cannot
personally control combat phases, command liaison
officers (often the commanders of arms or services)
are sent as his deputies to subordinate units.
If, on the basis of his personal observation, the
Commander decides that alteration in the prescribed
phase-lines with reference to time or space are necessary, he issues fragmentary orders amending the
original orders. Fragmentary orders may also kle
issued on the basis of reports submitted by the chiefs
of the various arms and by the numerous observers
along the front.
Throughout the combat phases, the plans of the
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arms are continuously coordinated and adjusted between the staffs of each arm, and also with the staff
of the Commander. This cooperation insures the
fulfillment of the prescribed time and space schedule, the maximum exploitation of tactical capabilities, and the maintenance of a joint system of combat

security and camouflage discipline. Lateral adjustments may be made among the chiefs of the various
arms (and lower units) as to the methods of attaining the phase-lines. The Commander is advised by
signal (wire, radio, or rocket) as each phase-line
is attained.

PART II. TACTICS OF GROUND ARMS
Section I. INFANTRY
1. GENERAL
Soviet infantry units are characterized by great
strength in automatic weapons and mortars. Their
tactical mobility is low if they are equipped only
with organic transport. Their moving weight is
low, compared to similar U. S. units, and as a result their maneuverability is good. The rifle regiments (less their supply trains), rifle battalions,
and rifle companies have horse transport only and
can move across country even in difficult terrain.
The supply capacity of Soviet rifle units is adequate
even for heavy combat, but their maintenance facilities are inadequate and must be supplemented
by army resources.

2. BASIC DOCTRINE

Soviet tactical employment of infantry is predicated on rapidity of maneuver of small groups,
concentration of fire of automatic weapons, and
shock action. In fluid situations, rapid deployment and immediate engagement with the enemy
are the rule. In more stable situations, engagement with the enemy is generally preceded by thorough reconnaissance and planning, and detailed rehearsal of the contemplated maneuver, including
even the tactics of the individual soldier. The objectives of infantry attack are to break the cohesive
defense of the enemy, to divide him into small isolated groups, and then to destroy him. The plan
of maneuver usually calls for an advance to the
flanks of the enemy, culminating in a single or
double envelopment. This plan may be varied to
conform to the situation or to achieve surprise.
Soviet infantry units are deployed for combat
similarly to the U. S. practice; that is, in line,
wedge, inverted wedge, column, and echeloned to
right or left (fig. 22). The size of the reserve is
rigidly controlled. For example, if a regiment on
the defensive occupies an interior position, the reserve consists of one rifle company, some antitank

rifles, and the regimental antitank and howitzer
batteries. In a similar situation, the battalion reserve will consist of one rifle platoon, one antitank
rifle platoon, the battalion antitank guns, and several heavy machine guns.
A regiment generally attacks on a front 1,500
yards wide; an interior battalion on a front up to
700 yards; a company up to 350 yards; and a platoon up to 100 yards. On the defensive, a battalion
occupies an area up to 2,000 yards wide and 1,500
to 2,000 yards deep; and a company occupies an
area up to 700 yards wide and 700 yards deep.
To insure the success of its missions, the Red
Army infantry regiment has at its disposal several
specialized units: the reconnaissance company, the
submachine gun company, the antitank rifle company, the heavy mortar battery, the antitank gun
battery, and the regimental howitzer battery. The
reconnaissance company executes normal reconnaissance and screening tasks. The submachine
gun company is used for rapid flanking moves, infiltration, security of accompanying tanks, and as a
mobile reserve. The antitank rifle company provides antitank security in all phases of combat.
The antitank gun battery, together with battalion
antitank guns, is used to repel tank attacks in especially vulnerable sectors. Regimental and battalion antitank guns, together with the regimental
artillery, are used extensively for direct fire in support of river-crossing operations and assault of
fortified positions. The heavy mortar battery is
used under centralized control during artillery preparation on the offensive and for laying down barrages on the defensive. It is under control of supported units in the assault phase of the offense and
III decentralized defense.
3. APPROACH MARCH
A Red Army infantry regiment, acting as an advance
guard of a division, has the missions of overcoming
the resistance of enemy outposts, occupying terrain
favorable for deployment of the division, and orga-
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nizing preliminary reconnaissance. To accomplish
these missions, the regiment advances in the following order: advance guard preceded by reconnaissance elements, the main body, the flank guards, and
the rear guard. The advance guard consists of an
infantry battalion reinforced by artillery and engi-

Figure 22. Plan

0/

attack, rifle battalion echeloned to the left.

neers. The main body follows 1.2 to 1.8 miles behind the adv-ance guard. It consists of several sections, each comprising a balanced fighting group of
approximately battalion size. The main body is
flanked by security groups consisting of rifle platoons
reinforced with heavy machine guns and antitank
rifles. The rear guard, likewise, consists of a reinforced rifle platoon. If the regiment advances along
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an exposed flank, the flank guard on the exposed side
is increased to approximately a battalion (fig. 23).
Artillery elements which form parts of the main body
must always be ready to support the advance guard.
During long halts, artillery habitually deploys for
action, while antitank units reconnoiter and deploy

in sectors considered especially vulnerable to attack
by tanks.
If the advance guard encounters only disorganized
resistance, it overpowers enemy rear guards while
the main body continues advancing. If the advance
guard encounters organized resistance at a well for·
tified position, the regiment deploys for action and
endeavors to overpower the opposit:Jon by speed of
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maneuver and shock action. If the enemy is fully
prepared to defend organized positions, the regiment
secures advantageous ground for the deployment of
the division and for organized intensive reconnaissance. During the advance the Commander retains
his command post in the advance guard.

Figure 24.

Example

slOn is determined by the over-all objective of the
division. It generally consists of overcoming all
enemy resistance in the assault sector including enemy artillery positions. Both the initial and the
successive missions are designated in terms of space
and time. The assault is conducted in three distinct

0/ in/an try offensive, rifle battalion in double envelopment. Example 0/ wedge and inverted
wedge.

4. THE OFFENSIVE

In the offensive, infantry generally has two successive missions: First, it must break into the forward
defense lines of the enemy in a particular sector and
destroy or neutralize the system of infantry and antitank weapons. This mission is accomplished by the
initial infantry assault groups. The subsequent mis-
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phases: the preparation, the execution of the initial
mission of the infantry groups, and the penetration
of the enemy defenses in depth in the execution of
the subsequent missions (fig. 24).
a. Preparation for the attack. The preparation phase includes command and staff reconnaissance; the command decision; formulation of the

1 Nov 45
operations, intelligence, signal, and rear area plans;
and formulation of the tables of combat coordination. Upon receipt of their missions, subordinate
commanders formulate their plans of maneuver and
designate assault groups for the execution of specific
tasks. A typical assault group consists of three to
five engineers, a rifle platoon, and several antitank
rifles.
Some battalion mortars and battalion guns are
assigned to the various assault groups according to
the general and partial fire plans. Heavy machine
guns are either allotted to the assault groups, or
retained under centralized control.
According to the demands of the situation, regimental and, less frequently, divisional specialized
arms are distributed among the assault groups. If
time permits, the assault groups rehearse the plan
of maneuver both individually and as a whole. These
rehearsals are generally conducted in daylight and
at night over terrain similar to that of the contemplated operation and far enough removed from the
enemy to escape his observation and interference.
Before important operations it is not uncommon for
Soviet troops to spend considerable time drilling in
standard and specialized use of their weapons.
h. Conduct of the assault. During the assault, regimental and battalion commanders remain
at their command observation posts. Only in exceptional circumstances may they leave their command
posts to lead subordinate units in combat. It is
considered imperative that the final artillery barrage
be laid so that there is a minimum of time between
it and the moment that the infantry reaches the forward defense lines of the enemy. Regimental and
battalion antitank guns and mortars will continue to
fire on their targets until the last possible moment.
The infantry must be placed so as to reach the enemy
forward lines from 1 to 2 minutes after the artillery
barrage is lifted. Red Army regulations state that
infantry can follow within 200 yards and 100 yards,
respectively, of forward and flanking barrages of
artillery firing at ranges of 2,000 to 3,000 yards.
Infantry can follow within 150 to 200 yards behind
the bursts of 82-mm mortars, and within 200 to 250
yards behind the bursts of 120-mm mortars.
During the assault, antitank guns and mortars
revert to the control of the supported units. Regimental artillery supports the assault in depth and
prepares to displace forward. Battalion commanders do not commit their units in extended fire duels
with the enemy centers of resistance; instead, they
671306°--45----4
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move ahead, leaving small detachments to deal with
the by-passed enemy.
When the infantry advance reaches the artillery
positions of the enemy, widening of the breach, destruction of the by-passed centers of resistance, and
exploitation of the break-through are achieved by
the regimental reserve, assisted by some of the assault groups. The remainder of the assaulting force
consolidates captured positions, prepares to repel
counterattacks, or regroups and continues the
advance.
If tanks accompany the infantry attack, regimental and battalion artillery concentrate fire on enemy
antitank defenses. Infantry and engineers protect
the tanks from hostile infantry, neutralize antitank
minefields and other antitank obstacles, and help
e\lacuate damaged tanks. Tanks must not outdistance their supporting infantry by more than 400
yards. Typical missions which may be assigned to
accompanying tanks by an infantry commander
include:
Determination of the location and number of
breaches to be made in antipersonnel
obstacles.
Firing positions of the enemy which are to
be destroyed.
Sectors of responsibility for repelling counterattacks.
Assembly areas.
Subsequent missions of tanks.
5. THE ENCIRCLEMENT
The Soviet encirclement is carried out in two phases:
the process of encircling an enemy force, and the
destruction of the encircled force. Although under
special circumstances a smaller force may encircle
and destroy a larger one, normally a regiment is
required for encircling and destroying a battalion.
In addition to problems which accompany frontal
assault, combat for encirclement requires the maintenance of lines of supply and evacuation over longer
routes, as well as protection of the exposed flanks
and rear of an inverted front. Displacement of the
service centers must be coordinated with the advance
of the combat teams in order to, utilize service personnel most efficiently. While the break-through
sector is narrow, control of the service units must
be centralized; that is, service elements of two battalions may be combined to render most effective aid
to the encircling and security units. When the
break-through sector becomes wider, these service
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elements revert to the control of the parent units
(figs. 25 and 26).
Engineers must be allotted to the service elements
in order to establish and maintain supply and evacuation routes, and to help the security units in the
construction of defenses along the exposed flanks
and rear. Infantry reinforced with antitank weapons
must be made available to the commander of the
rear echelon; these are assigned the tasks of clearing
the break-through area of enemy stragglers, mop-

Figure 25.

Organization of lines of supply and evacuation at the start of an encirclement.

ping up the by-passed centers of resistance, and
defending the exposed rear and flanks of the inverted front. Medical elements of the encircling
battalions must have a.-l;Jitional personnel for evacuation of the wounded along longer than normal
routes.
6. THE PURSUIT

The slightest indication of the enemy's intention to
withdraw from combat is a signal for every Soviet
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commander to initiate pursuit. Pursuit, once it is
started, may be halted only by the senior commander.
In order to prevent the enemy from withdrawing
and forming march columns, infantry battalions increase pressure along the entire sector and the artillery and mortar batteries conduct interdictory fire
on road junctions and assembly areas. The Commander moves his reserves forward, groups them into
reinforced platoons, and deploys them for rapid advance in the direction of the main effort of the

assaulting battalions. The submachine-gun company, grouped by platoons, infiltrates into the enemy's rear area, disrupting his lines of communication and control.
As the pursuit develops, artillery and mortars advance by bounds so that one echdon is ready to fire
missions on request from the pursuing elements,
while the other echelon displaces. The antitankrifle company and the regimental antitank battery
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Figure 26.

Organization of lines of sllPply and evacuation during an encirclement. Note that the supply and evacuation centers of the two encircling battalions have been combined.

~
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organize protection of the flanks against counterattacks. Rear-area security groups keep the lines of
supply clear of enemy stragglers. The engineer officer organizes obstacle-clearing detachments which
march with the pursuing elements and facilitate the
advance of artillery, mortars, tanks, and supply
vehicles.
If motorized transport is available, pursuit detachments are organized and sent in parallel columns
along secondary roads in order to overtake the enemy
and strike him from the flanks and rear. A motorized pursuit group generally consists of a rifle company, a reconnaissance squad, a machine-gun platoon, an engineer squad, and an antitank-gun team.
If possible, each pursuing vehicle is provided with an
antiaircraft machine gun. 1£ tanks are available for
the pursuit, infantry riders are assigned from the
battalions. Regimental mortars advance with the
infantry, but if half-tracks or other suitable transport
is available, mortars may be loaned to tank units for
exploitation of the break-through. As the pursuing
elements outdistance the original battalion assault
teams, these teams are also organized into pursuit
groups and sent on supplementary missions.
During the pursuit, the regimental staff organizes
flank and rear security detachments, controls operations of the reconnaissance elements, organizes
coordination between the pursuing groups and their
supporting units, and provides for continuous supply of ammunition and fuel.
7. THE DEFENSIVE

The objectives stated in Red Army defensive doctrine are: hold important positions with small
forces; utilize natural and artificial obstacles; inflict heavy losses on the enemy by an organized fire
of all weapons, thus forcing him to abandon the attack; and finally, destroy him by a determined
counterattack. Red Army doctrine for the organization of defensive positions prescribes the following requirements:
The positions should be established in depth.
Each defensive area and its parts should be
capable of all-around defense.
The defense should be supported by planned
counterattacks.
The fire plan should be designed to provide
fire trap concentration on sectors subject
to probable enemy attack.
In setting up defensive positions, all commanders
are responsible for the construction of field forti-
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fications, shelters, main and reserve command and
observation posts, and main, alternate, and night
firing positions for artillery and mortars. All defense installations and fields of fire are checked by
the Commander and the Chief of Engineers. In the
Red Army, lack of care and thoroughness in organizing and executing the construction of defense installations is considered one of the most serious of
military offenses.
a. Centralized defense. Tactical doctrines of
the Red Army define two types of de:£ense: centralized and decentralized. Centralized defense is
preferred. It is organized to hold the main approaches to important positions with a system of
mutually supporting strongpoints. Secondary approaches are covered by fire and by a relatively
large mobile reserve. In this type of defense, artillery is massed, counterattacks are initiated by the
over-all commander, and supply installations are
centrally located. Wire communications are established along the main defense axis.

h. Decentralized defense. Decentralized defense is undertaken when the forces available for
defense of a sector are insufficient for the centralized type of defense. Decentralized defense consists of a series of self-sufficient islands of defense,
each with a local commander, artillery, and supply
installations. The reserve of the over-all commander is relatively small, and counterattacks are
undertaken on the initiative of the local commanders. Communication is accomplished primarily by
radio and visual signals.
c. Infantry division defense. In general, the
defensive positions of an infantry division consist of
an outpost line, a security line, and the main line of
resistance.
OUTPOST LINE. The outpost line is designated by
an army or divisional commander. It is sited 6 to
10 miles in front of the main line of resistance. The
outpost line is intended to inflict losses on the enemy,
to disrupt his attack groupments, and to gain time.
It consists of forward and intermediate field positions
manned by forward detachments.
SECURITY LINE. One-half to one mile in front of
the main line of resistance, an infantry division
forms a security line. The purpose of this line is
to prevent surprise attacks and to form an anti-reconnaissance screen. It is established according to
instructions of the divisional commander. The security line consists of a number of strongpoints
manned by elements of the forward battalions and
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supported by their fire. Often, in order to deceive
the enemy, the security line is made strong in front
of dummy positions and weak in front of the main
defensive positions.
MAIN DEFENSE LINE. The main defense line is
intended to stop the attack of the hostile infantry and
tanks, and to force the enemy to abandon the attack.
The main line is divided into regimental sectors,
which are in turn divided into battalion sectors and
regimental reserve sectors.
Each regimental sector consists of several centers
of resistance which integrate a system of strongpoints for all-around defense. The strongpoints con-

ASSIGNMENT OF MISSIONS. After personal reconnaissance of the terrain, the divisional commander
assigns a defensive mission to the regiments. The
regimental commander initiates command reconnaissance and issues preliminary instructions to his
staff. These instructions include orientation points,
boundary lines between battalions, and location of
the outpost line, the security line, the main defense
position, and the regimental reserve. The regimental
commander sketches out the location of the principal
antitank installations and specifies time limits for
the completion of the various defense preparations.
Instructions to the battalion commanders include

Figure 27. Reinforced battalion in defense.

sist of field and permanent fortifications connected
by antitank and antipersonnel obstacles, minefields,
and traps. The system of obstacles must contain
gaps for use by counterattacking forces. These gaps
must be arranged so that they may be quickly closed
in the event of enemy penetration of the defenses.
The strongpoints are manned either by specially designed garrisons or by elements of the forward hattalions. In the former case, the forward battalions
occupy positions defending approaches to the strongpoints and support them with fire. In defending a
strong position, the regimental reserve may consist
of a rifle battalion reinforced with artillery, antitank
weapons, and tanks. The main line of defense may
be abandoned only on orders of the commander of
the next higher echelon.

boundaries of their sectors, antitank defenses for
which they are responsible, plan of fire for long and
intermediate ranges, and the composition and mission of the security line. The battalion commanders
are told what fire support they may expect, and the
probable direction and relative time of the regimental counterattack.
The regimental reserve is assigned its defense
sector, probable direction of counterattacks, and a
plan of fire within the defense positions (fig. 27).
ARTILLERY MISSIONS. In the defensive, regimental artillery and antitank weapons, together
with allotted divisional weapons, are generally portioned out to the battalions according to the im·
portance of their sectors. However, artillery fire
is planned so that it can be shifted easily from de-
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centralized to centralized control. The artillery
fire is designed to support defensive operations of
forward detachments. In particular, emphasis is
placed on delaying enemy preparations for attack.
The Soviet gunners attempt to cause casualties
among enemy personnel and armor during deployment for the attack and to separate tanks from accompanying infantry, destroying the infantry ,dth
artillery and mortar fire and destroying the tanks
which penetrate into the defensive positions with
antitank weapOll3.
In organizing defensive positions, the formation
of antitank centers of resistance is stressed. These
centers, usually located in terrain inaccessible to
tanks, consist of a rifle company with three to five
antitank guns, one or two antitank rifle platoons,
mortars, and heavy machine guns. Minefields are
laid only on orders of the divisional commander.
The mission of the infantry is to keep enemy foot
soldiers from destroying or neutralizing antitank
obstacles. Antiaircraft positions are chosen in terrain inaccessible to tanks. Careful camouflage and
camouflage discipline is emphasized. Defensive
combat is controlled from a command post which
must not be located within the artillery positions.
Control of fire, timely commitment of battalion and
regimental reserves, and avoidance of premature
disclosure of positions and plan of defense are primary considerations in successful defensive combat.
During the first stages of enemy attack, artillery
fires from alternate positions.

flank and rear area security, and works out relative
time schedules for the displacement of the command
post and rear area installations.
Defense lines are so chosen that the enemy upon
taking one line would have to displace his artillery
and mortars in order to attack the next. Each successive position is strengthened with field fortifications and antitank and antipersonnel obstacles. The
interval between strongpoints is covered by artillery and mortar fire. 1£ terrain permits, ambushes
are prepared in corridors between strongpoints.
The location and composition of ambushes are designated by the regimental commander.
The regiment occupies two lines simultaneously:
the first is occupied by the forward battalions and
the second by the regimental reserve. When the
enemy attacks, the forward battalions open fire at
extreme ranges, forcing the enemy to deploy for
battle, causing casualties, and delaying neutralization of obstacles. They do not engage the enemy,
but on completing their delaying mission, retreat,
covered by the fire of the reserve. The reserve
counterattacks if the enemy succeeds in flanking one
of the battalions or if the forward battalions are unable to disengage. The commander of the last battalion to occupy a defense line or, if the situation
demands it, the regimental commander, orders
demolition of bridges and roads.

Section II. ARTILLERY, MORTARS,
AND ROCKETS

8. WITHDRAWALS AND DELAYING ACTION

1. BASIC TACTICAL ROLE

On receiving his mission, the regimental commander conducts command reconnaissance of the
terrain and designates the first and subsequent defense lines. Sectors of responsibility of each
battalion and of the reserve, and the composition of
the supporting groups for each battalion, are determined for each defense line. The battalion commanders are given instructions concerning the relative time of their occupation and retreat from each
defense line, and their responsibility for antitank
defense. The reserve, approximately a battalion
made up of rifle, submachine-gun, mortar, artillery,
heavy-machine-gun, and antitank-rifle platoons, is
instructed as to its sectors of responsibility and
probable direction of counterattack from each position. The staff initiates reconnaissance in front
of and on the flanks of the regimental sector, determines the axis of communications, provides for

Artillery is the basic striking force of the Red Army.
Its mission is to neutralize and destroy the enemy
system of fire throughout all operational phases, thus
enabling Soviet infantry to encircle and destroy enemy personnel. To carry out this mission, the Red
Army has used artillery on a much larger scale than
any other modern army. In repeated offensive operations during W orId War II, the artillery density
was 320 to 480 pieces per mile (200 to 300 pieces
per kilometer). In certain operations the Soviets
employed a total of more than 20,000 pieces, a number approaching the total quantity of artillery pieces
used by all armies during World War I. This unprecedented mass employment of artillery required
the development of large artillery units-such as
artillery, mortar, and rocket divisions-to supplement organic artillery of the infantry division. To
facilitate the commitment of such masses of artillery,
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a highly developed system of artillery reconnaissance
cnd artillery planning was essential.
!!. TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT

[he organization and tactical employment of Soviet
artillery underwent continuous changes during the
war. These changes were not always the result of
newly formulated doctrines, but were often imposed
upon the Red Army by specific strategic situations.
During the first period of the war, Soviet artillery
was organized according to conventional conceptions. Only about 20 percent of the total artillery
was in army artillery units (the Soviets had four
artillery divisions, several independent artillery regiments, and a number of heavy artillery units), while
the bulk was found organically in the rifle divisions
or in corps artillery units. The major defeats suffered by the Soviet Union in 1941, which led to
destruction of a great portion of its original number
of artillery pieces, forced the Red Army to exploit
the remaining artillery by increased centralization.
Up to this time, the rifle division had two artillery
regiments (one motorized and one horse-drawn regiment). The motorized artillery regiment was taken
from the rifle division and organized in army artillery units. Within the rifle division, also, artillery
and infantry heavy weapons were brought under
centralized control.
Simultaneously with this reorganization, the production of artillery was given high priority. When
newly produced weapons were made available to
the Red Army, they were included in army artillery
units. The great number of independent artillery
regiments created a command and logistical problem, which the Red Army solved by forming larger
artillery organizations such as brigades, divisions,
and even corps. The great increase in the number
of army artillery units also facilitated the organization of specialized units such as mortar regiments, mortar divisions, antitank divisions, antitank brigades, antiaircraft artillery divisions, and
even superheavy artillery units. These new organizations were employed for the first time for
large-scale operations at Stalingrad.
The steady growth of the army artillery made a
reverse process possible, so that at the present time,
army artillery regiments are attached to rifle divisions to increase the fire power of their direct support artillery.
a. Mortars and rockets. Mortars and rockets
playa far greater tactical role in the Red Army
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than in any other army. The fundamental principle
of mortar employment in the Red Army is the use
of massed mortar fire as an independent striking
weapon. Requirements are set by the infantry
commander, while technical control and coordination are the responsibility of the artillery commander. Fundamentally, Soviet mortar units employ field artillery methods. The principle of
rocket employment in the Red Army prescribes mass
commitment at critical phases of an operation.
Rocket units are normally coordinated in the general plan of artillery and mortars, and are under the
control of corps artillery.

h. Self-propelled artillery. Soviet self-propelled artillery units are found either as organic
parts of armored, mechanized, or cavalry corps or
as independent regiments for employment in the
main effort. Soviet self-propelled artillery is
equipped with telescopic sights which permit indirect fire and employment for other than assault
artillery missions, such as reinforcement of regular
artillery units. Soviet doctrine prescribes that
self-propelled artillery should be employed in batteries or larger units; for indirect fire it is centralized in regiments or brigades. When self-propelled
artillery is committed in support of infantry, it is
under the control of the infantry divisional (regimental) commander.
In the attack, self-propelled artillery is employed
in the main effort to support infantry, tanks, or
cavalry, with the primary mission of destroying
unforeseen enemy centers of resistance at short
range. It may also be used as the Commander's
fire reserve for action against enemy counterattacks. When attacking on the move, self-propelled artillery goes into position on a broad front
without echeloning in depth. In an attack on a
fortified position, it is organized in depth. During
the attack, self-propelled artillery provides continuous support for infantry and tanks by displacing
forward and firing from concealed positions.
In the defense, self-propelled artillery regiments,
as a rule, constitute the mobile fire reserve. This
reserve is employed as support for counterattacking
tanks and infantry, or as an antitank reserve. During retreat, it may be attached to the rear guards.
c. Division artillery. The artillery weapons
and mortars of an infantry division are found in the
field artillery regiment and in the infantry regiments.
The field artillery regiments have three identically
organized battalions. Each battalion consists of two
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batteries with 76.2-mm guns (four guns to a battery) , and one 122-mm howitzer battery. The infantry regiment contains a howitzer battery with four
76.2-mm howitzers, and a heavy mortar batt~ry with
six 120-mm mortars. Each battalion also has nine
82-mm mortars. In stabilized situations, the 33
mortars of each regiment are organized, according
to a definite standing operating procedure, into a
provisional mortar bat:talion. The two 50-mm mortars of each company ~re for direct infantry support
only. The antitank artillery pieces of an infantry
division are found iIi the division antitank battalion
and within each infantry regiment. The antitank
artillery battalion has three batteries, each with four
45-mm or 57-mm antitank guns (a total of 12
pieces) • The infantry regiment has four 45-mm
antitank guns in its antitank battery and two 45-mm
antitank guns in each infantry battalion.
Since the divisional artillery consists of only 36
artillery pieces, recent Soviet practice has been to
reinforce the artillery by one to four battalions of
122-mm and 152-mm howitzers. The divisional artillery commander, however, is in control of all the
artillery in the division including artillery reinforcement from higher echelons. He also exercises control of the over-all employment of the heavy mortar
battery or provisional mortar battalion of each
infantry regiment.
Organic artillery is employed on a regimental
combat-team basis, but direct battery-infantry-battalion coordination is provided. In the regimental
combat team, the field artillery battalion controls the
provisional battalion that may be formed from the
120-mm mortar and the 82-mm mortar batteries.
76.2-MM GUNS. The tactical characteristics of the
76.2-mm guns (M1939 and 1942) are their high rate
of fire, good muzzle velocity, and great maneuverability. These guns are employed in close support of
infantry ( tanks), and especially for direct fire.
Their primary missions are destruction of personnel
and neutralization of infantry weapons in the open;
antipersonnel barrages; destruction of tanks, vehicles, embrasures, and dragon's teeth by direct fire;
and harassing fire. Secondary missions are accompanying barrages and concentrations; neutralization of artillery and mortars; establishment of smoke
screens; and destruction of wire. Exceptional missions are fire reconnaissance, destruction of light
materiel with indirect fire, and destruction of minefields.

V-50

I Nov 45
122-MM HOWITZERS. The characteristics of the
other divisional artillery weapOl1, the 122-mm
howitzer (M1938) which is the backbone of Soviet
field artillery, are its great flexibility in muzzle
velocity and traj~ctory, very effective burst, and
good maneuyerability. (A lighter model 1910/30
is employed when terrain prohibits the use of the
M1938.) This weapon may be used for almost any
mission except the destruction of strong positions
or for distant fire. The primary missions are:
Destruction of personnel and neutralization
of infantry weapons in the open and under
cover.
Antipersonnel barrages, accompanying barrages, and concentrations.
Destruction of light field fortifications.
Neutralization or destruction of mortars.
Fire reconnaissance against camouflage and
minefields or in conjunction with sound
ranging.
Neutralization of artillery at medium ranges.
Establishment of smoke screens.
Harassing fire.
Secondary missions include antitank defensive barrages; destruction of artillery; attack on fortified
houses; destruction of wire; and destruction of
tanks, ordnance, embrasures, antitank escarpments,
and dragon's teeth by direct fire. The destruction
of minefields is an exceptional missio~.
152-MM HOWITZERS. The 152-mm howitzers
(M1938) differ from the 122-mm howitzers in their
greater radius of burst, slightly longer range, lower
rate of fire, and reduced maneuverability. Basically, they reinforce 122-mm howitzers or replace
them against more resistant targets. Their primary
missions are to furnish accompanying concentrations; to provide antitank defensive barrages; and
to neutralize or destroy personnel, infantry weapons
in the open or under cover, light and medium field
fortifications (including fortified houses), antitank
ditches, artillery and mortars, and minefields. Secondary missions are direct fire against very strong
earth and timber fortifications; establishment of
smoke screens; and reinforcement of antipersonnel
and accompanying barrages. Exceptional missions
are destruction of tanks and motor vehicles by direct fire, and harassing fire.
OTHER WEAPONS. The 76.2-mm howitzer is an
organic weapon of the infantry regiment.
Sometimes several 122-mm MlD/30 howitzers are attached. Both weapons are excellent direct infantry
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support weapons because of their light weight. The
45-mm guns of the infantry regiment and battalion
are employed for direct fire missions at ranges of
about 1,000 yards.
The 120-mm and the 82-mm mortars compare in
radius of burst with the 122-mm howitzer and the
76.2-mm gun, respectively. They are emplaced primarily against personnel, in concentrations or defensive barrages.
d. Organic artillery of armored formations
and cavalry corps. The organic artillery of the
mechanized, tank, and cavalry corps is highly mobile and possesses great fire power. The organization of the tank corps includes three self-propelled
artillery regiments, one antitank artillery regiment,
one antiaircraft artillery regiment, one mortar regiment, one rocket battalion, and one antitank battalion. The three tank brigades and the motorized
brigades of the tank corps have additional artillery
pieces, antitank guns, and, mortars. The mechanized and cavalry corps have only one or two selfpropelled artillery regiments instead of three, while
the other supporting components are about the same
as in the tank corps.
Mobile formations are usually employed in the
exploitation of a break-through to widen the gap
and to pursue the enemy. Normally, they do not
assist actively in the initial stage of the operation,
although they may be employed for flank protection. In an extensive operation, the average distance of advance of such formations is about 200
miles. Their artillery is employed particularly for
close support of irifantry and tank elements, making
large use of direct fire in the attack of organized
positions. During the advance, the artillery is
greatly decentralized. When, however, the formation establishes defensive positions far beyond the
original line of departure, the artillery immediately
converts to strictly centralized control. The formation possesses a sufficient amount of antitank and
antiaircraft protection to enable it to hold out
against enemy counterattacks until the arrival of
the main forces.
e. Corps artillery. Artillery at corps level in
the Red Army is of relatively less importance than
in the U. S. Army, because the Red Army places
greatest stress on artillery at army level. Corps
artillery is normally in control of the artillery in
sectors of secondary priority, while army artillery
controls the artillery in the sector of main effort.
Artillery units at corps level include medium ar-
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tillery brigades, antitank artillery regiments (towed
tank destroyers with 76.2-mm guns), and rocket
units. The weapons of the medium artillery brigade are the 122-mm guns and the 152-mm gunhowitzers.
122-MM GUNS. The 122-mm guns (M1931/37),
the basic long-range weapons of Soviet field artillery, have high muzzle velocity, great penetration
and range, good rate of fire, but only moderate
maneuverability. (They are replaced by 107-mm
guns, M1940 or 1910/30, in difficult terrain or
when rapid movement is required.) The 122-mm
guns are employed against distant targets and for
destruction of materiel. Their primary missions
are neutralization or destruction of artillery and
armored trains; neutralization, interdiction, or harassment of distant targets; destruction of moderately strong permanent fortifications by flat-trajectory fire; and fire reconnaissance against distant
targets. Secondary missions are destruction of
tanks and vehicles by direct fire; destruction of elevated targets; and destruction or neutralization of
field fortifications, mortars, infantry weapons, and
infantry in the open. Exceptional missions are
antipersonnel and accompanying barrages, and destruction of minefields.
152-MM GUN-HOWITZERS. The 152-mm gunhowitzers (M1931/37) have much greater range
and penetration than the 152-mm howitzers, but a
lower rate of fire and, except with the self-propelled
KV mount, considerably less maneuverability.
They are employed in conjunction with the 122-mm
gun against targets beyond the range or capabilities
of the 152-mm howitzer. Their most important
missions are:
Neutralization or destruction of artillery
and armored trains.
Neutralization or interdiction of distant
targets.
Destruction of strong field fO,rtifications.
Destruction of moderately strong permanent
fortifications by flat-trajectory fire.
Fire reconnaissance of exceptionally important or resistant targets.
Destruction of distant minefields.
Secondary missions include destruction or neutralization of mortars, infantry weapons, and infantry in the open; and destruction of tanks, vehicles, armor, and concrete by direct fire. Reinforcement of antipersonnel fire and employment
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in accompanying barrages and concentrations are
exceptional missions.
ROCKET WEAPONS. Normally rocket units are
not assigned to echelons lower than corps. Corps
artillery control assures their centralized employment for intense, surprise shock actions during critical phases of offensive or defensive operations.
Rockets are brought forward with great secrecy and
are moved immediately after firing. They are
committed against area targets, supplementing artillery preparations or counterpreparations, and are
normally directed againsf enemy infantry concentrations.
f. Army artillery. The heaviest fire power of
Soviet artillery is concentrated at army level. Great
flexibility is the advantage of large artillery organizations. Soviet commanders are provided with the
means to concentrate large artillery forces in the
area of the main effort.
The artillery division of the Red Army includes
in its organization a well balanced assortment of
weapons ·which, as a ruJe, are employed together.
The component parts of the artillery divisions are:
One howitzer brigade with three regiments
of 122-mm and 152-mm howitzers
(M1938) .
One light artillery brigade with three regiments of 76.2-mm guns.
One gun brigade with two regiments of 122mm guns and 152·mm gun-howitzers.
One mortar brigade with three regiments of
120-mm mortars.
One observation battalion.
The fire power of the artillery division is remforced as needed by additional brigades or regiments containing heavy, very heavy, or superheavy
guns, howitzers, and motar-howitzers-such as 152mm guns, 203-mm howitzers, 280-mm mortar-howitzers, 406-mm mortar-howitzers-and other superheavy caliber weapons.
The general characteristics of the guns are extremely great range, very high muzzle velocity and
penetration, low rate of fire, and poor maneuverability. They are employed against extremely distant targets or, in conjunction with the heavy howitzers, for destruction or neutralization of exceptionally important and resistant targets. Heavy
howitzers and mortar-howitzers are used by Soviet
field artillery when exceptionally great blast and
penetration are required. Targets for these weapons are carefully selected because of the low rate
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of fire and great weight of ammunition. Typical
targets are permanent fortifications (using either
flat-trajectory or high-angle fire), bridges, railroads,
and buildings. The mortar-howitzers are employed at moderate ranges. Normally, fire reconnaissance by lighter weapons precedes the employment of the reinforcing heavy-caliber weapons of
the artillery division.
The mortar brigade of the artillery division composes the countermortar group which also may be
reinforced by a 132-mm rocket regiment of 12
rocket installations or by a regiment of 122-mm
howitzers.
Mortar divisions and brigades have been formed
to support large-scale operations against strong
enemy fortifications or powerful defenses at river
lines. Mortar divisions contain rocket as well as
mortar regiments. Rocket units of regimental size
have also been organized. They employ mobile
and stationary installations.
g. Artillery groupments. The outstanding
organizational characteristic of Soviet artillery is
the artillery groupments, which are the basic operating organizations of artillery. It is the responsibility of the artillery commander to form
these groupments from artillery divisions, from
units and elements of GHQ regiments, from infantry
divisional artillery, and, to a limited extent, from
regimental or even battalion mortars and cannon.
These groupments are organized on the basis of a
careful estimate of the special requirements for a
specific operation.
TYPES. One infantry support groupment is set
up for each regiment of infantry, divided into subgroupments for each battalion of infantry when
three or more battalions of artillery are alloted to
the groupment.
Countermortar groupments usually operate during the artillery preparation. They consist of 120mm mortar and 122-mm howitzer units supported
by sound-ranging or other instrumental reconnaissance elements. At the conclusion of their mission,
the component elements are often attached to infantry support groupments.
Artillery destruction groupments normally consist of fire reconnaissance and destruction subgroupments. These groupments are often operative only
during the preparation phase. The fire reconnaissance subgroupment and light guns from the de·
struction subgroupment are then attached to infantry
support groupments, while heavy and very heavy
artillery either reverts to the army artillery com·
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mander or is attached to the counterbattery or distant operations groupments.
COllnterbattery groupmcllts are maintained
throughout the operation against deep defenses.
When large quantities of artillery are available,
separate distant-operations groupments are also
formed.
Antiaircraft grollprvents initially protect the en·
tire artillery and infantry deployment area. (An
antiaircraft artillery division usually operates as the
basis of such a groupment.l Upon displacement
by light artillery and mortars, elements of the
groupment are detached and placed under forward
artillery or infantry control. Medium and heavy
antiaircraft artillery remains in place to protect
army artillery groupments and rear installations.
Roving batteries operate during the advance
guard and screening phases of the operation only.
They are then attached to infantry-support groupments.
Accompanying guns (direct fire weapons) are
generally allotted and sited during the night preceding the artillery preparation. If they are allotted to artillerY destruction groupments, they begin operations during the destruction phase of the
artillery preparation. If they are allotted to infantry units (down to companies), they begin operations at the end of the preparation.
The number of groupments and subgroupments
depends upon the expected difficulty and duration
of the operation, the quantity of artillery, the width
and the depth of the zone of operations, and possibilities for observation. A groupment may vary
from one to nine battalions in size; a subgroupment from a battery to three battalions. A groupment or subgroupment must be provided with adequate fire controL signal communications, observation, and transport to execute its mission. The
sector of fire varies with the range; it is usually divided into a primary and an emergency sector.
CONTROL. Groupments and subgroupments may
be controlled by the army artillery commander, by
an artillery division, by an infantry corps artillery
commander, by an infantry division artillery commander, by a regimental artillery commander, or by
an infantry commander ~ from corps to company).
Control is determined by the phase of the operation, the scheme of maneuver, the width and depth
of the firing sector of each groupment, and its position area.
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In general, the divisional or regimental artillery
commanders control artillery during the advance
guard and covering phase. During preparation,
control is highly centralized. The army (army
group) artillery commander personally supervises
fire against the most critical targets, regardless of
their character. The artillery divisions control
counter battery, distant operations, antiaircraft,
antitank, and sometimes countermortar and artillery destruction groupments. The divisional artillery commanders control infantry support and,
normally, countermortar and artillery destruction
groupments, as well as roving batteries and accompanying guns. Furthermore, the artillery commander at each level sets aside a portion of fire of
one or more artillery units as command reserve for
critical emergencies.
With the assault, control of accompanying guns
and infantry support groupments passes to the infantry artillery divisions. to insure their most effective employment.
During reorganization, when the security of the
assaulting troops is a paramount problem, the regimental and divisional artillery commanders control
artillery in advanced positions, while the army artillery commander continues command of the artillery division.
In exploitation, control is increasingly assumed
by infantry commanders, and artillery is decentralized to small units (even battalions or companies I .
Long-range artillery, howe\"er. remains under centralized control to give distant support to mobile
troops.
The degree of centralized control varies with the
tactical importance of each sector. In the zone of
the main effort, the army artillery and artillery division commanders have primary responsibilities;
in secondary sectors, the corps or the divisional artillery commanders. In operations on a wide front,
the reinforcing artilleq" of secondary sectors may
be controlled by infantry corps.
The width and the depth of the firing sector, and
the position area of each groupment are determined
bv its mission. A countermortar groupment, for
e~ample, may operate on the front of two infantry
divisions. An artillery destruction groupment may
fire from firing positions of one division at targets
in the sector of another. In such instances, control is assumed by the next higher echelon, corps or
army, with subgroupments allotted to each division.
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3. ARTILLERY AND AIR OFFENSIVE

a. Basic doctrine. The large-scale offensive
use of artillery crystallized in 1942 into a Soviet
tactical doctrine, "the artillery and air offensive."
The fundamental element of this doctrine is the responsibility of the highest artillery commander,
through the artillery chain of command, for the
organization and execution of a unified system of
fire preparation, support, and security for infantry
maneuver. The operations of tactical air bombardment and other supporting fire power are coordinated with the basic artillery responsibility. The
success of the doctrine can be judged from repeated
operational examples: Orel, the crossing of the
Dneiper River, Novogorod, the Karelian Isthmus,
the Perekop Isthmus, and Sevastopol.
Most important in the execution of the artillery
and air offensive are the following features:
INTELLIGENCE. A comprehensive intelligence
system includes a thorough standing operating
procedure for troop reconnaissance by batteries and
battalions, and aggressive action by infantry and
artillery patrols to push observation as far forward as needed_ Specialized types of instrumental
and air reconnaissance augment the results of troop
reconnaissance. Extensive documentation
and
systematic analysis of information are required.
Operational recommendations from lower echelons
are combined directly with their intelligence reports. Higher echelons, particularly army, must
disseminate all necessary intelligence directly and
promptly to every operating level down to batteries.
PLANNING. Continuous comprehensive planning
of fire is based upon a thoroughly developed firing
technique. The requirements of fire against personnel, tanks and ordnance, field fortifications, permanent fortifications, minefields, wire and dragon's
teeth, elevated targets, bridges, railroads, and highways have been well determined. Initial standards
for the neutralization, destruction, interdiction,
harassing, and fire reconnaissance of targets have
been established. Beyond this, great attention is
paid to secrecy and surprise, maneuver of fire, aggressive displacement, and variation of tactics.
Planning develops from the combined scheme of
maneuver and the detailed analysis of enemy capabilities by operational phases of time and space,
starting with the initial concentration of forces
through the de)5truction of the enemy defensive
system and culminating with the exploitation in his
deep rear. Neutralization of enemy capabilities
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must be effected within the time allotted, and with
maximum economy of personnel, materiel, and ammunition.
After careful calculation of the requirements, the
fire power, transportation, and signal systems of
the entire task force (army, front or group of
fronts) are reorganized accordingly. Flexibility to
meet surprises or to exploit unexpected successes is
provided by systematic duplication of material in
critical areas (for example, radio duplicated by
wire, mortars duplicated by rockets), and by allotment of reserves. Centralized reserves under the
immediate control of the senior artillery commander
are employed in mass for decisive results. Local
reserves, particularly of ammunition, insure security.
COORDINATION. Coordination of time, space, and
command is the basic concern of every artillery
echelon. The following are mandatory: personal
contact, exchange of liaison officers, multiple communications, unified code, and terrain reference
systems within and between artillery units and with
supported or cooperating arms. Survey is always
initiated at the earliest possible moment; full survey is prescribed for all units in the main effort.
Command and organizational groupments are
changed as required with every new operational
phase to support the infantry most closely and effectively.
h. Fire plan. Accurate, unceasing planning of
fire is a mandatory function of artillery regimental
and higher staffs. Advance planning, with suitable modifications during combat, alone can insure
continuous, reliable, and close support of infantry
(or tanks), as well as economy of ammunition and
ordnance.
REQUIREMENTS. Primary responsibility for artillery fire plans rests with the highest artillery
commander engaged in the operation (army, army
group, or GHQ). The plan, based on the infantrv
(or tank) scheme of maneuver, must embrace th~
entire contemplated operation from advance guard
action to completion of exploitation.
A correct plan is dependent upon continuously
developing intelligence. Needed intelligence Includes:
The forward line of enemy defenses, which
determines the location of observation
points and firing positions.
The grouping of enemy reserves, which determines the measures taken for their di-
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rect neutralization and for the interdiction
of routes of communication.
The locations, numbers, and types of enemy
artillery and mortars, which determine
the composition, firing positions, and missions of counterbattery and countermortar
groupments.
Detailed analysis of the enemy defensive system in the zone of main effort comprising
the location of strongpoints and of firing
and communications trenches.
Fields and densities of fire of automatic
weapons, mortars, and infantry guns_
These factors determine the composition, firing positions, and missions of the infantry-support and artillery destruction groupments, as well as the allotment
of weapons to infantry units. Basic factors of terrain, vegetation, and weather determine the systems
of observation and fire control, and the capabilities
of artillery displacement.
COORDINATION. The plan is initiated with the
first warning order. It is continuously coordinated
with the staff of combined arms, and with the staffs
of other arms, to insure a common time and space
schedule, a common system of essential signals and
signal communication, maximum exploitation of tactical capabilities, joint combat security, and joint
camouflage discipline. It is checked to the greatest
practical degree by personal reconnaissance of the
artillery commander and the commander of combined arms. It must be disseminated to lower echelons, in preliminary form, as early as possible; in
final form, simultaneously with the field order.
The estimate of artillery fire allows for the neutralization of all probable enemy capabilities. Duplicate equipment must be provided for execution of
the most important missions. Safety factors and
reserves of ammunition and ordnance for unforeseen
contingencies must be generous. Artillery must not
hesitate to ask for fire by air, by mortars and rockets, by infantry, or by other weapons when more
rapid, economical, and certain results can be
achieved thereby.
The fire plan must provide maximum surprise and
deception. Sudden concentrations, false transfers
of fire, irregular periods of neutralization or interdiction, and employment of alternate firing positions or roving batteries-all are important methods
which must be utilized to surprise and shock the
enemy.
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Soviet doctrine emphasizes the necessity for largescale artillery support in offensive operations. An
artillery groupment must be formed or activated for
the execution of each major artillery mission, usually bringing the proportion of artillery to infantry
to 2 to 1. Certain groupments are maintained
throughout the operation; others, through one or
more phases only.
USE OF THE PLAN. The artillery plan computes
the necessary densities of fire and the capabilities
of friendly artillery. In addition, it recommends
army (front) and subordinate artillery groupments
as well as the position areas and missions of army
(front) artillery, and the missions of lower echelons
of artillery. The plan computes the time necessary
for artillery preparation and ammunition requirements; -and it determines the time when the artillery
will be ready for combat and the most effective methods for the support of infantry and tanks.
With the aid of this plan, the Commander of
Combined Arms prescribes the following:
Attachment of army (army group) artillery
to lower formations.
Composition of army (army group) groupments.
Priorities and system of deployment.
Time and duration of artillery preparation,
infantry assault, and reorganization of assaulting forces.
Parallel regrouping of artillery.
Allotment of ammunition.
The Commander of Combined Arms checks the
position areas or firing positions of army (army
group) artillery groupments and assigns missions
of the following types: counter battery; neutralization of deep reserves; neutralization or destruction
of supply installations; accompanying barrages and
concentrations in the zone of the main effort; and
destruction of strong permanent fortifications.
Control of the initial fire plan during combat is
indispensable. The execution and effectiveness of
firing missions must be continuously reported by
lower echelons and checked by responsible staff officers. Estimates must be corrected to conform with
actual expenditures of ammunition and ordnance.
Groupments and missions must be modified with
changes in enemy and friendly capabilities, with
movement, with increasing intelligence, and with
changes in weather and observation. The objective
of artillery at all times must be to anticipate the immediate requirements of the supported troops.
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DEVELOPMENT AND EXECUTION. The development and execution of fire plans is accomplished in
six steps: The combined scheme of maneuver;
analysis of targets and enemy capabilities; determination of objectives of fire; computation of artillery fire requirements; formation (or activation)
of groupments and assignment of batteries, position
areas, and mission; and control of operations.
The scheme of maneuver is normally divided into
five phases of time and space: advance guard (covering forces) action and assembly of main forces;
fire preparation; infantry (or tank) assault;. reorganization and security of assaulting forces; and
exploitation.
Known targets and suspected areas are plotted.
Enemy capabilities of movement and employment
of fixed installations, both for the known and the
probable order of battle, are then calculated. The
objectives of artillery fire against each group of
targets in time and space are then prescribed.
During the first phase (advance guard action and
assembly of main forces) normal objectives are
neutralization of enemy artillery, interdiction of
enemy attack, and fire reconnaissance.
During the fire preparation phase (subperiods:
neutralization; registration, fire reconnaissance, and
destruction; and neutralization) the normal obj ectives are:
Neutralization and destruction of enemy
field and antiaircraft artillery.
Neutralization and destruction of enemy
mortars.
Neutralization of observation and command
posts, local reserves, and important centers
of resistance in enemy rear areas.
Interdiction of main enemy routes of communication and fire reconnaissance.
Destruction of the most important fortifications, especially permanent ones of concrete and steel.
Break-through of gaps in obstacle systems
( in con j unction with engineers and
tanks) .
Destruction of located flanking, firing points
(machine guns and infantry and au'titank
guns) and neutralization of the automatic
weapons defensive system.
Support of the infantry assault requires the following of artillery:
Continued neutralization of enemy artillery.
Interdiction of main enemy routes of communication.
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Destruction of antitank guns, machine guns,
and field fortifications in the zone of advance (especially by direct fire of accompanying weapons).
Neutralization of observation and command
posts, local reserves, and important centers of resistance in enemy rear areas.
Accompaniment of infantry and tanks by fire
and displacement.
Interdiction of enemy counterattacks.
Normal artillery objectives during the fourth
phase (reorganization and security of assault
forces) include neutralization of undamaged, newly
found, and revived enemy batteries and centers of
resistance; interdiction of enemy counterattacks
and of the movement of tactical reserves; neutralization of rear installations.
The artillery's tasks during exploitation include
support of mobile forces by displacement of light
artillery and by long-distance fire from heavy artillery; destruction of remaining enemy centers of
resistance; interdiction of enemy counterattacks,
and movement of tactical or strategic reserves.
Computation of artillery fire requirements involves two problems: the expenditure of ammunition, and the types and quantities of artillery. Ammunition expenditures include the total required for
all targets (with a safety factor in some cases) ;
duplication of the most important missions; a command reserve for each echelon (to be utilized only
by permission of the next higher commander) ; and
an un allotted reserve. Requirements for each target
are determined by: the nature and the size of the
target; the accuracy of target location, registration,
and survey; the range; and the objective of fire.
(In neutralization and interdiction, the duration of
fire is also a factor.) The range and the objective
of fire are basic factors in the choice of weapons.
The time allowed for the mission governs the needed
quantity of artillery.
EXAMPLES. Figures 28 and 29 present an example of an artillery fire plan in the offensive in a
secondary sector. Thus, corps rather than army,
is in control. The field fortifications encountered
require only a brief period of destruction fire.
Characteristic of the operation are the alternation
of concentrations, destruction fire, and repeated
false transfers. The duration of the preparation
is 1 hour and 55 minutes. The plan for the artillery commitment after the assault phase is not detailed in this instance, but is of the general mission
type.
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Figure 28. Extract from the plan for artillery ofJen!ive of the 1st Rifle Corps_
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control; a medium gun brigade, a mortar regiment,
a rocket regiment and probably one antitank regiment under corps control; and part of a heavy gun
brigade and part of an antiaircraft artillery division
under army control.

The plan covers the commitment of the following
weapons, units, and formations in the corps sector
with an approximate width of 1.5 miles: infantry
weapons, mortars, and an organic field artillery
regiment plus one howitzer regiment under division
~
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TRENCHES AND COMMUNICATION TRENCHES TO BE NEUTRALIZED BY DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY
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SECTORS TO BE DESTROYED BY CORPS ARTILLERY
ARTILLERY AND MORTAR BATTERIES TO BE NEUTRALIZED

INTERDICTION OF RETREAT

INTERDICTION OF COUNTERATTACKS

Figure 29. Plan of artiLLery fire for artillery offensive of 1st Rifle Corps.
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Figures 30 and 31 are examples of the fire plan
of a regimental infantry-support groupment in offensive operation in a moderately defended enemy
sector. The infantry-support groupment in both
examples comprised three artillery battalions (one
battalion from the divisional artillery and two attached battalions) and a provisional mortar battalion temporarily organized from the infantry, regimental, and battalion mortar batteries.
Examples A and B present different methods employed by the infantry support groupment. In Example A, the artillery fires accompanying barrages
which cover the entire width of the sector during
the assault phase, while in Example B, the artillery
supports the assault with accompanying concentrations on definite targets in each phase line.

c. Characteristics of artillery in the offensive. The location of firing positions is determined
about 10 days before the attack by the comprehensive reconnaissance of assault unit and artillery
commanders. About 2 to 3 days before the attack,
the reinforcing artillery moves into prepared firing
positions under the cover of night and noise created
by mortar fire and planes. The newly arrived artillery immediately starts registration fire with single
pieces from dummy and roving gun positions, making extensive use of the firing data available. from
the artillery already active in the sector.
As a rule, every battery has a main firing position
and an alternate position to the front or rear of it.
The main firing position is usually sufficiently far
forward to facilitate effective fire into the depth of
the enemy position. For the destruction or neutralization of individual strongpoints, firing positions
are located far forward and prepared for single direct-fire artillery pieces. The most effective ranges
for direct fire during short and intensive artillery
preparations are 440 to 880 yards for 45-mm guns,
1,100 to 1,320 yards for 76.2-mm guns, and 1,650 to
2,200 yards for 122-mm and 152-mm artillery pieces.
The army or army group artillery commander
controls registration when a large amount of artillery is committed. Plans for registration and deceptive registration are developed to assure secrecy.
During the course of the attack, Soviet artillery
displaces forward as soon as the enemy main line
of resistance is reached by friendly infantry, always
keeping two-thirds of the artillery in firing position
while the other third is on the move.
671306°--45----5
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4. ARTILLERY IN DEFENSE
a. Basic doctrine. The Red Army considers
its artillery as the main weapon of the defense. As
previously described, Soviet tactics distinguish two
basic systems of defense: decentralized and centralized. The artillery in decentralized defense is
broken up, and its components are under the control of the individual strongpoint commanders. In
the centralized system, the artillery remains under
the control of the artillery commander.
The artillery missions, however, are the same for
both defense systems:

Fire against enemy march columns and troop
concentrations.
Support of the units in the forward positions.
Interference with the deployment of the attacking enemy.
Counter battery and countermortar fire.
Firing of smoke against enemy observation
posts.
Annihilation of the enemy infantry and tank
attacks in front of the main line of resistance.
Destruction of tanks which have penetrated
through Soviet lines.
Preparation fire for counterthrusts and
coun ter attacks.

b. Concentration of artillery for defensive
operations. Soviet artillery in the defensive is
usually organized to facilitate the massing of fire in
definite areas. For this purpose, artillery in a corps
sector is normally divided into infantry-support
groupments and artillery groupments for long-range
counter battery and countermortar missions.
Soviet tactical doctrine also prescribes the establishment of three firing positions for each battery,
and emphasizes that the positions must be selected
so that the bulk of the artillery can participate in the
fire against enemy tanks which have penetrated the
defenses. Emphasis is laid on the construction of
alternate and dummy positions and the employment
of roving guns and silent batteries to deceive the
enemy as to the location of the real positions and
artillery strength. The weapons are brought into
position only when firing; the rest of the time they
are kept to the rear in well camouflaged dugouts.
The artillery commander also develops a fire plan
for each sector, considering all possible combat
phases, including:
Concentration by long-range artillery upon
enemy artillery positions, approach routes,
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AREAS IN THE DEPTH OF THE ENEMY POSITION

regimental infantry support groupment during assault phase and the subsequent concen.
trations in the depth 0/ the enemy position (example A).
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road crossings, and other important installations in the enemy rear.
Massed fire at enemy assembly areas, command posts, and observation posts.

The Red Army employs stationary antipersonnel
and moving antitank defensive barrages. Antipersonnel barrages are the rule in the defense. All
typt:s of artillery weapons, mortars, and rockets are
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Figure 32.
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Map for the chief oj section oj the roving gun.

Box barrages against enemy tanks and large
troop concentrations.
Direct fire against tanks which have penetrated.
Barrages in front of the main line of resistance and in the depth of the friendly main
battle position.
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coordinated for these barrages, which normally are
about 330 yards in front of the friendly main line
of resistance. The areas covered by the barrages
are usually identified with names. Each artillery
battalion is supposed to have not more than four
barrage areas, about 440 yards wide and overlapping the barrage areas of adjacent artillery battal-
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ions. Antitank barrages follow the enemy along
his axis of approach to the friendly main line of
resistance; however, these barrages find only limited employment due to gunnery difficulties.
The Red Army places great emphasis on the employment of roving guns in the defensive. They
deceive the enemy as to the quantity and grouping
of the friendly artillery and thereby force the enemy
to disperse the fire of his supporting weapons.
Plans for the employment of roving guns are
carefully worked out by the battalion commander of
the firing platoon to achieve maximum effects.
These plans include the march route of the gun,
positions to be occupied and the reference points,
firing positions to be used for effect, and deceptive
firing positions. With the assistance of the topographical computation platoon of the battalion, the
battalion commander also prepares a chart which
contains: a description of the observation points and
reference points; a description of the march route;
target designation and firing data; and the number
of rounds to be expended for each target and firing
position. The firing platoon also is furnished with
a small map which contains the march route, the
firing positions (which are staked previously on the
ground for easier identification), and the reference
points (fig. 32).
c. Artillery counterattack. Soviet doctrine
speaks of an "artillery counterattack," thus emphasizing the offensive character of the artillery in the
defensive. The mission of the artillery is to crush
an enemy attack in its initial phase. The artillery
counterattack, controlled by a carefully prepared fire
plan, commences when the enemy moves into his assembly position and begins his attack preparations.
Soviet artillery relies on the observation battalions
for firing data, to obtain complete surprise and
abstain from using registration fire. The organization of artillery in the centralized defense facilitates
the conduct of the artillery counterattack.
d. Artillery in delaying action and retreat.
In delaying actions and retreats, the artillery is or·
ganized in depth. Firing positions and ammunition reserves are prepared in the rear to facilitate
speedy retrograde displacement and to permit relatively large expenditure of ammunition by the covering forces. Single motorized batteries or battalions are subordinated to the rear guard covering
the retreat of the infantry. Soviet artillery opens
fire at great ranges to delay and disorganize the
advancing enemy.
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5. ATTACK OF TARGETS
The effectiveness of artillery fire, according to Red
Army doctrines, depends upon correct determina.
tion of the nature and location of the target, correct
choice of the objective of fire, and the mode of at·
tack (including weapons, ammunition, fuze, charge,
angle of impact, firing pattern, and expenditure of
ammunition) .
Accuracy of registration and constant correction
of fire, as well as continuous, accurate planning are
additional factors.
Surprise is of max!mum importance in fire against
personnel; prior adjustment directly on the target
is permissible only in exceptional cases. Short
bursts of sudden, massed fire at maximum rates produce the greatest physical and psychological effects.
Methodical fire, with the observation and adjustment
of each round, is most effective in the destruction
of materiel.
Tabulated standards for neutralization or de·
struction of targets are only guides. In the de·
struction of point targets, direct fire is most rapid
and economical; no expenditure of ammunition can
replace accuracy in destruction fire. Direct fire,
however, demands extremely careful preparation and
camouflage to prevent excessive losses of personnel
and materiel. All types of fire for effect must be
employed until the required tactical results have
been achieved.
The rate of fire should not exceed the technical
capabilities of each weapon as designated in stand·
ard tables. With reduced charges in prolonged
fire, increases up to 50 percent are permissible. The
rate of fire must not be increased at the expense of
accuracy. After prolonged or intense fighting, corrections for heating and other ballistic changes are
essential.
a. Types of targets. From the standpoint of
artillery fire, enemy operations and installations
may be divided into seven general components, excluding aircraft: personnel (or animals); tanks,
motor vehicles, and other ordnance; field fortifications, tank ditches, houses, and other structures of
moderate strejl1gth; permanent fortifications and
structures of great strength; minefields; wire,
dragon's teeth, and similar resistant, small, but immobile, targets; and elevated targets, such as observation posts in high trees and observation balloons.
PERSONNEL. Personnel are the primary or secondary targets of all artillery fire. Fragmentation
and incendiary projectiles are most effective against
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personnel in the open; heavy blast can often neutralize or destroy personnel under cover even in the
absence of direct hits_ Light and medium artillery
may be usefully employed against personnel,
although mortars and rockets of similar calibers are
more effective. Surprise and quick action are
mandatory.
Against moving infantry, cavalry, or motorized
troops, shrapnel and high explosive shells with
superquick, delayed (to produce ricochet) , and time
fuzes are employed. Fire is usually by battery, with
a normal or concentrated sheaf, in rapid bursts of
four to six volleys, at each sight adjustment. Whenever possible, fire is delayed until the approach of
troops to a registered phase line. Concentrated fire
begins with their arrival on the line of shorts.
Against large or rapidly moving masses of infantry,
zone fire by all available artillery produces decisive
results. At long ranges, such fire should be adjusted
by aerial observation whenever possible.
Against infantry in the open or troops in shallow
trenches, ricochet fire, and fire with superquick fuze
and minimum charge are most effective. HE with
time or superquick fuze is employed against reverse
slopes. In very broken terrain, high-angle fire is
used with delayed fuze to get maximum vertical dispersion. The sheaf must be normal or concentrated
to correspond to the width of the target. Bursts of
three to six volleys alternate with methodical fire.
Several methods of fire may be employed against
personnel in field fortifications. Small groups of
observed or unobserved, but accurately located,
targets may be grouped into target areas not exceeding 72,000 to 96,000 square yards, which are
brought under fire by sudden concentrations of medium or heavy artillery (at least one battalion per
240 square yards I employing suitable zone fire,
with HE and incendiary ammunition, quick fuze,
and minimum charge. When targets are inaccurately located, the probable error in range and
dispersion must be determined.

If the target is large, such as a battery position or
a supply installation, fire is distribu~ed uniformly.
If the target is small, distribution of fire corresponds
to the law of probabilities, with the heaviest concentration in the center of the area.
TANKS AND OTHER ORDNANCE. Projectiles which
result in penetration, incendiary action, and strong
blast are effective against tanks and other ordnance.
Accompanying exposed personnel must always be
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attacked simultaneously-by fragmentation fire
from other weapons, if necessary.
Distant firing missions against tanks, motor vehicles, artillery, and similar materiel are executed by
the concentrated fire of medium or heavy guns, or
heavy howitzers. Aerial observation and control,
or precise registration, are essential to prevent excessive waste of ammunition. HE with superquick
fuze, or concrete-piercing ammunition, are combined
with incendiary shells for optimum results. Fire
proceeds at maximum rates in bursts of 2 or 3 minutes, interrupted .by periods of methodical fire and
ad j ustment.
Firing missions against moving tanks at medium
ranges (antitank defensive barrages) must be previously organized, with one or two battalions of
medium artillery assigned to each probable tank
approach, and with light artillery and mortars prepared to fire upon accompanying infantry. Phase
lines are registered along these approaches at inter·
vals of 330 to 440 yards, depending on the probable
speed of the tanks. HE superquick-fuze ammunition is allotted and prepared at firing positions. As
the head of the enemy tank column reaches each
phase line, concentrated fire at maximum rates is
conducted for 2 or 3 minutes. As soon as the main
tank group has passed the point of concentration,
fire is then laid down upon the next phase line.
Antipersonnel fire may be continued on the first
phase line to isolate the tanks from their infantry.
The last phase line is within direct fire range.
The Red Army considers training in direct fire
against tanks essential for all light and medium artillery. In massed tank attacks, fire must be opened
at a maximum direct·fire range of 1,100 to 1,650
yards. To destroy single tanks or small units, the
most effective ranges are 330 to 770 yards, depending on muzzle velocity. Maximum charges, with
armor-piercing or concrete-piercing ammunition,
are employed. In the absence of AP ammunition,
HE with quick or superquick fuze may be used,
especially against tankettes, armored cars, and other
lightly armored vehicles.
FIELD FORTIFICATIONS. Field fortifications, tank
ditches, houses, and similar structures present a
variety of firing problems. Some of the more important variables to be considered are: hardness
and texture of the ground; drainage and vegetation;
presence of timber, brick, steel rails, or other reo
inforcements; surface and subsurface profiles; nature and degree of overhead cover; and the degree
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of compartmentation. Hasty defenses may sometimes be destroyed by light artillery and mortars,
while developed systems often require prolonged
operations by heavy artillery and direct cannon fire
even for effective neutralization. The peculiarities
in each case must he established by the most thorough reconnaissance possible.
Fire upon field fortifications is best initiated by
surprise concentrations of medium howitzers, mortars, and rockets (high-angle fire, HE and incendiary shells, quick and superquick fuzes). In addition to the physical and psychological effects against
personnel, such concentrations serve to remove
camouflage, exposing armor or concrete, and reveal dummy positions or weak spots. Soviet artillery then initiates destruction fire. Compact groups
of light fortifications may often be destroyed by
several repeated concentrations, carefully observed
and adjusted.
The destruction of strong and extensive field fortifications in this manner, however, is rarely feasible.
In firing upon such systems, comprehensive reconnaissance must establish, as far as possible, the
coordinated tactical grouping of the fortifications,
differentiating occupied and alternate firing positions, observation posts, personnel shelters, communication trenches, barrier systems, and dummy installations. A definite firing plan must be developed
for each strongpoint.
An artillery-destruction groupment or subgroupment is formed, and necessary types and numbers of
weapons are allotted. Guns or howitzers are used
for direct short-range fire at embrasures or vertical
walls (using HE delayed fuze). Medium howitzers
or heavy mortars with HE and quick or delayed fuze
destroy and interdict communication or other
trenches: in frontal fire, high-angle fire is used; in
flanking fire, flat-trajectory. Personnel shelters and
emplacements with good overhead cover must be
destroyed by high-angle fire from heavy or very
heavy howitzers using HE or incendiary shells and
delayed fuze. Mortars, howitzers, or light guns may
be used to neutralize other, lighter positions or to
blind them with smoke. In all cases, fire must secure
maximum accuracy. Observation is deployed as far
forward as possible. No more weapons than necessary are employed, and every round must be
ob~erved.
Firing upon fortified houses is normally difficult
and time consuming, because, in modern tactics, the
main battle position is dug into the basement, with

TM 30-430
firing apertures broken through the wall. In the
center of the basement, a personnel shelter is constructed, while a communication trench facilitates
escape from one or more hidden exits. This position
is not only given natural protection by the house
foundations, walls, and floors, but it is also reinforced and fireproofed by the construction of barricades and blast walls, and the packing of earth on
floors. The roof and upper stories are used for
observation and harrassing fire.
There are two methods of artillery attack upon
such a strongpoint. Heavy or very heavy howitzers
may demolish the entire position. If these are not
available, or if time and ammunition do not allow
their extensive use, an entirely different technique
must be employed. Destruction of the upper structure alone is not only futile, but it hampers subsequent artillery and infantry operations by limiting
visibility in dust and smoke, and increasing protection and camouflage afforded by rubble. The most
effective technique is neutralization of the windows
and roofs with time fire or shrapnel; destruction of
the forward and other edges of the basement with
direct fire or flat trajectory (HE, delayed fuze) fire
from medium howitzers or guns; and interdiction
of possible exits with suitable zone fire (by howitzers or mortars). After the main battle position is
thus destroyed or neutralized, the upper structure
may be destroyed by using HE or incendiary projectiles, or it may be mopped up by infantry.
PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS. Successful fire
upon massive structures requires comprehensive
visual and fire reconnaissance, employment of very
heavy howitzers and medium guns, close range and
continuous observation and adjustment, and, if possible, suitable firing positions not over 5 kilometers
from the target. Under favorable circumstances
fortified targets up to 10 kilometers distant may be
destroyed; at greater ranges only neutralization is
usually possible. Destruction can rarely be accomplished in less than several days' reconnaissance
and a day's fire, or with the expenditure of less than
several hundred rounds per target.
Permanent fortifications are destroyed by the flat
trajectory fire of medium and heavy guns, and of
very heavy howitzers, or by high-angle fire from
very heavy howitzers. Such targets are neutralized
by direct, short-range fire of light and medium guns
at embrasures and armor. The angle of impact in
all cases must not be less than 58 degrees. Flattrajectory fire, and especially direct fire, must be
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employed whenever possible, since these bring about
an economy of 80 to 90 percent in time and ammunition_ Care must be exercised, however, to conduct such fire against the actual wall of the position,
rather than against a mask or exterior blast wall.
Red A];my artillery missions against massive structures are divided into four phases: fire reconnaissance, selection of firing positions for very heavy
artillery, registration, and destruction fire. To
conduct such an attack, an artillery destruction
groupment or subgroupment is formed. As far as
is necessary, its operations must be protected against
counterbattery fire by the neutralization of enemy
artillery.
Fire reconnaissance is conducted by medium and
heavy howitzers, and, to a lesser degree, by mortars
and rockets. It must be closely coordinated with
repeated aerial and ground photography, and with
continuous optical observation. Fire on the suspected area seeks to strip away masks and camouflage, and to establish the presence and thickness
of concrete or armor, the outlines of the fortified
structures, the location and direction of embrasures,
and the system of tactical coordination with other
strongpoints. In fire reconnaissance, the presence
of gray dust in a low, wide burst and a sharp reverbration indicate concrete; a very marked reverberation, and frequent, sudden ricochets indicate the
presence of armor. Indisputable evidence of the
presence of permanent fortifications is afforded by
the gradual disclosure of angular outlines, embrasures, and cupolas. On the other hand, a dummy
position is indicated if repeated hits develop a large,
sagging depression not over 2 yards above ground
level without revealing any indications of the presence of concrete or armor.
If fire reconnaissance discloses a field fortification
within the capabilities of the artillery then firing,
these guns continue fire until the target is destroyed.
Once fire reconnaissance has definitely established
the presence and character of permanent fortifications, firing positions for very heavy artillery are
chosen. One to two pieces are assigned to each
target. Whenever feasible, the positions should allow flat trajectory or very high-angle fire at ranges
under 5,500 yards, provide reasonable cover from
enemy fire, and coincide as closely as possible with
the longitudinal axis of the targets. Suitable covered approaches must exist. Observation must be
provided as far forward as possible, preferably
within 550 yards of the target. In some instances,
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local infantry attacks may be necessary to facilitate
such observation. Observation posts are either single or in pairs. The single observation post must
coincide as closely as possible with the gun-target
line. In every case, exact survey is indispensable.
Soviet gun positions for dir.ect fire against embrasures are also chosen with great care; they should
be within 660 yards of the target and in direct line
with embrasures, vertical walls, or other vulnerable
parts of the target. Extremely careful camouflage
must be maintained in occupying positions and prior
to opening fire. Artillery which has a mission of
destruction takes precedence over all other weapons
in the occupation of suitable firing positions and
observation posts.
Fire continues until the obvious collapse of the
target, or until two or three complete penetrations
ha ve resulted. This requires from two to ten direct
hits by heavy guns or very heavy howitzers, depending on the strength of the fortification and the power
of the weapon. Approximate ammunition requirements for each hit may be calculated by the probability formula. When destruction has been completed, interdiction fire by light and medium artillery is essential to prevent reoccupation of the ruins.
MINEFIELDS. Establishing gaps through minefields in volves two phases: fire reconnaissance and
fire for destruction. In fire reconnaissance, a heavy
battery combs the entire suspected area, employing
a parallel sheaf and elevation changes of one probable error. (Combing fire is an observed barrage
progressively covering an area with suspected, especially immobile, targets. As soon as results of
fire confirm the location of the targets-by explo. sions, sudden ricochet, etc.-massed fire for effect
is initiated.) HE, with quick fuze, is employed.
Two battery salvos are fired at each s-ight setting,
with careful observation for signs of sympathetic
detonations.
Once the boundaries of the minefield and of the
desired gaps have been determined, fire for effect
is begun. If possible, heavy or very heavy howitzers are used. The sheaf is closed or concentrated to ll-yard intervals. Ricochet fire is employed, with the burst no higher than II yards above
the ground. Fire is conducted at one sight setting,
with observation of each salvo, until no evidence of
sympathetic detonations can be seen or heard. If
the probable error in range is small and the minefield deep, then the bombardment is repeated at the
next sight elevation, until the gap has been com-
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pletely cleared. In the absence of heavy or very
heavy howitzers, the Red Army may use medium
howitzers or light guns against minefields. HE with
quick fuze is used. Large expenditures of ammunition are necessary, however, and results are not
always certain.
WIRE. Against wire, dragon's teeth, and similar
resistant, small, but immobile, targets, the Soviets
employ frontal, flat-trajectory fire by light guns or,
in some cases, medium howitzers. Protection of
these weapons by other artillery fire is generally
necessary. If more than one weapon is employed,
calibration and ballistic corrections must be applied.
Whenever possible, direct fire is used; in no case
should the range exceed 3,300 yards.
Medium howitzers or light guns are employed,
singly or in small units, to destroy wire. If the
desired gap is 9 yards or less, a concentrated sheaf
is used; otherwise, the sheaf corresponds to the desired width. HE ammunition is employed, with
superquick fuze and the minimum possible charge
(to produce the maximum angle of impact with
least range dispersion). The forward edge of the
wire serves as the aiming point; to secure the best
results, one·third of the rounds should be shorts.
Fire is continued until the gap is completely cleared.
Requirements in time and ammunition vary greatly
with the range and the depth of the wire barrier.
Dragon's teeth are attacked with short-range direct fire. Light guns with AP ammunition are
employed against concrete and granite dragon's
teeth; timber obstacles are destroyed by medium
howitzers with HE fire and superquick fuze. Artillery fire is ineffective against heavy steel obstacles.
In all cases, dragon's teeth and similar obstacles
require the expenditure of much time and ammunition. Fire must be continued until the remnant
stumps can be cleared by tanks.
b. Fire objectives. The obj ectives of Soviet
of fire for effect are: neutralization, destruction,
interdiction, or harassment. Fire reconnaissance is
either an independent objective or a phase of ob·
served fire for effect. Above all, choice depends on
the targets' threat to the infantry (or tank) scheme
of maneuver. Successive phases of an operation will
often require different objectives in firing upon the
same target: for example, neutralization during the
artillery preparation, destruction during the assault,
and interdiction of the ru'ins during exploitation.
Other important factors are: firing capabilities of
the artillery within the time and with the ammunition available; accuracy of target location and reg-
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istration; size of the target and its resistance to fire;
range; and meteorological and visibility conditions.
Neutralization is the normal objective of artillery
fire; by employing surprise and intense fire, almost
any target can be successfully neutralized. This
condition is primarily psychological, and results
normally from attacks on personnel that achieve 25
percent casualties, with accompanying shock and
destruction. Neutralization is achieved by two or
three repeated periods of concentrated fire, interrupted by periods of adjustment and methodical
fire. Whenever possible, continuous observation
must be maintained on neutralized targets. If signs
of activity are observed, harassing fire should be
employed; a major resurgence of activity should be
neutralized by a new concentration of fire.
The annihilation of personnel or the certain de·
struction of materiel by artillery fire are possible
only under favorable conditions. Direct fire at
short ranges, as the most certain, rapid, and economical method, must be employed whenever possible.
Flat-trajectory observed fire and high-angle observed fire by medium, heavy, and very heavy artillery demand successively greater accuracy in initial
data and a greater expenditure of time and ammunition. Unobserved fire for destruction is practicable
only with large masses of heavy and very heavy
artillery and cannot be guaranteed against small,
mobile, or very resistant targets. It should be utilized only in exceptional cases, against targets of
the greatest importance. Fire for destruction by
large masses of artillery is usually feasible only
against personnel or light field fortifications. When
more than one piece is employed for the destruction
of a small resistant target, full ballastic preparation,
precise registration, and continuous control of fire
are indispensable.
Soviet artillery fire is widely employed to deny
terrain to the enemy and to immobilize him undercover. The principal types of interdictory fire are
antipersonnel and antitank defensive barrages, accompanying barrages, accompanying concentrations, and distant interdictory concentrations. All
interdiction fire requires accurate registration on
the target, and continual knowledge of the exact location of friendly troops. The battalion, or its
equivalent, is usually the smallest unit to conduct
interdiction fire. Often such types of fire are
mixed: for example, an antipersonnel mortar barrage fired in conjunction with an antitank artillery
barrage.
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ANTIPERSONNEL DEFENSIVE BARRAGES. These
are planned so as to lay down fire on registered and
observed phase lines, screening friendly forces
against infantry attacks or counterattacks. If the
friendly troops are under cover, such barrages may
be laid down not closer to them than 220 yards with
frontal fire, and 110 yards with flanking fire. If
the friendly troops are in the open, minimum dis·
tances for light or medium artillery are 440 yards
with ricochet or superquick fuze, and 220 yards with
quick fuze. The normal sheaf is employed in fron·
tal fire; in flanking fire, platoon (two.gun) concentrations are separated by one sight setting for
guns or two for howitzers. Fire is conducted at
one sight setting only. At each piece, 10 or 12
rounds of fuzed ammunition are set aside; in firing,
two or three rapid volleys are followed by methodi·
cal fire every 5 to 10 seconds. Registered ranges
and deflections are noted prominently on each piece;
care is taken to correct for decreases in range after
prolonged fire and for other errors. Calls for anti·
personnel defensive barrages take precedence over
all other firing missions, which are immediately sus·
pended.
ANTITANK DEFENSIVE BARRAGES. These have
been described under attacks against tanks.
ACCOMPANYING BARRAGES. These are employed
to support infantry and tanks through the main line
of enemy resistance (1,650 to 2,200 yards) in the
assault of organized positions. They consist of a
rolling barrage by heavy mortars, medium howit·
zers, or light guns; direct fire through gaps in the
infantry lines by light guns and howitzers; and ac·
companying concentrations against rear areas by
heavier weapons. In organizing the rolling barrage, the zone of fire is divided into sectors by primary and intermediate phase lines. The first pri.
mary phase line is 220 to 275 yards from the line
of departure. In the support of infantry, other
primary phase lines are from 165 to 330 yards apart
(usually on enemy trenches or on other lines of resistance or movement) ; in the support of light tanks,
275 to 440 yards; in the support of medium or heavy
tanks, 440 to 880 yards. Intermediate phase lines
for infantry are separated by 110 yards; for tanks
by 220 yards.
The width of the sheaf varies from 40 to 80 per·
cent of normal. Density of fire on each phase line
varies from 6 to 18 rounds per no yards per minute,
depending on the caliber (76.2- to 152-mm) of the
weapon used. When exceptionally heavy resistance
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is expected, the barrage may be deepened-not
thickened-by additional layers of medium or heavy
artillery fire. HE with superquick or delayed (rico·
chet) fuzes and flat-trajectory fire are employed;
also shrapnel and smoke shells under favorable
circumstances.
The duration of fire on each primary and secondary phase line is determined by the speed of
advance of the supported troops. Fire is lifted by
signal from primary phase lines, and by schedule
(not over 2 minutes) from intermediate phase lines.
Accompanying barrages require exceptional safeguards: full ballistic preparation and precise regis.
tration, reliable multiple-signal systems, and con·
tinual observation of friendly troop;; from all
possible points.
ACCOMPANYING CONCENTRATIONS. This type of
fire, employing uniform zones, neutralizes suspected
or active areas of enemy resistance. It is employed
either as a part of an accompanying barrage or-if
the resistance is moderate or when ammunition is
insufficient for an accompanying barrage--independently. The concentrations may be fired on call
or on a schedule. Generally, fire is lifted by signal.
INTERDICTION FIRE AT LONG RANGES. This is
used to block communications. Employment of
precise data is necessary to avoid excessive waste of
ammunition. If the target is under observation, fire
is begun at the approach of enemy vehicles or per·
sonnel; otherwise, an irregular schedule of harassing
fire is maintained. The weapons and firing unit
employed depend on the range and the size of the
target.
Harassing fire, designed to reduce enemy efficiency and excite return fire, is conducted by roving
batteries or from alternate positions. It may consist of sudden concentrations, or the more constant
fire of a few guns. Intervals, expenditure of ammunition, and pattern of fire must be constantly
varied to secure maximum effect. High explosive
with delayed (ricochet) or superquick fuze and minimum charges are utilized.
Fire reconnaissance, conducted by roving batteries or by elements of an artillery destruction groupment, seeks to clarify the enemy situation and to
permit the economical and effective use of heavy
and very heavy artillery by provoking enemy fire or
other noticeable activity; by stripping off camouflage, earth, and other cover from suspected permanent fortifications; by detonating mines, etc. Me·
dium guns and howitzers are employed, with de.
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layed (ricochet) or quick fuze, depending on the
target. Observation, aerial photography, or sound
ranging are indispensable. Against areas suspected
of containing personnel, harassing or combing fire
is most effective; against minefields, combing fire
is required; against camouflage, combing or con·
centrated fire may be utilized.
c. Registration. The Soviets regard accurate
registration as the indispensable foundation of their
techniques of massed fire and fire on unobserved
targets. The four elements of registration are: ballistic preparation; development of a network of registration check points; adjustment of fire; and
transfer of fire to the target, or massing it on the
target.
In massing large quantities of artillery, registration is limited to gain surprise and to avoid obscuring observation. Registration fire is usually conducted by one piece of each caliber and a model
from each battalion or groupment, although the
proportion may be as low as one piece every 4,400
to 5,500 yards. Ballistic preparation and survey
must have been completed. The registration piece
must be the best available, that is, have the lowest
differential reduction of muzzle velocity, and be
carefully calibrated, preferably by fire.
ADJUSTMENT TECHNIQUE. The primary technique of adjustment of fire is bracketing, controlled
by a single axial or lateral observer. Whenever
possible, shells from the same lot and of the same
weight and fuze setting are employed both in adjustment and in fire for effect. For adjustment on
an impact check point, at least four rounds are required; for adjustment on an air burst or sound
ranging check point, from six to nine rounds.
Normally, adjustment is fired by a single piece,
with corrections for range, deflection, and-in air
burst or ricochet-elevation. When speed is desired, as in adjustment on personnel, or when adjustment is by sound ranging or aerial observation,
battery or battalion salvos are employed.
OBSERV ATION. Aerial observation is undertaken
with the light, two-seater U-2 airplane, the slow
but heavily armored Stormovik, or with an observation balloon. It is normally limited to ranges in
excess of 5,500 yards or to areas inaccessible to
ground observation. In every case, thorough briefing of the pilot and air observer in land marks,
orientation points, and recognition signals is required to reduce time in the air and to obviate errors. Salvos are always concentrated. The fire of
battery or battalion ladders is a common type of

TM 30-430
control. In another method of correction, the observer drops a flare or a smoke bomb at a point
visible to ground observers and adjusts fire in relation to this reference point.
When large numbers of guns are firing, identification of the correct bursts for adjustment is insured
by checking the estimated time of flight with a stop
watch.
Adjustment of fire by paired observers is undertaken to insure both greater accuracy and greater
economy of ammunition than are possible with a
single observer. This is the basic method for heavy
artillery, and is utilized whenever time and terrain
permit establishment of suitable observation points
and signal communications. The angle of intersection between the observers' lines of sight and the
target must always exceed 250 mils.
FIRE TRANSFER. Two techniques are employed
for transfers of fire: K-transfer (computation of the
coefficient between survey and registration distances,
angle of site, drift, and necessary additional corrections for changes of ammunition) when survey
has been completed; and direct transfer from a real
or an arbitrary check point with or without survey.
The first method is applicable to transfers up to
1,650 yards from the check point; the second, up to
330 yards, with a deflection not in excess of 300 mils.
Whenever possible, fire should be transferred immediately after adjustment on a check point. When
this is impossible, the correction of two factors must
be considered. Adjustments for meteorological conditions must be made within a maximum of 3 to
12 hours, depending inversely on the height of
trajectory. Adjustments for change in range of the
trajectory due to the heating of tubes and ammuni·
tion must be made after 20 to 30 minutes of steady
fire. To compensate for this decrease in range, elevations should be raised by one or two sight graduations for ranges of 3 to 6 kilometers; by two to
three graduations for longer ranges.
More accurate correction of the transfer results
from re-registration executed by the original registration piece. If graphs of the lines of registration
distances and deflections have been previously pre·
pared, it is necessary only to fire one check point.
The old data are then recomputed proportionally
to the new correction. Such re-registration is especially important in unobserved fire.
6. ARTILLERY ANTITANK TACTICS

The destruction of tanks and self-propelled guns is
the primary or secondary mission of all artillery,
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and Red Army crews on all types of artillery are
trained in direct fire. The antitank defensive barrages of medium and heavy artillery have been
described above under the discussion of types of
targets. The primary tank·destroying weapons are,

rifle corps and division commanders for the protec·
tion of primary sectors. Part of the antitank artillery must always be kept by the Commander of
Combined Arms as a reserve. For example, onefourth of the antitank guns of a rifle division, in-
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Figure 33.

Antitank artillery supplemented by obstacles in a Soviet main battle position.

however, towed antitank guns: 45-mm, 57-mm, 76.2mm, 85-mm, and IOO-mm guns are found in organic
and GHQ antitank artillery units. Self-propelled
artillery often supports towed antitank guns, particularly in mobile corps; self-propelled artillery tactics
are described under section III, Armored and
Mechanized Forces.
Antitank artillery regiments are often attached to
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eluding regimental and battalion weapons, are held
in the mobile divisional antitank gun reserve.
Coordination between antitank artillery and other
arms, especially field artillery, mortars, engineers,
and infantry, is of prime importance. Antitank artillery regiments are also used as tank support in
the area of the main effort.
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Antitank artillery is usually employed in echelons,
with weapons of varied caliber in each to insure
equal distribution of fire power. Light and medium
antitank artillery is supported as a rule by heavy
antitank artillery, such as the newly developed 100mm gun, for fire against heavy enemy tanks.
Lighter guns are emplaced as far forward as practicable, although normally not before the second line
of infantry trenches. Well dug-in and camouflaged
positions, protected by infantry and antitank rifles,
are mandatory. Each battery must have at least one
alternate position. When this is occupied, the original position is maintained as a dummy position.
Change of position usually takes place at night.
Antitank guns in each position are placed in rhombus pattern to obtain all-around fields of fire.
The fire plan of Soviet antitank artillery is carefully worked out, with particular attention given to
the natural tank approach routes_ The fire of the
antitank guns is usually coordinated with a system
of ground obstacles erected under engineer control;
constant liaison and coordination between antitank
artillery and combat engineers is therefore mandatory_ Also, minefields normally are laid to protect the gun position itself (fig. 33).
The Soviets compute the minimum required density of antitank weapons in defensive sectors on the
basis of the suspected number of enemy tanks, the
number and characteristics of tank approaches, and
the average number of rounds necessary for a tank
kill. On the basis of experience against enemy armor, the Red Army figures on six rounds of fire from
76.2-mm antitank guns, or 12 rounds from 45-mm
antitank guns, for the destruction of one medium
tank_
Antitank fire is directed not only against tanks,
but also against accompanying infantry. Such
antipersonnel fire is usually supported by mortar
units and automatic weapons in coordination with
the antitank artillery.
Antitank guns continue firing until overrun, since
the Red Army considers that the destruction of a
large number of enemy tanks represents the successful execution of the mission even when all of its
own pieces are lost. The Soviets consider that each
antitank gun is capable of destroying an average of
2 to 3 enemy tanks before it is put out of action.

As a rule, antitank guns fire at ranges of 550 to
660 yards in order to avoid revealing prematurely
the location of positions_ However, when a socalled "firesack" is prepared, a limited number of
guns (usually flank pieces) open fire at the first
enemy tank wave at 1,650- to 2,200 yard ranges,
attempting to channelize the enemy tanks into the
area of the prepared concentration. Reinforcing
self-propelled artillery fires at the tanks from concealed positions; supporting artillery, such as 152-

Figure 34.

Organization of a firesark by an antitank
artillery regiment.

mm howitzers, fires from positions to the rear and
flanks of the antitank guns (fig. 34).
The mobile antitank artillery reserve usually consists of one battery from each regiment. It is located to the rear, in the center, and on the flanks of
the defense sector under the centralized control of
the Commander. Artillery reserves are committed
by platoons against enemy tank attacks at the flanks_
One platoon will open fire immediately while another moves to a more favorable position", pulled
over short distances by the gun crew_
A secondary mission of antitank artillery is its
employment in support of infantry and tank attacks,
with the bulk of the antitank artillery committed in
the first assault echelon (fig. 351.
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Figure 35.

Antitank artillery regiment in support of a tank attack.

Section III. ARMORED AND
MECHANIZED FORCES
1. COMBAT MISSIONS

The combat tasks of Soviet armored forces are to
deliver decisive blows on a narrow sector, to wedge
deeply in the enemy defensive system, and, in coordination with other arms, to envelop and destroy
large hostile units. The paramount principles of
Soviet tank tactics are the continuity of cooperation with other arms and full exploitation of tank
mobility.
From late 1942 to the end of World War II was
a period of definite change in Soviet employment
of armor. Soviet strategists believed, in the early
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part of this period, that the main effort should be
made primarily by infantry and that armor should
be used in the exploitation of a break.through to
develop a pursuit. This tactic, however, seldom was
successful, since German defenses were progressively deepened to the point where resistance was
never completely broken by a penetration of the
main line of resistance.
As German defenses stiffened, Soviet armor was
more extensively used to effect penetrations; and
additional units of armor were used successively to
effect exploitation, pursuit, and envelopment.
Current Soviet doctrine requires that all armor be
given local protection by infantry, normally riding
on the vehicle prior to deployment in order to com-
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bat concealed infantry traps. Advance engineer de·
tachments and engineer tank riders clear lancs in
minefields. In addition, mine.clearing vehicles
called "trawlers" (operating on the same principle
as the British "Scorpion") have been developed to
clear paths for tanks in the assault of strong defen·
sive posItIons. The enormous depth of German
defensive systems with continuous lines and centers
of resistance made it necessary for Soviet tank {or·
mations to be reinforced by fully mobile infantry,
artillery, and mortars in order to regain their mo·
mentum against continuous resistance. Self-pro.
pelled artillery could not be limited to the role of
assault guns but had to be capable of centralized,
massed indirect fire_ Full-track carriers (Bren gun
carriers and Weasels) proved most effective for the
transportation of infantry and mortars.
2. ARMORED FORCES AND THEIR CAPABILITIES

Armored forces as large as "tank armies" are found
within the Red Army, but the normal operating units
are the tank corps and the mechanized corps. These
units are usually part of the GHQ reserve to be used
by the army or front commander as the situation
may demand. They are well balanced units resembling our armored divisions in strength and organi- .
zation. There are fewer tanks in the Soviet armored
units but the medium and heavy tank components,
compared to U. S. light and medium tanks, give
more weight to the Red Army armored units. Similarly, the Soviet units have less self-propelled artillery but it is of greater caliber length, hence more
powerful. The Soviet armored unit has a larger
infantry component than the U. S. armored division
and also contains heavy mortar units and a rocket
battalion which are absent in the U. S. armored
division.
The Soviets consider that armored forces are most
effectively employed in the enemy operational depth.
After intensive artillery preparation, the infantry
assault penetrates into enemy defenses. Then, armored forces strike in the direction of the deepest
infantry penetration on a narrow front from a con·
cealed centralized position, develop the breakthrough, and strike at the enemy's rear to destroy
him (figs. 36 and 37). The scale of operations may
reach mammoth proportions as in the break-through
of German defenses on the River Oder by some 4,000
tanks supported by 5,000 planes on a 50-mile front.
Large Red Army armored forces advanced as far
as 125 miles in 3 days under conditions of continuous and intensive combat against the German Army.
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The maneuver of armored forces is limited by
extreme terrain conditions such as swamps, thick
woods, mountains, and deep snow, but they are not
road bound and operate freely over difficult country. In a break-through sector a tank corps moves
on a front not wider than 3 miles, but may spread
out in the enemy operational depth depending upon
the available road nets, terrain, enemy resistance,
and assigned objectives.
Rapid transfers of Soviet armored units from one
sector to another laterally have been executed on
many occasions. These movements have been executed with secrecy and without disrupting the supply lines of units holding the area traversed. The
Soviets emphasize that the duration of sustained
combat depends upon resupply efficiency. Continuous fuel and ammunition supply can maintain armored units in action for several weeks, but Red
Army doctrine prescribes that infantry units must
consolidate and hold the territory penetrated by
tanks. The cavalry-tank team can increase the
tempo of the offensive from 1.5 miles per hour with
infantry to 3.5 miles per hour with cavalry.
a. Tank corps. The mission of the tank corps
is to destroy enemy infantry and firing positions
throughout the depth of the defenses in the breakthrough sector. The tank corps has great fire and
shock power for a frontal attack in a narrow sector,
but coordinates its assault with infantry units in
that sector. This infantry-tank assault team, aided
by intensive artillery preparation, repeatedly spearheaded Soviet offensives.
The major corps units are the three tank brigades,
and the motorized infantry brigade, supported by
two self-propelled artillery regiments-one regiment
each of 76.2-mm antitank artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and 120-mm mortars, a rocket battalion, and
a 45-mm antitank battalion.
The tank brigades are the striking elements of
the tank corps, and are reinforced by an attached
heavy tank regiment when circumstances require
maximum shock power. The tank brigade has a
strength of about 1,200 men and consists of 65 tanks
and a batta~ion of infantry with antitank rifles, antitank guns, and mortars.
h. Mechanized corps. The mechanized corps
is very similar to the tank corps in composition except for its larger infantry component. Three motorized infantry brigades, one tank brigade, and
one additional tank regiment give the mechanized
corps a strength of 16,000 as compared with 10,300
in the tank corps. The tank corps has two self-pro-
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MOBILE COLUMNS: TO PASS THROUGH GAPS IN ENEMY
LINE. SEIZE AND HASTILY fORTIfY DOMINANT TERRAIN
IN ENEMY'S REAR. DEfEND AGAINST ENEMY
COUNTERAnACKS.
MAIN ASSAULT fORCES: TO DESTROY THE ENEMY
fORCES TRAPPED BY THE MOBILE COLUMNS. AND
CONTINUE ADVANCE

(DEPLOYED AND

Figure 36.
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A typical armored assault in coordination with a frontal attack.
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Figure 37.

Tank brigade in a coordinated attack.

pelled artillery regiments; the mechanized corps has
one.
A mechanized brigade consists of a motorized
.brigade and one tank regiment of 40 medium tanks.
The mechanized corps centralizes control of the four
tank regiments but may detach them to support the
infantry elements. An additional heavy tank regiment is sometimes attached to the corps.
The mission of the mechanized corps is to exploit
break.throughs in organized defenses rather than to
accomplish the break-through. It is capable of
greater independent action than the tank corps, be671306"-45--6

cause of its balanced strength of infantry and armor
which resembles the U. S. combat command in tactical employment •
The average for mechanized corps operations in
four major offensives during 1943-44 follows:
Continuous action __________________________
Period of concentration _____________________
In offensive operation_______________________
On defensive ______________________________

46
4
20
22

days
days
days
days

Percentage of time on defensive_____________ 52 percent
Maximum penetration ______________________ 228 miles
Depth of territory consolidated after counterattacks by enemy reserves. __________________ 202 miles
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c. Infantry-support armored units. Small
GHQ units, such as the independent heavy tank
regiments, are frequently attached to infantry units
to support the infantry assault of strong defensive
positions. The missions of these tank units are designated by the commander of the infantry unit to
which the tanks are attached.
3. ROLES OF COMPONENT ARMS OF ARMORED
FORCES

a. Medium tanks. In the Red Army, the medium tank is the basic shock and maneuvering element of all armor. Its primary mission is to assist
the infantry in occupying enemy positions and
destroying enemy personnel. This mission is usually accomplished by frontal penetration or deep
outflanking of enemy positions. In frontal assaults,
medium tanks advance on a broad front or in a wide
wedge under cover of supporting weapons. They
are preceded or closely followed by infantry or engineers who guard the flanks and rear, reconnoitering
areas of suspicion. The tanks engage machine guns,
infantry heavy weapons, and antitank guns with
utmost vigor in order to force the enemy to disclose
his entire system of defensive fire. Frontal tank
attacks must always be deeply echeloned.
In operations against enemy armOl, particularly
against heavy tanks and assault guns, medium tanks
made full use of their speed and maneuverability,
attempting constantly to strike at flanks or rear. The
use of medium tanks as tank destroyers from concealed positions is exceptional. Even in defense,
tanks are used in a mobile role and particularly to
support counterattacks.
h. Heavy tanks. Heavy tanks are used in mass
in the direction of the main effort, and always in
coordination with medium tanks which protect their
flanks and rear. Medium tanks force commitment
of enemy antitank weapons which are then destroyed
by heavy tank fire. In operations against armor,
particularly medium tanks, the heavy tanks attack
frontally, while accompanying medium tanks envelop
the enemy flanks and rear. Only in the support of
assault groups destroying emplacements are heavy
tanks used in small separate detachments of 2 or 3
tanks. Infantry must always support heavy tanks.
When enemy opposition is severe, heavy tanks reinforce medium tanks by attacking heavy enemy tanks,
self-propelled artillery, antitank and field artillery,
and permanent fortifications. They depend primarily upon long-range, flat-trajectory, direct fire from
short halts.
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c. Self-propelled artillery. Self-propelled artillery provides security for tanks by protecting their
flanks and rear against armored counterattacks.
They operate from hull defilade or concealed positions, covering probable avenues of tank approach.
Unlike towed antitank guns, which fire in place
until either they or enemy tanks have been neutralized, Soviet self-propelled guns utilize their mobility and speed repeatedly to outflank attacking tanks.
They must, however, be provided with automatic
weapons and antitank rifle protection against enemy
infantry. In frontal assaults, self-propelled guns
follow tanks (at approximately 400 yards) by moving from cover to cover.
They also support infantry in the reduction of
by-passed field or light permanent fortifications.
Heavy self-propelled guns reinforce the fire of medium self-propelled howitzers and tank destroyers.
Their heavier armor permits more aggressive tanklike tactics. Their great fire power makes them
extremely effective against all armored vehicles, artillery, and permanent fortifications. Low rates of
fire and limited ammunition capacity are their principal weaknesses.
d. Mine-clearing tanks. Flail-type mine clearing tanks are employed to clear lanes through enemy
minefields as rapidly as possible in order to facilitate
the uninterrupted forward progress of tanks and selfpropelled guns. Mine-clearing tanks approach the
line of departure from concealed positions during
the artillery preparation phase and take lead positions in the infantry tank-support groups. Two or
three mine-clearing tanks are used for clearing each
lane. Close support by tanks, self-propelled guns,
mortars, and pioneers (combat engineers) is always
provided to protect the mine-clearing tanks from
enemy fire covering the minefield. Assault tanks
follow mine-clearing tanks within 60 yards. The
pioneers from the first echelon of the tank support
group move forward with the mine-clearing tanks,
using visual signals for working with the tanks.
The pioneers remove mines from sectors of the field
inaccessible to mine-clearing tanks, remove tank
obstacles, and assault prepared enemy engineer fortifications under fire cover of the mine-clearing tanks
and assault tanks. After passing through a minefield, the mine-clearing tanks assemble in a concealed area to reorganize for succeeding missions,
while the assault groups move forward.
e. Artillery and mortars. Close artillery support is delivered to tank formations at all times.
Great flexibility in the control of artillery is normal
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when it moves forward into the penetration area.
After the artillery preparation, which is the normal
initial artillery mission for all artillery and mortars,
long. range army artillery units continue to support
the armored assault for depths up to 5 or 6 miles.
Direct army artillery support of the armored unit
ceases at this point, and other missions are executed- such as counterbattery fire against enemy
positions on the flanks of the break-through area.
The mobile artillery units continue to deliver fire
against enemy strongpoints encountered in the penetration area and on the flanks, as directed by the
supported armored unit commanders. One of the
most important Soviet artillery missions is to combat
counterattacking enemy tanks. Fire against strongpoints is delivered in short area concentrations. Not
less than one unit of fire is allotted to artillery for
the assault phase of the armored offensive. Approximately one brigade of artillery supports each
tank brigade of the first corps echelon. The 152mm gun-howitzers and the 122-mm guns are deemed
especially effective in supporting tanks against strong
resistance.
Heavy mortars are always employed in support of
motorized infantry. The battery commanders' observation posts are well forward within .1;2 to 1 mile
of the advance units. Control is decentralized to
battery commanders; larger concentrations are developed when enemy resistance slows down the
atlvance. The heavy mortars are always used in
supporting the independent operations of motorized
infantry, as well as during the break-through phase.
f. Rocket units. The rocket battalion is under
the control of the corps commander throughout the
entire operation. Rocket units are used only at
critical times. The launchers are brought to their
firing positions secretly and are fired in sudden concentrations. Rocket units are usetl for independent
operations of the armored corps, against enemy
counterattacks, and during the general artillery preparation for the corps offensive.
g. Infantry component. The infantry component of the armored corps is not entirely concentrated in the motorized infantry brigades, but has
infantry groups for local security of tanks and selfpropelled guns. The motorized submachine-gun
battalion of the tank brigade has a tank-riding company as well as a mortar, antitank gun, antitank rifle,
and an automatic-weapons company. These infantrymen facilitate the advance of armor by neutralizing enemy infantry antitank weapons and traps; they
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also organize small defensive positions against enemy
counterattacks.
h. EngiIreer troops. Engineer troops of the
armored corps are used especially in small units as
tank riders and with the leading motorized elements.
Their primary duties are to clear enemy mines and
obstacles, to facilitate the advance of armored ve·
hicles, and to assist in the reduction of strongpoints
with demolitions, flame throwers, and other engineer
assault equipment. In defending armor against
counterattacks, special hasty mine.laying techniques
are employed using both controlled and contact type
mines. The corps engineer battalion is capable of
other types of engineer support as well.
4. ARMORED AND MECHANIZED FORCES IN THE
OFFENSIVE

The armored offensive differs from the infantry of·
fensive in the following respects: The main effort
of the armored offensive is made on a relatively
narrow front by a deeply echeloned formation with
the objective of completely breaking through enemy
defensive positions and exploiting the break· through
by attacking enemy rear installations, encircling and
destroying enemy forces, and generally effecting
deep penetrations. The break-through operation of
large armored units passes through five distinct
phases: Concentration of forces, fire preparation,
the assault, securing the offensive, and exploitation
(fig. 38).
a. Concentration phase. This phase involves
movement of units, the dispersal of units, and very
extensive planning of coordinated action of all arms
for all phases of the offensive. Carefully planned
lateral movements of armored units from adjacent
sectors to the concentration area are executed at
night for distances up to 60 miles. Special traffic
controls insure regulated movement across the supply
lines of adjacent front-line units with minimum in·
terruption. Usually the armored formation moves
in at least two columns, with tanks and self·propelled
artillery to the front, and the remaining columns of
wheeled vehicles and tank corps reserves moving on
interior roads.
The concentration is usually 25 to 50 miles from
the front lines (fig. 39). The concentration phase
varies in duration from 3 to 8 days, during which
time coordination of all arms is based on information obtained from reconnaissance units and ob·
servers. The reconnaissance group of the tank or
mechanized corps, the various artillery observation
and survey detachments, engineer reconnaissance
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Tank brigade in break·through operations.
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Figure 39.

Concentration of armored forces and infantry for ofjenstve operations.
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units, and infantry patrols conduct intensive uninterrupted operations in the break-through sector.
Specific information vital to the armored force offensive is obtained by ground observation of engineer and tank reconnaissance units. This information includes:
Terrain throughout the enemy defensive
depth with respect to the maneuver of armored units.
Location and extent of the enemy fortifications strongpoints ( especially antitankgun emplacements I and troop dispositions.
Routes of withdrawal available to the enemy.
Air reconnaissance supplements this information
by determining the possible directions of enemy tank
counterattacks, the location of tank reserves, and
other pertinent data. The various artillery reconnaissance groups and observation posts determine
the location of artillery targets and firing plan of the
artillery offensive.

h. Fire preparation phase. This phase varies
in duration from several hours to several days, de·
pending entirely on the extent of the enemy defensive
pOSItIOn. The tank corps attacks independently
only in a sector where enemy defenses are relatively
weak. Then a short intensive artillery preparation,
immediately followed by the tank assault, combine
the shock power and surprise necessary to achieve
a break-through. Otherwise, an extended infantry.
artillery attack is necessary to breach the enemy
defensive pOSItIon. Large armored formations
move forward from the concentration area to the
assembly area, which is 9 to 12 miles from the
enemy front lines, prior to the period of artillery
preparation. This movement is made by echelons
during the night between D·minus 2 and D·minus
3 days.
c. Assault phase. During the period of artil·
lery preparation on the night before D.day, the
armored formation advances to its jump.off position,
located from % to 2 miles from the enemy front line.
Assault groups are organized from infantry, engi·
neers, and tanks for infantry support. These groups
vary in size from infantry companies to regiments
and are supported by tanks from independent bat·
talions, regiments, and brigades. Coordination be·
tween elements of the assault groups, the following
echelons, and supporting artillery is worked out in
detail. The mission of the assault group is to destroy
enemy firing positions and fortifications which the
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artillery preparation failed to neutralize, and to
clear lanes in minefields.
The first echelon of medium tanks follows immediately behind the assault groups, together with mine·
clearing tanks which clear lanes through minefields,
and attacks enemy positions by direct fire and flank
maneuvers. The first infantry echelon follows the
tanks at a distance of 200 to 400 yards. The second
echelon of tanks consists of heavy tanks and self·
propelled artillery moving behind the infantry at
a distance of 100 to 200 yards. These tanks and
self-propelled artillery support both the infantry and
the medium tanks of the first echelon. The artillerysupport group and the second infantry echelon follow
behind the heavy tanks (fig. 40).
Enemy defensive positions, 3 to 5 miles deep,
often consist of multiple belts containing lines of
trenches and numerous strongpoints. The immedi·
ate objective of the infantry-support tank group, together with the first infantry echelon and assault
groups, is to seize the first two trench lines of the
forward defense belt. The immediate objective of
the infantry group (infantry strength of about one
division) of the first corps echelon is to penetrate
the entire forward defensive belt, including enemy
battalion reserve positions and all strongpoints be·
tween the forward and the second defense belts.
Successive missions of the group, reinforced by
armor and infantry of the second corps echelon, are
to penetrate the second and remaining enemy defen·
sive belts. The assault of an armored corps takes
place on a sector not less than 3 miles wide. Tanks
in the first echelon move in bounds from phase line
to phase line, from 1,000 to 2,000 yards apart.

d. Securing the offensive. The closest con·
tact is maintained between combat arms of each
echelon and with supporting echelons, in order that
enemy counterattacks may be effectively repulsed by
tanks and self-propelled artillery. The speed of the
offensive is maintained by centralizing the control
of self-propelled artillery in support of tank battalions when enemy counterattacks are imminent. In.
fantry with engineers, supported by mortars and
artillery support groups, seize and fortify all vital
positions on the flanks of the break.through area.
Enemy firing positions on the flanks are neutralized,
and hasty mine belts are placed across flank ap·
proaches. Flank security groups organize road
blocks, covering the approaches by artillery and
mortar fire.
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DIVISIONAL ARTILLERY GROUP
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Figure 40.

Combat formation

0/ tank·supported infantry in the first phase of break·through operations.

The second echelon of the tank or mechanized
corps similarly organizes strong flank protection and
may use rockets as well as mortars and artillery to
repel enemy infantry attacks. As the offensive pen·
etrates deeper into enemy defenses, screening groups
supplement flank security groups to facilitate rapid
forward movement of motorized infantry and supply
trains (fig. 41).

e. Exploitation. The tank corps in exploitation advances rapidly toward a series of terrain objectives such as crossroads, bridges, and dominant
terrain features. Enemy lines of communication
are cut, supply dumps are seized, and the enemy is
attacked on the flanks and rear with the intent of
cutting enemy units into many segments which are
encircled and destroyed. If several break-throughs
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Figure 41.
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The corps organization in an approach,· march.
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are made, the tank forces exploiting each converge
in a double envelopment.
ADVANCE UNITS. In exploitation the tank corps
sends forward the bulk of its tactical reconnaissance
units, including the armored car reconnaissance battalion and the motorcycle battalion, often reinforced
by a tank company. The group operates 10 to 15
miles in advance of the medium tanks in the first
echelon. The security reconnaissance detachment
of each tank brigade operates 6 to 9 miles in advance of the brigade and consists of motorcyclists,
motorized infantry, armored cars, and a tank platoon sometimes reinforced by antitank guns. The
reconnaissance detachment of the motorized infantry battalion operates 3 to 4 miles forward and
consists of a squad of motorcyclists or motorized infantry. Flank security detachments, drawn from
the reconnaissance reserves, are used for flank defense and to destroy by-passed strongpoints. They
consist of a platoon of tanks, armored cars, and a
squad of motorized infantry and engineers.
The mechanized corps has far greater capabilities
for extensive exploitation than the tank corps, due
to the powerful motorized infantry component
which is added to its armored strength. The mechanized corps invariably has been employed in every
major offensive operation, not only to exploit breakthroughs but to develop the break-through into
pursuit. Air support of armored units has progressively increased with Soviet air supremacy and
the close coordination of these arms has resulted in
more rapid penetration and encirclement of enemy
positions.
EXPLOITATION OBJECTIVES. During the exploitation period, mechanized units encounter the
enemy's tactical reserves and also rear reserves
rushed up by motor, rail, or even air. Therefore,
in the process of exploitation mechanized units have
to carry out bitter actions, sometimes to defend
themselves, sometimes to disengage themselves. All
actions are carried out with the following goals in
mind: to retain the initiative, to defeat the pursued
enemy in detail, and to surround and destroy his
reserves after cutting them off_ The job of complete liquidation is left to regular front-line troops,
while the mechanized units go on to exploit the
new success_
PURSUIT. This strategy is organized in accordance with the possible routes of enemy withdrawal,
the terrain features, and indications of enemy withdrawal prior to the disengagement of his main

forces. Soviet units selected for pursuit are very
mobile and capable of independent action. The
basic composition of each detachment includes medium tanks, reinforced by assault troops with automatic weapons, motorcyclists, motorized infantry,
artillery, and engineers. Parallel pursuit is emphasized in Soviet doctrine_ Enemy rear guards
and organized defensive positions try to turn parallel
pursuit into a pursuit from the rear; thus parallel
pursuit consists of a series of actions, partly frontal
and partly flanking. Advanced detachments delay
and hold up the enemy's withdrawal in order to
give the main forces an opportunity to overtake and
destroy him (fig. 42). At the same time, advanced
troops, who have penetrated to the rear of the withdrawing enemy, attack command posts, destroy supplies, rupture communications, and create panic by
surprise thrusts.
The main body operates on the flank of the withdrawing enemy or in the space between withdrawing
columns. The combat formation of the main body
covers the area of the main effort. Strong reserves,
consisting of tanks, self-propelled artillery, and motorized infantry, are held in readiness to engage
enemy reserves which may be committed. If separate strongpoints succeed in resisting direct assaults,
the main body by-passes them, leaving motorizedinfantry groups to cover such strongpoints until
the arrival of troops following the mechanized corps.
Air support is considered vital to successful pursuit operations. Air action destroys enemy reserves
advancing to engage the pursuing forces. Stormovik
units are especially effective in giving close support
to advance detachments. Pursuit must be maintained night and day, stopping only on orders of the
Commander or when fuel supplies are exhausted.
Every expedient is used to maintain supplies, including mobile corps supply units, air drops, and
captured enemy supplies. Fresh troops from the
armored corps reserve are held in readiness to be
sent forward on combat reconnaissance missions.
5. MEETING ENGAGEMENT

The deployment of Red Army armored units in a
meeting engagement varies greatly, depending upon
enemy strength_ During pursuit, counterattacking
enemy rear guards are repulsed by combat reconnaissance groups reinforced by medium tanks, selfpropelled artillery, mortars, rockets, and motorized
infantry of the first echelon. The main body continues the pursuit without deploying its forces,
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although other combat reconnaissance units will be
organized to replace the units detached.
When superior enemy forces are encountered, a
powerful combat group of tanks and self· propelled
artillery assaults the forward enemy elements in a
short thrust designed to permit the mechanized corps
to deploy in a favorable defensive position.
The corps deploys along a wide front with combat
groups occupying separate, favorable terrain fea·
tures. The groups are organized for hasty defense,
with infantry supported by artillery, mortars, and
self· propelled guns in the forward echelon, while the
tanks are assigned to the second echelon as reserves
and for defense of the rear. Motorized infantry
occupies the gaps between strongpoints, which are
also covered by artillery and mortar fire. The corps
reserve deploys to the rear of the position, ready to
move against any likely direction of enemy attack.
Air reconnaissance and the advance reconnaissance
group, 9 to 15 miles ahead of the advance guard,
give armored formations timely information con·
cerning enemy strength, movements, and disposi.
tions. This information enables the formation to
deploy to greatest advantage m the meeting
engagement.
6. THE DEFENSIVE

In independent operations, the tank corps and the
mechanized corps are frequently counterattacked by
superior enemy forces, especially after deep penetra.
tions following a break.through. The defensive mission generally is to hold seized territory against
enemy counterattack until the combined forces fol·
lowing the armored units arrive to secure the area.
a. Tank corps. The tanks corps is limited in
its capacity for protracted defense. The infantrv
component of the corps is relatively small, and tanks
used in fixed positions are not as efficient as when
their high mobility and shock power are fully employed. The self· propelled artillery, antitank guns,
mortars, and rockets are the core of defensive
strength; but superior enemy infantry units, supported by armor and artillery, can force the tank
corps to withdraw by outflanking the defensive position. Soviet doctrine emphasizes the tank corps has
not sufficient infantry to risk encirclement for any
length of time. The mechanized corps, on the other
hand, is well organized for independent action far
forward of the advancing main forces and passes
from the offensive to the defensive in every major
operation involving deep offensive thrusts into
enemy territory.
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h. Mechanized Corps. The organization of
defenses by the Soviet mechanized corps is as thorough as its combat potential, favorable terrain, the
strength of enemy counterattacks, and time permit.
Extensive mine belts and fields are laid by engineers;
antitank gun positions and mortar positions are emplaced in a fire system integrated with self· propelled
artillery and rocket launchers. All firing positions,
infantry positions, and transport vehicles are camouflaged to the fullest degree. A second defensive
position to the rear is developed as thoroughly as
time permits, at the next tactically advantageous
area.
The mechanized corps can resist enemy attacks
from an encircled position for several days. If the
position to be held is of great tactical value, the
mechanized corps remains in position, permitting the
enemy to effect an encirclement, rather than withdrawing. This is achieved with the expectation that
advancing strong, friendly forces will relieve the
mechanized corps within a reasonable time.
The defensive position consists of groups of motorized infantry in separate strongpoints located in
advantageous terrain. Each group contains about
a battalion of infantry supported by two or three
batteries of antitank artillery, mortars, and self-propelled artillery and tanks. The self-propelled guns
and tanks are distributed within the groups in accordance with the most likely avenues of enemy
approach and the terrain cover available. Three
tank reserve groups consisting of medium and heavy
tanks are held in centralized, concealed areas. Their
mission is to counterattack enemy forces which penetrate into the defenses through the gaps between
the strongpoints. The gaps are held lightly by motorized infantry but are covered by artillery fire from
adjacent strongpoints, as well as by the corps artil·
lery group deployed to the rear of the tank reserve
group. The corps reserve, together \\ith all supply
echelons, is in the rear area of the defensive position
and is protected by the remaining tank units from
flank and rear attacks. Forward defenses in two
echelons are most effective, provided sufficient personnel strength is available. Successful defense is
largely dependent upon the efficient operation of the
tank reserve groups which cover a wider front than
the first defense echelon and must be ready to attack
enemy forces at all points of penetration (fig. 43).
The defensive strength of the mechanized corps
is greatly increased by the attachment of a howitzer
regiment. The strength of air support and expec-
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tat ions of supply by air greatly influence the corps
commander's decision to hold a position or to with·
draw. The antiaircraft regiment deploys its guns
to protect the main body of the corps from hostile
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armored formation is held in a concealed centra}·
ized position 10 to 30 miles to the rear of the first
infantry echelon. When the direction of the enemy
main effort is determined, the armored formation
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Defensive position of a mechanized corps.

air attack. Antiaircraft artillery is also given the
role of oovering the gaps between strongpoints
where enemy ground forces are likely to penetrate.
c. Other defensive tactics. Armored units,
supporting infantry in decentralized systems of defense, are used as mobile counterattack groups. The
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moves forward in a wide flanking maneuver and
attacks the enemy's flank and rear.
Another type of ambush defense is used when a
fluid situation exists and defensive positions have
not been firmly organized. Tank units concentrate
in concealed areas adjacent to main approaches
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along which enemy forces are advancing. Terrain
conditions determine whether two groups of tanks
in flanking positions or one concentrated group is
better suited to deliver sudden flank attacks against
enemy assault spearheads. Tank.riding automatic
riflemen and self-propelled guns support the tanks
in destroying the enemy assault elements. The mission of armor in this type of Soviet defense is to protect infantry units withdrawing under enemy pressure, as well as to inflict the maximum losses on the
enemy and thus disrupt his offensive operations.
7. WITHDRAWALS

If possible, withdrawals are executed at night, and
to prepared positions. Daytime withdrawals are
made under the cover of a smoke screen. Soviet
davtime withdrawals often coincide with a sudden
limited counterattack of a strong tank group, supported by self-propelled artillery, in the direction
of the enemy main effort. Soviet doctrine prescribes that withdrawals be executed rapidly by
echelons, without lessening normal artillery fire.
Mobile armored groups cover the withdrawal by
counterattacks if the enemy attempts to interfere.

Section IV. CAVALRY
1. CAVALRY MISSIONS AND CAPABILITIES

a. Basic doctrine. The Red Army has retained
the cavalry arm for use as an independent striking
force. The fundamental doctrine in the employment of cavalry stresses that cavalry is not a substitute for mechanized forces but is a powerful force
for operations where motorized units are handicapped by impassable terrain. By Red Army definition, the cavalry is capable of independent operation, of taking part in every kind of engagement,
and of carrying out actions in every kind of cooperation with other arms. A basic difference between
Red Army cavalry tactics and U. S. cavalry doctrine
is the stress placed by the Soviets on the employment of artillery with cavalry. Divisional artillery
operating with cavalry is employed under centralized or decentralized control, depending on combat
requirements. The primary mission of divisional
artillery is the neutralization of enemy antitank guns,
personnel, machine-gun positions, and similar
ground targets.
The tactical employment of cavalry in night operations and in terrain impassable to motorized elements such as swamps, steppes, and deep snow was
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repeatedly and successfully carried out by the Red
Army in World War II.
h. Capahilities. Cavalry averages 5 miles per
hour over severe terrain. Small independent cavalry
units cannot maintain continuous movement for
more than 3 days under combat conditions. Large
units with sizable supply trains and established resupply systems can operate for more than a month
over distances of 100 miles. Whenever possible,
cavalry forces attempt to strike the enemy flank or
rear, and to encircle and destroy the main group in
cooperation with the air forces, armored units, airborne units, and frontal assault groups. Other cavalry missions include: large-scale raids by cavalry
divisions and corps, especially during the winter;
the screening of troop movements of other arms; and
the execution of counterattacks against the enemy
flanks and rear from concealed areas in the rear of
a defensive position.
Soviet cavalry raids extend to far greater depths
and are made by larger forces than are envisioned
by the definition of a raid in U. S. cavalry doctrine.
For example, Lieutenant General Sokolov's VI
Guard Cossack Cavalry Corps made a 135-day raid
and fought behind the enemy lines most of the time.
c. Cavalry in auxiliary role. The tactical
employment of small cavalry units for reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, screening, and patrol
missions is essentially the same in the Red Army as
in other armies. Emphasizing the cavalry's surprise
potential, however, the Soviet's place added significance on more extensive employment of night reconnaissance and night raiding parties, especially when
terrain and weather are favorable to cavalry tactics.
Assaults are generally made dismounted from all
sides after rapid and secret flanking movements have
been executed (fig. 44). Heavy machine gunsmounted on carts-light machine guns, and submachine guns constitute the greatest fire power of small
cavalry units.
Normally, a cavalry regiment operates from 1 to 3
days in a local area up to 15 miles in depth. The
objectives are local enemy command posts, artillery
or antitank batteries, small relatively undefended
garrisons in the· enemy rear, and the capture of
prisoners.
2. CAVALRY UNITS AND BASIC WEAPONS

Red Army cavalry was modified greatly before and
during World War II. The cavalry divisions have
shrunk to a strength of 4,645 officers and enlisted
men, losing their mechanized regiment and one of
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Figure 44. Cavalry regiment attack in winter.

their horse regiments. Medium and heavy mortars,
and submachine guns have been introduced in large
numbers. The number of antitank guns has been
increased. The introduction of antitank rifles has
further facilitated close antitank and antiaircraft
defense. The normal operating unit is the cavalry
corps, which consists of three cavalry divisions, two
to four tank regiments of 41 tanks each, an antitank
regiment, either a composite artillery regiment or a
mortar regiment, and a rocket battalion. Additional
tank reinforcements are normally added for largescale operations.
Cavalry units are well equipped to protect themselves against enemy armored attacks, although their
staying power under such circumstances is limited.
The 14.5·mm long-barrelled antitank rifle carried
by pack horse provides antitank protection within
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the squadron. The horse-drawn 45-mm gun is the
regimental antitank weapon, while the 76-mm field
artillery pieces, as well as the 120-mm mortar batteries, are brought into play where necessary. The
Corps has considerable protection against enemy
armor in the 76-mm gun antitank regiment, the selfpropelled artillery regiment, and the composite artillery and mortar regiment. The rocket battalion
and the mortar units provide effective antipersonnel
fire.
The vulnerability of cavalry to air attack is the
greatest single weakness of cavalry units. To
counteract this vulnerability, the cavalry division
has been strengthened in antiaircraft fire power to
nine multiple antiaircraft machine guns and six 37mm antiaircraft guns, while the corps is reinforced
by an antiaircraft artillery regiment in operation
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where enemy air attacks are likely. As the relative
strength of the Soviet Air Force increased, cavalry
operations were given effective fighter support by
the air forces of the army group. In some in·
stances, supporting fighter units have been attached
to the cavalry corps. In the first case, an aviation
liaison officer maintains continuous liaison between
the corps and the army group headquarters, whereas
in the second case no such liaison exists. Night
marches are stressed for cavalry, especially in winter, with movements planned to conceal the cavalry
during the day in such covered or camouflaged
areas as collective farms.
General Belov's cavalry corps inflicted great losses
on superior enemy forces in the autumn of 1941 by
moving at night and striking the enemy rear at
dawn. Two German divisions were surrounded and
partly destroyed by this corps in October 1941.
During that winter, the cavalry corps engaged in
extensive offensive operations under severe winter
conditions of cold and deep snow, traveling 30 to
40 miles a day across enemy lines of communications. When necessary, dismounted combat against
fortified positions was undertaken. Although at
first the offensive succeeded in destroying many
enemy positions, later large losses were suffered by
the corps when it was itself encircled, primarily due
to powerful enemy air attacks which destroyed the
corps supplies and artillery positions.
This again stressed the vulnerability of cavalry to
air attack, especially in winter.
3. COORDINATION WITH OTHER ARMS
Coordinated operations of cavalry forces with large
tank units have been developed by the Red Army
where the terrain and season are suitable. This co·
operation may take different forms. In some instances these large units, while executing the complete mission by joint efforts, operate independently
but coordinate their blows. In other cases the tank
groups are attached to the large cavalry unit whose
commander assigns missions to each tank group.
Finally, a situation may occur when both types of
cooperation, operational and tactical, takes place at
the same time. A part of the tank forces execute
their missions independently, while the balance is
attached to and operates with the cavalry.
An outstanding operation in which cavalry and
tank forces were employed successfully was the encirclement and capture of the German garrison at
T aganrog in August 1943 (fig. 45). In this operation the cavalry units followed the tanks which had

broken through the enemy lines. After entering the
gap, the cavalry moved rapidly towards the Sea of
Azov to encircle the enemy garrison at Taganrog.
The tank units moved in two groups, covering the
flanks of the cavalry against enemy counterattacks
by mechanized German relief units as well as from
the encircled enemy group. All other Soviet tanks
were attached to the leading cavalry division; these
tanks moved ahead of the cavalry and paved the
way by overcoming scattered enemy detachments.
Wherever enemy resistance was strong, cavalry units
dismounted and attacked with close support of tanks.
The massed artillery fire of all cavalry artillery
was effectively used against strong enemy positions.
Enemy counterattacks were broken by artillery fire
and by maneuvering cavalry-tank groups against the
enemy flanks. Complete success was assured by uninterrupted contact between the cavalry division
commanders and the tank group commanders, as
well as by powerful air support which destroyed enemy artillery positions and armor and also provided
cover against hostile air attacks (up to 1,200 sorties
were flown daily).
Self-propelled artillery regiments work especially
effectively with cavalry in deep penetrations and
flank operations. Self-propelled artillery has supported cavalry in extensive Red Army maneuvers
across swampy terrain, covering as many as 125
miles in 2 days. One of the most important tactical
cavalry maneuvers is to establish and to hold road
blocks on highways over which the supporting selfpropelled artillery must pass. Cavalry executes
wide outflanking maneuvers across swamps to attack
enemy artillery from the rear; then the self-propelled
guns advance over the secured highway. Cavalry
moves on both sides of the artillery units for protection against possible flank attacks. Whenever enemy
guns or small fortified areas are encountered, the
self-propelled artillery quickly deploys and smashes
the enemy with concentrated fire. Rapid transition
from mounted to dismounted attack by cavalry units
and uninterrupted liaison with self-propelled artillery are basic principles in effective pursuit operations. Attached engineer and ponton detachments
greatly facilitate rapid movement of armor in such
operations.
4. COORDINATED OFFENSIVE

a. Organization of attack. Cavalry is used
to best advantage in coordination with infantry. In
an offensive, the infantry holds the enemy with a
frontal attack while the entire mass of cavalry and
V-89
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tanks is thrown upon the flanks and rear of the
enemy. The objective of cavalry is to strike at the
enemy's flank and rear; disrupt his headquarters

Figure 45.

Cavalry-tank coordinated break-through to encircle enemy garrison at Taganrog.

and lines of communications; and encircle and destroy his main force. To accomplish this, the cavalry must utilize its mobility to the utmost. This
is achieved by holding the enemy with a frontal
attack by other arms; by restricting his maneuverability; and by determining the disposition of his
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main force and the direction of his main effort. The
cavalry corps must be reinforced by infantry, tanks,
artillery, and mortars, and held in a centralized po·

sltJOn from where it can attack the enemy's flanks.
It is considered advisable to locate the cavalry on
the enveloping flank of the main attacking force
with the missions of reducing the enemy's flanks
and destroying his communications. The success
of a cavalry operation, especially when it has pene-
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trated into the enemy's operational depth, is conditioned by continuous coordination with the combined arms and tanks attacking frontally.
Red Army doctrine maintains that the expedient
moment to commit cavalry is when the enemy's
defenses in depth have been penetrated by a frontal
or enveloping assault. The enemy is then forced
to bring up his reserves. He is in a state of fluid
defense, has not had time to organize any defensive
positions, and is most vulnerable to a cavalry attack.
A successful operation depends not only on a
well executed initial phase but also on the successive

Figure 46.

Cavalry corps attacking with an open flank.

phases. Cavalry units should not be restricted by
boundary lines that reduce their mobility and force
them into protracted combat for strongpoints.
Therefore, in designating missions to the cavalry,
the objective, the direction of the main effort, and
time are indicated. The time factor is coordinated
with the capabilities of units making the frontal as·
sault, while the direction of the assault is aimed at
operationally important objectives in the flanks,
rear areas, and communication lines.
Essential considerations are air cover, liaison between army group and corps headquarters, secrecy
of concentrations, thoroughness of reconnaissance,
surprise, and continuous flow of supplies.
67130(;"-45--7

Cavalry formations advancing on the flank of
an assault group may use two types of attack: the
"open flank attack" and the "interior flank attack"
(figs. 46 and 47). In an open flank attack, co·
ordination and liaison with troops attacking front·
ally is maintained only on one side, while in an in·
terior flank attack, liaison must be maintained with
both flanks, permitting cavalry to pass through the
secured corridor. Coordination with units of ad·
jacent sectors is limited to the initial phase.
The Soviet disposition of troops will depend on
whether the corps attacks in an open flank or in an

interior flank. In an open flank attack, the cavalry
has more maneuverability during the initial phase
and attacks on a wider front. The corps reserve is
deployed on the open flank. In an interior flank
attack, the corps attacks on a narrower front, is
echeloned to a depth of 5 miles, and has a higher
density of troop concentration. In this case the
reserves will be used to augment the blow, and
will be located to the rear of the main thrust.
b. Attack phases. COORDINATION AND PLAN·
NING. A cavalry attack consists of several phases.
During the initial or coordination and planning
phase, the Soviet forces will secretly approach the
assembly area. In this phase air cover must be
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strong and is provided by the front and army fighter
air units; one or two battalions of small-caliber
antiaircraft artillery are attached for protection
against hostile aircraft.
Concentration of cavalry takes place in areas 25
to 35 miles from the front lines, and should end 2
to 3 days before the start of the general offensive.
Coordination with units attacking frontally, reconnaissance, line of departure, and engineer preparations are determined at this stage.

Figure 47.

Cavalry corps attacking with covered flanks.

The corps commander must be acquainted with
the follow ing:
Initial and successive objectives of infantry
and tank units attacking frontally.
Time of attack and boundaries, and direction of the main effort.
Location of command posts and their axis
of displacement.
Methods of communication with command
posts, and the signals to be used by units
reaching designated phase lines.
Assembly area of tank units, particularly
GHQ tanks.
The corps commander's field order includes the
above information and is issued after coordination
with the chiefs of supporting arms during the time
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the corps is in the initial assembly area. Detailed
and careful planning of coordination in this phase
is the foundation of success in the initial assembly.
Matters of supply are also determined during this
initial phase. They assume particular importance
since cavalry cannot depend on local supplies. In
addition to ammunition, food, and fuel, cavalry reo
quires large quantities of fodder. Any interruption
in the supply of fodder will materially impair the
mobility and combat value of cavalry. Both army

group and army transportation facilities are widely
used to insure a regular flow of supplies.
MOVING TO THE ASSAULT. Movement to the main
line of departure for the attack is the second phase
of an operation. The main line of departure is
usually selected beyond the range of enemy artillery
and mortar fire, although this distance should not
exceed 7 to 10 miles. The formation adopted depends on the decision of the corps commander and
should permit deployment against hostile air and
tank attacks. The open flank attack is on a front
4 to 5 miles wide with three cavalry divisions abreast
and the corps reserve deployed toward the outside
of the turning movement. In the attack ,,,here both
flanks are covered, the front is reduced to from 2.5
to 3.5 miles with two cavalry divisions in assault and
the third division with corps reserve echeloned to
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the rear. From the beginning, special attention is
paid to continuous mobility, freedom of movement,
and combat preparedness. To protect the forma·
tion against enemy artillery and mortar flanking at·

Figure 48.

tinuous coordination are essential for cooperation
between the cavalry and units attacking frontally.
LAUNCHING THE ATTACK. The third phase of the
operation is the actual execution of the basic mis·

Reinforced cavalry regiment attack on a fortified town.

tacks, and also from infantry and tank counter·
attacks, air cover is provided and artillery is detached to protect the flanks. These units move as
far as 5 miles from the flanks. Consolidation of
forces is the primary consideration of the second
phase. Timely exchange of information and con-

sion. Cavalry detaches itself from the troops attacking frontally and loses direct tactical contact; however, coordination must not cease. The cavalry
seizes positions to prevent the main enemy force
from extricating itself from encirclement. Part of
the cavalry cuts the enemy's route of retreat, while
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the main force, in coordination with units attacking
frontally, encircles and destroys the enemy's principal units.
Liaison during the third phase of the attack is the
responsibility of the army group command; without
continuous liaison, coordinated action with cavalry
is not possible.

the flanks of enemy salients. Under extreme conditions, cavalry engages in dismounted defensive
combat as infantry. In a decentralized defensive position, care is always taken to conceal horses in a
defiladed area for safety and to facilitate withdrawal.
In the defense of road blocks or tactically important
terrain, artillery and mortars are basic defensive
weapons relied upon by Soviet cavalry.

5. CAVALRY IN PURSUIT

In exploiting a break-through, cavalry is well suited
to execute parallel pursuit. Whenever enemy rear
guards attempt to restrict cavalry activity to pursuit
from the rear, wide outflanking maneuvers across
swamps or rough country permit cavalry to strike
at the flanks of the retreating enemy column or cut
off his withdrawal by creating road blocks.
The supporting self-propelled artillery moves up
to destroy enemy rear guard positions, while the
cavalry seizes important tactical features in the enemy rear to secure highways over which the supporting Soviet artillery and other arms may advance
more rapidly. Cavalry cannot hold terrain for long;
therefore, motorized infantry and supporting arms
must move forward rapidly to relieve cavalry units
counterattacked by the enemy. The mobility and
maneuverability of cavalry in sudden continuous
flank attacks against withdrawing enemy are the
basic elements of cavalry striking power. Mortars
and machine guns mOlllted on horse-drawn carts
supplement the automatic weapons carried by cavalry men. The striking power is considerable when
tanks operate with cavalry. Artillery is the basic
arm against enemy counterattacks, as well as in the
assault of fortified positions and road blocks.
During pursuit operations, small cavalry units are
detached to reduce important by-passed strong
points-especially enemy supply centers-situated
on vital lines of communication. Dismounted assaults are made simultaneously from all directions
by squadrons reinforced by antitank guns, mortars,
and automatic weapons (fig. 48). The assault group
may be as large as a reinforced regiment to which
self-propelled guns are attached to facilitate the
destruction of enemy defensive positions. Sufficient
striking power is given such assault units to clear
the enemy from the position quickly, enabling the
cavalry unit to rejoin the main body.
6. DEFENSIVE TACTICS

On the defense, cavalry covers withdrawals and protects the flanks and the gaps between units, inflicting
losses on the enemy by sudden counterattacks upon
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Section V. ENGINEERS
1. BASIC DOCTRINE

Engineer work in the Red Army regularly proceeds
under rapidly changing combat conditions and in
the face of limitations in the quantity and types
of engineer equipment available; this is especially
true of heavy construction and bridge building materials. These conditions serve to emphasize the
importance of combat engineers (pioneers) and to
demand from them efficient and speedy performance
of a great variety of engineer tasks. In addition,
the Soviets place a premium on detailed calculation
of engineer capabilities, full exploitation of available
equipment, development and perfection of engineer
techniques, and constant coordination between the
engineer arm and other arms, especially artillery.
The primary mission of the Soviet pioneer battalion is identical with that of the U. S. engineer
combat battalion: to increase the effectiveness of the
division in all phases of combat by general engineer
work and to hinder the movement of the enemy.
Due to the nature of combat on the Eastern Frontfrequent German counterattacks, lesser reliance on
friendly air cover, pressure of time in executing
engineer missions-greater emphasis fell on mine
laying, both in the offense and in the defense, on
construction of hasty field fortifications, and on
camouflage.
The Soviet divisional pioneer battalion is less
than one-fourth the size of our combat engineer
battalion, comprising 164 to 170 men as compared
with 637. Since it is not motorized, when rapid
movement of engineers is required, units are attached to other troops such as tank units or motorized infantry which provide transportation. Standard equipment is similar to ours-wire-cutters
grapnels, mine-detectors, shovels, saws, demolitio~
sets, flame throwers, etc.-but there is less powerdriven and more hand equipment.
The pioneer battalion of the mechanized corps
is approximately the same size as our armored division engineer battalion, and is motorized for move-
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ment into great depths in short periods of time.
Each of the three motorized brigades in the mecha·
nized corps has an engineer company of 121 men.
Specialized GHQ engineer units-independent bat·
talions, regiments, and brigades-are used exten·
sively in the Red Army for reinforcement, and par·
ticularly with infantry,· for the assault of fortified
pOSitIOns. Light and heavy ponton regiments are
respectively comparable to the U. S. engineer light
ponton company, which may be attached down to
divisional level when necessary, and to the heavy
ponton battalion, which may be attached to corps
or army. There also are other special GHQ unitssuch as camouflage-similar to ours in function.
The employment of army and corps construction
engineers, operating to the rear of the infantry di·
visions and executing heavier and more complicated
engineer work, is identical to ours. The use of
local labor in construction work is common in rear
areas.
2. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

a. Reconnaissance. Soviet doctrine stresses
the importance of thoroughly planned and efficiently
executed engineer reconnaissance. The organization
of engineer reconnaissance varies, however, with
combat conditions and with each specific situation.
Thus, no Soviet organization can be considered typical. The following examples serve to indicate the
saturation of elements for engineer reconnaissance
and the importance attached to it, especially in the
offensive (fig. 49) :
During the period of preparation for a breakthrough of enemy defenses, partially located on the
bank of a river, the engineer staff of a Soviet army
group composed a plan of engineer reconnaissance
and assigned to supervising staff officers missions
and areas of responsibility. Reconnaissance objectives included -enemy installations and obstacles on
the front line, the presence of escarpment, and of
breaks in the ice; the nature, extent, and areas of
defensive constructions; sectors accessible to tanks,
etc. It was conducted chiefly by observation. On a
front of 8% miles, 20 forward observation posts
were operated, 10 of which were manned by engineer
commanders.
A systematic reconnaissance of the ice in the
areas of possible crossings was also undertaken;
reconnaissance groups of six to seven men were sent
out to discover mined sectors. Some minefields were
located by interrogation of prisoners and by mine
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tracers or indicator movements or sounds; the enemy
defense system was photographed from the air.
This was done three times during the period of prep·
aration for attack so that changes in the arrangement of enemy defenses could be observed and provided for. During the period of movement through
the defensive zone of the enemy, two mobile engineer
posts with four men each were organized for the
first echelon of each division. In several sectors
special pioneer groups-each composed of six to
eight men-were sent out for mine and obstacle reconnaissance. Two to three pioneers were also
allotted to each reconnaissance group of combined
arms.
Reconnaissance in the second echelon of
troops was conducted chiefly for the discovery of
mine obstacles on the roads and road shoulders, and
for providing passage for heavy tanks.
During the period of preparation for attack by
another army group, engineer observation was conducted by regimental, divisional, and, partially, army
reconnaissance units. In each divisional zone two
to three engineer observation posts were set up in
addition to command observation posts in the main
operational sectors. The observation posts of other
arms were used: about 40 percent were artillery
observation posts, and 60 percent were combinedarms observation posts.
Mobile groups of combined arms, which conducted
active day and night reconnaissance, were also
allotted pioneers for mine and obstacle clearance.
In the advance, mobile engineer observation posts
were formed from regimental and divisional pioneers
(one to two posts per division) , while army groups
and army engineer reconnaissance platoons acted as
mobile reconnaissance g;:oups (one to two per divisional zone). Special groups were also organized
for reconnaissance of specific centers of defense and
for assisting tank and infantry units. Small engineer reconnaIssance groups, which infiltrated
through the front line of defense or were parachuted
from airplanes, operated in the deep rear of the
enemy.
In still another instance, the following elements
were created for engineer reconnaissance during
the period of preparation for the attack:
Two army group reconnaissance platoons,
operating in the deep rear of the enemy.
Four army group reconnaissance groups,
comprising part of the tank reconnaissance elements.
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Six army group reconnaissance platoons,
operating in army zones of advance.
One engineer group operating within the
army group reconnaissance organization
of combined arms.
Three reserve platoons of the engineer staff.
Six army reconnaissance platoons, operating
in army and divisional zones.
In addition, one or two squads in each divisional
pioneer battalion were designated for engineer
reconnaIssance.
On the basis of collated and verified data from all
sources, the Soviet engineer staff finally prepares
an engineer situation map (showing the enemy defensive zone, the lines and centers of defense, and
antitank and antipersonnel obstacles) and a detailed
description of enemy installations, which aid in determining the areas most favorable for a break·
through. In addition, situation maps are developed, showing water barriers, condition of line
of communication, availability of water supply, and
presence of local materials for construction of
crossings and roads and for camouflage.
Simultaneously, the engineer staff must assemble
complete data about its own engineer units to determine the quantity and condition of personnel and
equipment, and to what extent reinforcements from
the troops and higher engineer echelons will be
needed.
h. Preparation for the attack. In preparation for the launching of an offensive operation,
specific responsibilities are assumed by combat engineers. Troop concentrations at the line of departure
and other installations are camouflaged. Dummy
troop concentrations, artillery, tanks, fortifications,
and roads are constructed. Provisions are made for
water supply. The engineers repair roads and
bridges, or construct new ones; they fortify observation and command posts.
Engineer work for clearing lanes through obstacles and minefields is organized. Trenches are
dug-at least two to a company-to approach enemy
positions as closely as possible. Small bridges are
laid across communication trenches to permit passage of infantry-one bridge for each platoon.
Two bridges per battalion are laid for passage of
motor transport and artillery.
All preparatory work is executed as silently and
as secretly as possible so that the direction of attack will not be disclosed to enemy ground or air
observation.
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During this period, the engineer staff organizes
and supervises instruction of the troops in various
engineer measures. In one army, for example, tankborne companies in each infantry regiment were
organized to force a water barrier independently
and to secure the opposite shore. In addition, other
detachments were organized in each infantry and
artillery regiment and in each division to repair
roads along the route of march and to clear mines.
All army troops were instructed in the use of local
materials for crossing a river.
c. Assault tactics. ASSAULT ENGINEER-PIONEER
BRIGADE. The organic pioneers and engineers of
infantry and tank formations must be reinforced by
GHQ assault units in operations against strongly
fortified positions. Assault engineer-pioneer brigades are the basic Soviet assault units. Normally,
they are employed under centralized control in the
zone of the main effort. In a typical successful operation, an assault brigade operated in the zone of an
infantry corps and was subordinated to the corps
commander. Units of the brigade, as part of assault
groups, secured divisional operations and took part
in the assault.
Assault engineer-pioneer brigades should never,
the Soviets teach, be dispersed over a two- or threearmy area with equal distribution of equipment
along the entire front.
Brigades are employed in close coordination with
the other arms; pioneers must at all times be supported by infantry, artillery, and tanks. Assault
brigades and assault units should not be used as
"armored infantry" operating to the front of the
infantry or for pioneer-tank raids in breaking
through strongly fortified positions.
In the break-through of strongly fortified positions, the brigade performs the following:
Conducts engineer reconnaissance.
Detaches mobile obstacle-clearing detachments.
Includes assault engineer-pioneer elements in
corps and army antitank reserves for cooperation with antitank destroyer artillery
regiments.
Repairs and constructs roads, bridges, and
crossings and lays corduroy roads at the
line of departure.
Clears lanes in minefields and other obstacles
and organizes the passage of advancing
units through them.
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Participates in assault groups (detachments)
for the destruction of timber-and-earth
and concrete firing positions, and steel
pillboxes.
Accompanies tanks and artillery and, together with infantry elements, assists in
the displacement of guns and mortars attached to assault groups to new firing positions, and in equipping these firing positions.
Covers flanks and salients of advancing formations and secures seized areas by mines
and other obstacles_
Clears routes of march and inhabited points
used by troops of mines and obstacles.
MINE AND OBSTACLE CLEARANCE. In the offensive, pioneers move forward in front of the infantry,
or with it, to clear lanes through minefields for infantry, tanks, and artillery. Primary march routes
are cleared of mines first; the most experienced
pioneers are assigned this task.
In the Stalingrad offensive, 85 groups of carefully selected pioneers, composed of from 10 to 25
men each, were designated to clear mines on the
basic roads. They began work early in the morning and in 3% hours had made 64 lanes and had
rendered harmless more than 5,000 mines.
Security detachments are sent out to complete
mine removal in abandoned houses, trenches, shelters, and mud huts, command posts and troop concentration areas, road gullies, enemy fortifications,
etc., as the offensive develops.
Thirty-six obstacle-clearing groups may be organized from an assault engineer-pioneer battalion
to clear 36 lanes for 12 to 18 infantry companies or
4 to 6 infantry battalions. An assault battalion can
clear 18 to 36 lanes for tank platoons-fully servicing a tank brigade or two tank regiments.
DESTRUCTION OF PERMANENT FORTIFICATIONS.
When earth and timber or concrete pillboxes,
"crabs" (German mobile steel pillboxes), and concrete emplacements are expected, special assault
groups must be formed by the infantry and pioneers.
Each group contains from a section to a company
of pioneers; consequently, 9 to 18 assault groups can
be formed from one assault engineer-pioneer battalion. The infantry battalion or company, supported by the assault group, is usually commanded
by an infantry officer, but sometimes by an experienced commander of an assault engineer-pioneer
company or battalion.
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The assault group is usually organized into the
following subgroups (for an alternate, slightly
stronger organization, see the assault regiment, paragraph Ib, section II, part III) :
Demolition subgroups, composed of one to
two infantry sections, one to two assault
pioneer sections, and two to four flamethrower operators.
Blocking subgroups, each composed of 1 to
to 1% infantry platoons with one to two
heavy machine guns, a section of antitank
rifles, a platoon of 50-mm mortars, two to
four men with flame throwers, and up to a
section of pioneers.
Reinforcing subgroups (fire subgroups),
consisting of one to two antitank guns
(45- or 57-mm), two to six flame throwers,
and one to two heavy tanks. In addition,
one to two 82-mm mortars and one to two
76-mm guns are often included. In the
case of especially heavily fortified installations, a 122-mm howitzer is added.
The assault group must be covered by at least as
many direct-support infantry guns and machine guns
as there are enemy direct-support infantry guns and
machine-gun embrasures.
The organization and preparation of assault
groups proceed under the centralized direction of
the staff of infantry units, with cooperation by commanders of engineer elements for both tactical and
technical supervision of engineer maneuvers. Coordination of infantry, tanks, artillery, and assault
engineers must be organized between elements within the assault group; between groups within an assault detachment; and also between the assault
group, infantry elements, security group, and group
of artillery support. At least two practice assaults
are conducted to perfect coordination. Three to 4
hours, after receipt of the mission orders, must be
allowed for daylight reconnaissance.
The assault of pillboxes, "crabs," and casemates,
proceeds in the following order: The assault group
moves out under cover of artillery fire (which continues throughout the assault), and of smoke screens.
Fire cover for the attacked position is neutralized
first. "Crabs" are assaulted next by groups of reduced strength. Antitank rifles conduct fire on the
side and rear walls, while pioneers use hollow
charges to blow up the roof.
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The method of storming a timber·and·earth or
a concrete pillbox is as follows: The reconnaissance
and obstacle.dearing subgroup verifies the information obtained by engineer reconnaissance and espe·
cially notes any new firing installations that may
have appeared on the flanks. The blocking and fire
subgroups cover approaches to the firing position
from the enemy side. Simultaneously, part of the
reconnaissance and obstacle.clearing subgroup
clears the way for passage of the demolition sub·
group. Camouflaged pioneers with antitank rifles,
using all available cover, move up to positions for
firing on the pillbox embrasures and approaches;
the assault group must first concentrate its full
force on neutralization of the embrasures. Flame
throwers blind and tanks destroy the embrasures.
If tanks and flame throwers are not available, em·
brasures are blocked with bags of earth and saw·
dust. Then the demolition pioneers throw Molotov
cocktails, incendiary bombs, or smoke hand grenades
in any openings; or sear the interior of the pillbox
with a flame thrower. Finally, they blow up the
pillbox with explosive charges. After its seizure, the
pillbox must be secured with the help of infantry
regimental security groups (or battalion security
groups) .
d. Hasty defense in offensive operations.
Red Army combat experience has demonstrated that
captured enemy positions must be organized and
prepared immediately against violent and repeated
counterattacks, especially on flanks and salients.
Hastily laid minefields are the primary methods
of engineer support against such counterattacks, al·
though mobile pillboxes and prepared obstacles are
important supplements.
PLANNING THE DEFENSES. Sectors scheduled for
fortification are chosen with a view to utilizing
natural barriers which inherently, or with minimum
adaptation, serve as effectivo obstacles to enemy ad·
vance.
Inhabited points, forests, copses, and
heights are especially favored. All enemy fortica·
tions, after being cleared of mines, are used.
Camouflage concealing the system of fortifications
is erected if time permits.
Mine laying is planned in detail by commanders
of pioneer battalions or of regiments who are desig.
nated as chiefs of mine operations on a division or
corps front. The plans are based on thorough
reconnaissance and designate methods to be used,
quantities of materials needed, and timing of demo
olition with troop movements. They are presented
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for the Commander's approval through the Chief
Engineer. Chiefs of mining operations maintain
communication with the Chief Engineer, by means
of daily reports, and also with the over-all commanders of combat sectors with whom mine laying
is constantly coordinated. This uninterrupted contact enables engineer units, with a minimum loss
of time, to meet combat developments such as the
necessity for securing a newly seized enemy position, combating a sudden enemy counterattack, or
eliminating an unforeseen obstacle.
Coordination of pioneer maneuvers with antitank
artillery in the laying of minefields is of special
importance. Mines serve not only to destroy
enemy tanks by their own action, but also to
canalize tanks in minefields adequately covered by
direct Soviet artillery fire. To acquaint artillerymen with possible areas of tank approaches within
range of direct artillery fire, and with areas in which
cover for pioneers laying minefields must be pro·
vided, engineer and artillery officers make a preliminary reconnaissance for strategic locations for
minefields and firing positions. Artillerymen must
be kept constantly informed of the limits of minefields and belts, and of any changes in them.
LAYING THE DEFENSES. The Red Army often
attaches a pioneer platoon to an infantry company, or a pioneer company to an infantry battalion, for laying protective mine belts. An engineer unit assigned to an infantry company is held
responsible for a sector not more than % to 3 miles
wide_ A unit assigned to a battalion may cover a
sector up to 5 to 6 miles in width. The depth in
both cases is 3 to 4 miles. In one instance, the
first belt was completed within 3 hours after assignment of the task, the second within 4 hours, and
the third within 6 hours.

Mine and demolition equipment are brought forward on large sleds hauled by tanks and on hand
sleds. The engineer troops are organized into
small, mobile mine.laying units armed with auto·
matic weapons and rifles. Such units are equipped
with ten sleds, each loaded with six fragmentation
mines improvised from captured I55-mm artillery
shells; two prepared electrical circuits from the
engineer demolition chest; 90 antitank mines; fifty
200'gram blasting caps, with fuzes; two mine detectors; six probes; five grapnels; and two machine
guns. Controlled, electrically detonated mines in
circuits are placed across main avenues of approach
so that the offensive can be continued without wait-
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ing for the removal of minefields. Contact mines
are used in large numbers, however, in order to
install adequate defenses within the limited time
available (fig. 50).
The time element is so important that mine laying is continued even under enemy artillery fire.

3. DELIBERATE DEFENSE AND WITHDRAWAL

Chief engineers of regiments and divisions are responsible for technical assistance to their comIaanders in organizing deliberate defenses. They
participate in working out the plan of defense and
all orders concerning the fortifying of defensive po-

Figure 50. Hasty mine belts in an offensive operation.

Even though the enemy may observe some of the
mine-laying activity, the prime Soviet consideration
is to complete the system of defensive belts to the
greatest possible degree. The necessity for rapid
action may become so pressing that full completion of mine laying according to the planned pattern
is left to the second echelon of pioneer units.
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sltlOns. By authorization of the regimental (divisional! commander, they give orders to (company)
battalion commanders concerning the priority of engineer work. Priority is determined by a careful
evaluation of the nature of combat. character of the
terrain, quantity of water supply. pressure of time,
and availability of equipment and personnel.
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The troops themselves, within the limitations of
their organic equipment, fortify positions in their
own particular sectors, under the direction of their
commanders. Pioneers act as technical supervisors
and instructors, themselves carrying out only the
most complicated and difficult work. Under engineer leadership, communication trenches are dug;
minefields are laid; machine-gun nests are dug in;
mortar emplacements, command and observation
posts, and troop shelters are constructed; obstacles
are erected; and strongpoints are fortified.
For technical supervision of the fortifying of positions, the battalion commander has three to four
pioneers at his disposal and up to a squad of regimental pioneer instructors. For more complicated
work (mining, preparation of timber-and-earth firing positions, etc.), he will have in addition divisional pioneers-one to two platoons per regiment.
In the withdrawal, engineers are responsible for
the destruction of all equipment. supplies, and munitions which cannot be transported with the troops.
4. CAMOUFLAGE
Engineer camouflage troops (army, army group, and
GHQ) supervise the execution of strategic camouflage plans issued by the commander of combined
arms. The practices of individual concealment,
simple camouflage construction, and camouflage
discipline are the responsibilities of the individual
soldier. The engineer camouflage units advise,
supervise, and instruct the troops in camouflage work
and discipline, inspect camouflage work, assist in
supply and preparation of camouflage materials, and
themselves construct complicated, large. scale camouflage expedients.
American and Soviet camouflage doctrines are
basically similar in purpose, fundamental principles,
and methods employed. Camouflage by complete
concealment, imitation, or disguise is used, depending on tactical desirability and physical practicability. Specific methods are influenced by the distance of enemy forces, the nature of enemy
reconnaissance, available time and manpower, acces·
sible materials for camouflage, season of the year,
character of the terrain, and meteorological condi·
tions. Emphasis in both American and Soviet doctrine is laid on utilization of natural and artificial
materials, pattern painting, and dummy construction.
Soviet camouflage doctrine, because of a lesser reliance on friendly air power for protection, places
heavy stress on camouflage discipline in eliminating
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tell-tale indications associated with location of
bivouac areas, firing positions, command and observation posts, tanks, supply points, etc.
Bivouac areas are revealed by the regular, sharply
defined borders of unit sectors and outlines of tents,
by smoke from camp fires and kitchens, and by
worn paths to and from water supply areas, kitchens,
etc. Rigid Soviet camouflage discipline provides for
the disposition of troops in small groups so as to disguise the strength of infantry forces, and for the
pitching of tents in uneven rows using trees and
bushes as natural camouflage. Campfires can be lit
only with special permission. Smoke from kitchen
fires must be controlled and dispersed and, if possible, kitchens are located in nearby inhabited
areas and used only at night. Buildings are constructed along already existing roads; movement
within bivouac areas takes place along paths discovered and marked by engineer patrols.
Similar camouflage discipline hinders enemy discovery of observation and command posts. artillery
positions, and tanks. Activity in command and observation posts commences only after camouflage
measures have been taken. They are approached
and left only on designated roads. Exposed routes
do not end at an artillery position but are extended
to another logical termination. Tank tracks are
camouflaged by brushing them out or by covering
them with local materials. In all cases, camouflage
materials must be prepared, under engineer supervision, at a distance from the position or installation to be camouflaged so that tell-tale indications
of activity, such as trampled paths and uprooted
vegetation, will not disclosed their true location.

Section VI. TACTICAL ANTI.
AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY
1. MISSIONS

The primary mission of Red Army tactical antiaircraft artillery is to protect troop concentrations,
hrward and rear area installations, and forward
lines of communications from hostile aircraft attacks. Antiaircraft artillery also conducts direct fire
against land fortifications, attacks hostile infantry in
assembly and deployment areas, assists in repelling
attacks of enemy ground forces, and executes other
firing missions which are normally assigned to light
field artillery. Strategic antiaircraft artillery-with
heavy, fixed, semimobile, and mobile guns, radar,
searchlights, and barrage balloons-operates in
close cooperation with interceptor aviation as an
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entirely separate arm beyond the scope of this
discussion.
2. TYPES OF UNITS
Tactical antiaircraft artillery units consist of independent antiaircraft artillery divisions, and organic
antiaircraft units of mobile formations. The antiaircraft division is the basic GHQ reserve antiaircraft artillery organization which is allotted to the
various armies and army groups as required. An
antiaircraft artillery division consists of an antiair-

craft gun regiment and three antiaircraft automatic
weapons regiments totaling sixteen 85·mm guns,
forty-eight 37-mm guns, and sixty-four 12.7-mm
antiaircraft machine guns. It can effectively protect an area 10,000 yards wide and 7,000 yards
deep-that is, a deployment area for the main effort
of a major infantry-artillery offensive (fig. 51).
This tactical employment of antiaircraft artillery
gives a powerful concentration of medium antiaircraft artillery in addition to a barrage of automatic
weapons which is equivalent to that of U. S. practice.
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Figure 51. Antiaircraft artillery division in defense
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The organic antiaircraft artillery of the armored,
mechanized, and cavalry corps consists of an antiaircraft artillery regiment plus the antiaircraft
machine-gun companies of the component formations, comprising in all sixteen 37-mm guns, and
fifty-two 12.7-mm antiaircraft machine guns. By
U. S. standards, this allotment of organic antiaircraft artillery to the mobile corps is incapable of
providing adequate antiaircraft protection over the
entire corps deployment area in most situations.
However, centralized control of the antiaircraft
weapons makes up for some of their deficiency in
numbers, and permits defense of vital installations.
Combat troops employ their own 7.62-mm machine
guns and 14.5-mm semiautomatic antitank rifles for
local protection.
3. CONTROL

The commander of the antiaircraft artillery units of
a Soviet combined-arms formation is subordinate
to the artillery commander of the formation. The
artillery commander is the only person who may
change the missions of the antiaircraft artillery;
only he may shift its effort from a primary to a
secondary mission, and the reverse. The commander of the antiaircraft artillery must keep himself informed of the general situation and of the
mission of the supported units. He maintains communications with the staff of the supported organization and with the artillery commander of that
organization. Jointly with the signal officer he
establishes antiaircraft warning service.
In support of ground operations, the commander
of the antiaircraft artillery groups his batteries to
give maximum support to units which are in a most
advantageous position to develop the offensive. In a
static situation he groups his batteries to achieve
concentration of fire over important installations
and assembly areas. The antiaircraft artillery commander must not allow his tactics to become stereotyped and passive; guided by reconnaissance reports
and study of the tactics and habits of the enemy, he
must maneuver his batteries, use ruses, and, in cooperation with interceptor aviation lead the enemy
into firetraps.
4. DISPOSITION

Tactical antiaircraft artillery is used for the protection of deployment and assembly areas, forward and
rear area installations such as supply dumps and
artillery and mortar positions, and for the support of
ground operations. In protecting troops deployed
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in forward areas, antiaircraft artillery is deployed
linearly. The heavy machine guns are emplaced by
platoons between 300 and 500 yards from the forward elements. Light antiaircraft guns are emplaced by batteries on a line 1,000 to 1,500 yards
from the forward lines. The distance between batteries is between 1,000 and 2,000 yards, the distance
between platoons is between 100 and 150 yards, and
the distance between individual pieces is at least 30
yards. The medium antiaircraft guns are emplaced
by batteries on a line approximately 2,000 to 3,000
yards from the forward lines. The distance between
batteries is also between 2,000 and 3,000 yards, and
thc distance between individual pieces is at least 30
yards.
In protecting assembly areas and rear echelon installations, antiaircraft artillery is deployed in two
concentric circles. The inner circle is located within the defended area; the outer circle is approximately 1,000 yards from the perimeter of the defended area. Distances between the batteries, platoons, and individual pieces are the same as those
employed in linear defense.
Normally, medium antiaircraft batteries are emplaced approximately 2,000 yards apart in dug-in
positions, and are camouflaged. Alternate and
dummy positions are always prepared for the whole
battery; if fire against land targets is anticipated,
special dual-purpose emplacements are also prepared. The depth of emplacements is such that
gun sights are protected from mortar fragments.
The preparation of all types of emplacements and
maneuver of batteries from one position to another
are habitually accomplished at night.
Five types of fire control are used by Red Army
medium antiaircraft artillery: tracking individual
targets, moving barrage, stationary barrage, direct
fire against land targets, and observed indirect fire
against land targets. In tracking individual targets,
a battery fires as a unit from data computed by a
range finder and director, or by radar. In erecting
moving and stationary barrages, a battalion or a
larger groupment is a firing unit. These, barrages
are considered inefficient and wasteful of ammunition, and are used only when tracking is impossible
due to meteorological conditions or other causes.
In direct fire against land targets, fire is controlled
by individual gun commanders against designated
targets. When massed fire is desired, a battery may
be used as a unit. Direct and indirect observed fire
are used against land targets as parts of artillery
preparations. Antiaircraft artillery guns are as-
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signed targets whose destruction requires high
velocity projectiles. Observed indirect fire is controlled in the same manner as that of light field
artillery.
Light antiaircraft artillery is normally emplaced
by platoons in dug-in and camouflaged positions.
Emplacements are deep enough to protect gun sights
from mortar fragments. Alternate positions for
duty pieces and positions for fire against land targets
are prepared with embrasures covering the sectors
of responsibility for antitank defense. Light antiaircraft artillery employs direct fire only. The
platoon is the firing unit. Effective range against
approaching targets is 2,000 yards; against depart.
ing targets, 1,000 yards. In attacking ground tar·
gets, light antiaircraft guns are effective against em·
brasures of fortifications, personnel, observation
posts, machine gun and antitank positions, and
tanks.
5. SUPPORT OF GROUND OPERATIONS
In supporting ground operations, antiaircraft artillery has three functions: protection of march
columns against air and land attacks; protection of
personnel and materiel in assembly and deployment
areas; and active support of the assault.
During the approach march, antiaircraft batteries are disposed throughout the column. Some
light antiaircraft guns are emplaced in advance at
points along the route where traffic may become
channelized (narrow defiles, bridges, fords, or
woods) . Antiaircraft machine guns are dispersed
along the column to protect the heavier antiaircraft
weapons again'st attacks by low.flying planes and

enemy ground forces. At night 50 percent of the
machine guns must be ready to fire against ground
targets.
Active support of ground operations is carried out
in three phases. During the artillery preparation for
the assault, antiaircraft artillery-in addition to its
primary mission-is used in planned fire against
enemy fortifications, firing positions, and observa·
tion posts. During the assault, light antiaircraft artillery guns and machine guns accompany the assault
teams to protect them against air attacks and to assist
supporting arms. As a rule antiaircraft weapons are
concentrated in sectors where the assault is most successful, in order to assist in repulsing prohahle counterattacks and to maintain the momentum of the
assault.
6. IMPROVISED ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSES

In addition to the antiaircraft weapons proper, the
Red Army effectively uses light field artillery and
semiautomatic antitank rifles against air targets.
Field artillery batteries (76.2-mm guns and 122·mm
howitzers) fire in volleys at predetermined ranges
with pre-cut fuses. Gun emplacements are constructed so that trails can be lowered to increase
the maximum elevation by 30 degrees. To facilitate control and to speed fire, orientation points are
selected in directions of probable approach of enemy
planes.
Three to five semiautomatic antitank rifles, firing
on the same target, are used against low-level and
dive· bombing attacks. They are considered effective at ranges up to 500 yards.

PART III. SPECIAL OPERATIONS
Section I. OPERATIONS IN LIMITED
VISIBILITY
1. NIGHT OPERATIONS

The Red Army has been successful in both largeand small-scale operations at night. The Soviets
consider that night operations are preferable when
terrain, dense minefields, and other obstaclescombined with enemy preparedness-eliminate the
possibility of surprise and make heavy casualties
in da, time operations a probability.
Night raids, smaIl·scale attacks, and reconnaiS.
sance in force are initiated to complete reconnaIS-
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sance data, to force the enemy to disclose his plan
of defense and plan of fire, to capture prisoners,
to harass the enemy, and to divert his attention from
other sectors of the front. During preparation for
a major offensive, small·scale night operations are
conducted in order to capture terrain favorable
for observation of the enemy or suitable for deployment of the main force. All night operations
are carefully planned and coordinated. For example, a typical small raid (figs. 52 and 53) was
planned 6 days in advance and was preceded by
careful observation of the enemy by members of
the raiding party.
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Order of advance Cross the Vistula in a boat disem·
of the recon·
barking near a separate clump of
naissance party.
bushes. Cross the trench and deploy in the rear of the heavy rna·
chine gun.
Heavy machine gun in open firing
Objective.
position about 400 yards to the east
of height 124.8.
Organization o f Reconnaissance party to consist of
four men; Number 1 to guard the
the attack.
boat. Nos. 2 and 3, to attack the
machine gun crew. No.4 to throw
a grenade into the shelter.
Fire support:
Two batteries to lay interdictory bar·
Artillery.
rage at A and B. One battery to
fire interdictory mission in depth
along the communication trench.
405·mm guns to fire in pairs on the
enemy firing positions to the north
and south of the objective.
To lay interdiction barrage at C.
Mortars.
Machine guns To engage the same targets as 405·mm
and anti·
guns.
tank rifles.
Coordination sig· To call for artillery and mortar firenals.
one green rocket fired upstream.
To call for a reserve boat~red
light from a flashlight.
Order of with· No.4 to convoy the prisoner to the
drawal.
boat. Nos. 2 and 3 to cover No.
4, then Nos. 1 and 4 to cover Nos.
2 and 3.

Figure 52.

Plan of a night raid across the Vistula, 16
November 1944

The success of night operations depends on careful reconnaissance, simplicity of maneuver, speed of
execution, and surprise. The deployment area is
occupied secretly during twilight hours so that the
commanders of the assault teams may familiarize
themselves with orientation points, phase lines, and
avenues of approach. To achieve surprise, artillery
preparation is often omitted during the initial
assault. Two phase lines are selected. The first
is located within the forward defense zone of the
enemy. This position is used to regroup the
assault teams and to establish coordination with
the supporting artillery for the attack of the next
objective. The second phase line is so selected that
its capture would force the enemy to displace his
artillery. To facilitate control of combat and designation of targets for the supporting artillery, the
assault zone is divided into sectors. Orientation
points for infantry and tanks are carefully designated. The assault is launched by a signal from

the line of departure_ Advance of the assault teams
is marked by visual and auditory signals. In order
to reduce the effectiveness of enemy mortar fire,
infantry advances at a jog_ Battalion commanders
must continue the assault until the second phase line
is reached. If the attack fails, it is often repeated
in the same sector on the assumption that the enemy
does not expect such a tactic. This IS in contrast
to U. S. doctrine.
The battalion attacks III a single wave preceded
by a small advance guard. The rifle companies
are deployed in line, each company in turn being
deployed in a line of platoons. Individual riflemen
wear white arm bands. Squads advance in wedge
formation: riflemen to the right of the point fire
ahead and to the right; those to the left of the point
fire ahead and to the left. If the assault sector is
narrow (400 to 500 yards), a rifle battalion may
attack in two echelons. The second echelon then
consists of a reinforced rifle company whose mission is to protect the flanks of the battalion. For
raiding missions, a special detachment is formed
to evacuate captured documents, equipment, and
prisoners. The assault-team principle is followed
in grouping elements of the rifle battalion; that is,
riflemen are supplemented by company and battalion weapons and by engineers according to the
mission of each assault team.
Tanks are frequently employed in support of
infantry at night. Preliminary terrain reconnaissance, clear statement of tasks, clear definition of
orientation points, and close cooperation with infantry are considered the salient points in successful
use of tanks at night. Each tank is assigned its
route, mission, and the infantry assault team which
it supports. Several riflemen are assigned to each
tank to aid its crew in locating antitank weapons
and obstacles. When the situation permits, tank
headlights are used to illuminate enemy firing points,
to light the way for obstacle-clearing parties, and
to blind the enemy. In street fighting at night,
tanks often set fire to buildings in order to illuminate the enemy.
In a night tank-infantry attack on Kuestrin, Germany, the following action was reported: Retreating Germans prepared an ambush for the pursuing
Red Army infantry and tanks in a town park. The
lead Soviet tank stopped and fired a few rounds
into the town hall, setting it on fire (fig. 54), while
the remaining tanks and infantry deployed in a
rough semicircle. German soldiers in ambush were
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Figure 53. Sketch showing plan of a night raid across the Vistula, 16 November 1944.

silhouetted against the burning building and Soviet
tommy-gunners who remained in the shadows made
short work of the ambush.
Forcing of the Oder River line is an example
of a large-scale night operation: 5,000 planes,
4,000 tanks, and over 22,000 pieces of artillery
supported the"infantry attack. A special feature of
this operation was the use of massed searchlights.
Over 200 searchlights were spaced about 200 yards
apart to illuminate the path for Soviet tanks and
blind the enemy. Surprise was achieved by launching the main attack along the entire front at night
instead of at daybreak when it was expected.
2. USE OF SMOKE

Soviet tactical doctrine stresses the employment of
smoke to cover friendly troops as much as to blind
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enemy observation (fig. 55). Smoke IS used to
cover regroupment of forces, concentrations of
troops, direction of the main effort, and all phases
of large- and small-scale operations where the terrain affords little cover from enemy observation.
It is also used to deceive the enemy by false smoke
concentrations which cause him to waste ammunition and disclose his firing positions.
The Red Army uses smoke concentrations over
large areas for extended periods to cover major
attacks; to protect vital installations such as railroad bridges, assembly areas, and supply dumps
from enemy aviation; to screen a counterattack; or
to cover a withdrawal. The width of such a smoke
screen varies from 2,500 to 3,500 yards. Roads
leading to important locations and all orientation
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points in the proximity of targets are also covered
with smoke to make their detection more difficult.
Smoke, when used to cover a major attack, is
coordinated with the principal phases of the assault.
In the preparatory phase, smoke is used to cover

the activities of the reconnaissance parties and ob·
stacle-clearing detachments (fig. 56). During the
assault phase, smoke is laid over the forward lines
of the enemy (fig. 57). Care is taken not to blind
friendly observation posts. In this phase, false con-

Figure 54. Armored attack on a town at night.
671306'--45--8
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Figure 55. Smoke used to hide a counterattack. Note that smoke covers friendly rather than enemy troops.
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Figure 56. Use of smoke to cover removal of obstacles.
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SMOKE
(FROM SMOKE SHELLSl

Figure 57.
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Smoke used to cover the initial objective of the assault.
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Figure 58. Smoke used within the defensive positions of the enemy.
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centrations of smoke are used to confuse the enemy
as to the direction of the main effort. A smoke
screen may be laid between the first and subsequent
assault waves. During combat within the defense
lines of the enemy, smoke is used to cover portions
of the enemy positions~ to blind by-passed centers of
resistance, or to blind stubbornly defended areas
(fig. 58).
Small-scale employment of smoke is an established practice in the Red Army. Smoke pots
or smoke hand grenades are used to cover the actions
of an individual soldier or a small unit~ or to blind individual enemy observation posts or firing positions.
Smoke is a valuable cover for individual riflemen or
a small infantry unit during the advance toward
enemy lines. Tank units use smoke not only to cover
their advance from the assembly area to the deployment area and maneuvers within the enemy defense
zone, but also for withdrawal from enemy fire.
Smoke is also used to simulate tank losses, to screen
the work of tank crews in repairing minor damage
on the battlefield, and to facilitate the evacuation of
damaged tanks under fire. Three to five smoke pots
are used to screen the maneuvers of one tank.
Judicious use of smoke can nullify efforts of the
enemy when he uses smoke shells for registration
fire.

Section II. ASSAULT AND DEFENSE
OF FORTIFIED ZONES
1. PLANNING AND ORGANIZING THE ASSAULT
The destruction of enemy forces in a fortified zone
is accomplished by the complete break-through of
all enemy defensive positions in the sector of the
main effort, and subsequent flank attacks against
adjacent sectors to clear the entire fortified zone.
(See also sections II and V ~ part II.)

Fortified zones vary in defensive strength according to the extent of development, type of
fortifications, terrain, strength of the defending
personnel, and defensive fire power. The German
fortified zones encountered by the Red Army were
usually about 40 miles deep and extended up to 100
miles along the front. The outpost defense zone,
9 to 12 miles from the main defensive position,
consisted of strong points at all dominating terrain
features. The main defensive positions consisted
of permanent steel and concrete emplacements
organized as strong points, with numerous trenches
and separate firing positions interlaced between
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them. Switch positions, to prevent lateral movement if main defensive positions were breached,
covered the 7- to 10-mile distance between the main
defensive positions and the second defensive positions. The second defensive position was generally
weaker than the main defensive position except that
counterattacks were a constant threat to the assault
groups, especially if strong units from the main
defensive positions succeeded in falling back to the
second line. This line was 2 to 3 miles deep;
behind it was the rear defensive belt, generally of
earth and timber construction, 1 to 2 miles in depth.
Soviet doctrine prescribes two possible types of
assault, the accelerated attack and the progressive
attack. The accelerated attack is used when enemy
forces are disorganized and the fortified zone is not
fully developed. Combat formations of combined
arms and mobile troops reinforced by infantry,
artillery, engineer units, and aviation are used to
break through the fortified zone. The progressive
attack is employed when considerable resistance
from thoroughly developed fortifications is anticipated. Soviet doctrine stresses the intensive training of assault groups together with the supporting
arms as the most important single factor in the
successful assault of fortified zones. In many
W orId War II operations, at least two rehearsals
by assault groups and cooperating arms were held
in rear areas prior to the actual assault.
The assault may be made with the main effort
along a single front from 6 to 9 miles wide or in
multiple thrusts each 2 miles in width. Holding
attacks are made simultaneously for diversion and
to seize isolated fortified positions. The basic mission is to destroy enemy forces within the defensive
zone and in the rear. Great emphasis is made on
attacks against the flanks of the penetration area.
In mountains and swamps, assaults are generally
made on a narrower front in successive stages.
2. COMBAT ORGANIZATIONS IN THE ASSAULT

Infantry assault groups must be of balanced composition to facilitate control under exacting conditions. The echeloning of troops must be organized
to provide for the immediate replacement of losses
in the leading assault groups, to increase the intensity of the attack into the enemy's defensive depth,
and to develop the breach by attacking the enemy
flanks. The organization of assault groups begins
with the assault division; the basic combat element
is the assault battalion. While some details of the
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assault organization vary with the situation, the basic
structure has been standardized since 1944.

basic rifle division employed in the assault IS reinforced by the following:

8. Assault division.
This consists of a Guards
Rifle Division of 10,500 men, and strong tank, artillery, and engineer reinforcements which bring the
total strength up to 16,000 men (fig. 59). The supporting armor normally consists of one regiment
each of heavy and medium tanks, a regiment of
76.2-mm or 85-mm self-propelled artillery, and about
a company of mine-clearing, flame-throwing, and
bridging tanks. GHQ artillery includes a light artillery brigade, a mortar regiment, two to four battalions of 122-mm to 152-mm howitzers, a battalion
of 203-mm howitzers, and a battery of superheavy
artillery. The assault engineer-pioneer regiment includes flame-thrower operators and other special engineer troops.
The assault division forms three assault regiments.
In addition, artillery groups and subgroups, the
tank support group, the smoke-laying group, and
the antitank reserve are constituted.

Artillery (one battalion of the organic divisional artillery, one battery of the organic
divisional antitank battalion, a GHQ mortar battalion, and a GHQ light gun battalion) .
Armored vehicles (two companies of medium
tanks, one company of heavy tanks, one
battery of light or medium self-propelled
guns, and about a platoon of mine-clearing
tanks) .
About a battalion of combat engineers
(fig. 60).

Four types of artillery operate under the control
of the divisional artillery commander:
The divisional artillery support groupment
(120-mm mortars, 122-mm howitzers, and 152-mm
howitzers) is responsible for neutralizati.on of at
least the first two lines of trenches in the assault and
for reinforcement of the regimental artillery groupment. Part of the artillery employs direct fire
against enemy firing positions and obstacles.
The division is also allotted subgroupments from
the corps countermortar (120-mm mortars and
122-mm howitzers) and destruction groupments
(152-mm and 203-mm howitzers, super heavy artillery) . The former subgroupment is assigned the
mission of countermortar and counterrocket operation; the latter, the destruction of permanent fortifications.
Finally, the division maintains an artillery reserve,
which is committed by the divisional commander as
required.
The assault division is deployed in one or two
echelons in accordance with the strength of enemy
fortifications and the assigned missions. A general
reserve and an antitank reserve must be provided.
The divisional assault front in the main effort has
a width of from 0.6 to 1.2 miles. In secondary efforts, and in mountain and swamp combat, the front
is 2 to 2.5 miles wide.

h. Assault regiment.

Each regiment of the

The assault regiment resulting from these reinforcements forms two assault battalions. The third
rifle battalion is utilized for the infantry component
of the regimental assault group, the regimental
obstacle-clearing group, and the regimental reserve.
The regimental assault group is used in operations
against forts and concrete casemates of great
strength. In addition to a rifle company, it comprises a pioneer platoon, a heavy tank company,
mine-clearing tanks, a self-propelled gun battery,
and platoons of mortars and flame throwers. It is
often supported by a smoke-laying group. The
regimental obstacle-clearing groups clear passages
through minefields and obstacles, prior to and during the infantry and tank assault, support the battalion obstacle-clearing groups in difficult operations, and enlarge gaps for the passage of succeeding echelons. The regimental reserves provide
antitank and antipersonnel security, especially for
the flanks and rear of the regiment; they also serve
as a personnel and materiel replacement pool for the
assault battalion and the regimental assault group.
The tank support group consists of two medium
tank companies~ each of which normally supports
one assault battalion.
The regimental artillery groupment consists of
one organic battalion of divisional artillery (regimental combat team), plus a battalion of heavy
mortars. This groupment is under the control of
the divisional artillery commander during the
artillery preparation phase, but passes under the
control of the regimental commander during the
assault phase. This artillery fires from open as well
as covered positions, supports the assault as directed
by the regimental commander, and may be utilized
to replace losses in the battalion direct-fire artillery
groupment.
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The assault regiment in the main effort deploys
with assault battalions abreast or in column; its
zone of action therefore varies from 550 to 1,100
yards.
c. Assault battalion. The assault battalion is
the primary tactical unit employed in the assault
of fortified positions. It consists of the rifle battalion reinforced by two batteries of 76.2-mm guns
or infantry howitzers, two light antitank guns, a
platoon of antitank riflemen, and a company of
pioneers (fig. 61).
The assault battalion, like the assault regiment,
forms but two assault companies, the third rifle company being allotted to the battalion assault group,
the direct-fire artillery groups, and the battalion reserve.
Each assault company deploys two
platoons-one rifle and one submachine-gun platoon-abreast.
Infiltration and trench-clearing
teams, as well as personnel for flank security, are
organized from the third platoon. Each company
is reinforced by an obstacle-clearing group of one
pioneer and one rifle section; and a direct-fire artillery group of 76.2-mm guns or a howitzer battery,
two light antitank guns, and a rifle section for security (fig. 62). Direct-fire artillery does not participate in the artillery preparation.
For operations against pillboxes and concrete emplacements, an assault group is organized in the
battalion. Its organizalion varies slightly in strength
and capabilities in accordance with the resistance of
the enemy position to be assaulted. Typically, it
consists of a section of submachine gunners, a section of pioneers, a section of antitank riflemen, and
two or three men with portable flame throwers.
The battalion mortars and heavy machine guns
remain under centralized control. The battalion
reserve consists of the balance of the third company
(one rifle and one submachine-gun platoon) and an
antitank rifle section.
The battalion deploys on a front of 550 yards and
to a depth of 440 yards in one assault echelon. In
mountain warfare and in swamps, the battalion deploys in two echelons.
3. PREPARATION OF THE ASSAULT

a· Organization of reconnaissance. The
staff of the senior troop commander organizes the
reconnaissance plan for the entire operation. Soviet
practice prescribes mission-type and continuous
reconnaissance by all reconnaissance units to make
possible the proper command decision. A minimum
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of three separate sets of aerial photographs is uften
prescribed to supplement ground reconnaissance.
Extensive and uninterrupted ground observation
during the preparation phase, as well as during combat, is one of the most important forms of reconnaissance. Day and night reconnaissance patrols determine specific enemy data. Complete information
must be gained by means of combat reconnaissance.
A combat reconnaissance group consists of a rifle
battalion supported by two or three divisional artillery battalions and reinforced by GHQ artillery and
tanks, mortar units, and aviation. During this operation, special artillery, tank, and engineer reconnaissance is conducted simultaneously with general
troop reconnaissance. During combat reconnaissance, forward enemy firing positions and outposts
may be assaulted and seized if the neutralization or
capture of such positions will facilitate general assault.
All information of enemy installations and dispositions is recorded on large-scale maps and distributed down to battalion and company commanders several days prior to the assault.
b. Planning the assault. Assault group training is a fundamental requisite during the preparation
phase. Thorough training in the proper employment of the individual weapon is followed by the
training of assault groups in close coordination with
all supporting arms. In many operations this type
of training has taken place on a large scale in an
area far to the rear, and has included practice
assaults by the assault teams against reproduced
enemy fortifications. Holding forces and reconnaissance units remained in contact with the enemy
forward positions during this time.
The line of departure is far more elaborate in
this type of operations than in the offensive where
no heavily fortified zone is encountered. A forward trench position is constructed at a distance of
150 to 200 yards from the enemy outpost line, and
is occupied by observers and security elements.
Infantry units are deployed in several lines of
trenches to the rear where elaborate shelters, dumps,
and concealed gun positions are prepared. These
trenches are 100 to 150 yards apart; they contain
battalion and regimental reserves, dug-in directfire gun positions, mortar positions, command posts
and medical stations, and ammunition and other
supply dumps.
The topographic service produces maps (R. F.
1/2,000) in sufficient quantities for complete dis-
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Combat formation oj the assault battalion.

semination. The entire enemy fortified zone is
indicated in the greatest possible detail. The com·
bat coordination tables are worked out in complete
detail with definite missions assigned to every
assault group.
Troop concentration and redeployment prior to

V-lIS

UNIT FROM WHICH GROUPS ARE FORMED

the assault are carried out by night with great
secrecy, using specially constructed communication
trenches. Assault groups must occupy the line of
departure trenches within one day of the assault.
On the eve of the assault, ramps are dug and passages
are cleared to facilitate movement forward of per·
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sonnel, tanks, and guns from their entrenched
positions.
4. CONDUCT OF THE ASSAULT

The artillery and aviation preparation has the
mission of weakening enemy resistance to the greatest possible degree. Artillery and bombardment
units attack all known enemy fortifications on a
front wider than the main effort sector in order to
neutralize enemy positions which can direct flanking
fire on the penetration area. Stormovik formations
attack enemy personnel in trenches, assembly areas,
and rear areas as well as firing positions and targets
of opportunity. Fighter groups provide cover
against enemy air action throughout the entire
operation. Artillery and close-support aviation
continue to neutralize enemy positions throughout
the entire assault phase by attacking successive
enemy defensive lines and strongpoints impeding the
progress of the assault groups. Particular attention is directed against concentrations of enemy
infantry antitank guns and revived strongpoints, gun
batteries, and mortars.
The obstacle clearing groups prepare lanes
through minefields and wire entanglements on the
eve of the assault and move forward during the
artillery-aviation preparation phase to continue obstacle clearance.
Final assault group and tank preparations are
completed during the artillery and air offensive, in
accordance with the observed results of the preparation.
The assault begins at the moment tank units reach
the line of departure. Artillery fire is transferred
against enemy positions in depth and on the flanks
of the assault sector. The assault must follow close
behind the artillery barrage, to deny the enemy an
opportunity to reorganize.
Infiltration units move forward prior to the assault
in order to cover the assault units with submachine·
gun fire directed against enemy infantry firing positions. Infantry and tank assault groups then pass
through obstacles along prepared lanes, directing
their fire on the first and second line of trenches.
Upon reaching the first line of trenches, grenades
are thrown and the group continues the offensive,
keeping close to its supporting artillery and mortar
barrage. Enemy personnel left behind in trenches
are destroyed by the trench-clearance teams and
units of the second echelon. The obstacle-clearing
groups continue to remove mines and obstacles,
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guide infantry and tanks through the gap, then follow them for further obstacle clearance. Automatic
weapons and artillery fire at revived enemy firing
positions to facilitate the forward advance of assault
groups.
The offensive is intensified by feeding an increasing number of supporting troops into the penetration
area to reinforce the break-through spearheads and
to deliver strong flank attacks from the gap.
Those special fortification assault groups which
have been assigned the specific mission of destroy.
ing known enemy fortifications are placed in the
first echelon. Other special assault groups follow
in the second echelon in readiness to assault new or
revived casemates or strong points as directed by
the battalion commander in that sector. The assault
group commander determines the direction and
mode of attack, taking into account the location of
supporting enemy firing positions, their sectors of
fire, the characteristics of the fortifications to be
assaulted, and precautions against enemy counterattacks. The assault group sections operate as follows: Direct-fire artillery, machine-gun and tank
sections fire on adjacent enemy firing positions and
infantry protecting the fort or casemate. The obstacle-clearing section and the main body of the
assault group advance through obstacles up to 100
yards of the casemate and cover the demolition section with submachine-gun fire and by grenades. The
demolition section destroys the casemate in a single
blast or piecemeal, depending on its size and
strength. At the same time, charges are placed;
grenade, flame-thrower and submachine gun attacks
are directed against apertures. In some cases, embrasures are blocked by sand bags. (A detailed
description is given in section V of part II.) After
the assault is launched, artillery and machine-gun
support is brought up behind the assault group to
cover probable approaches of enemy counter attach·
ing infantry.
Powerful forts are assaulted after the advancing
echelons of infantry and tanks have isolated the fort
from its supporting firing positions and enemy infantry. Smoke screens are often used to facilitate
the assault on a powerful fort which has been bypassed and is isolated from enemy support.
After breaking through the main defensive posi.
tion, the next positions are similarly assaulted but
at a greater tempo. To facilitate the complete
seizure of the fortified zone, every small breach in
depth and on the flanks must be immediately ex-
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ploited even though the breach may not be in the
sector of the main effort.
Artillery and air bombardment in short concentrations support the deep penetration of the assault
groups. Increasing numbers of supporting troops
develop the penetration in depth and width. Every
captured position is carefully secured against enemy
~ounterattacks-by hasty minefields, firing positions,
and wire obstacles placed by engineer groups of the
second echelon. When enemy counterattacks are
repulsed, the assault groups must follow on the
heels of the withdrawing enemy for further exploitation.
5. DEFENSE OF FORTIFIED ZONES
The bases of organization of permanent fortified
areas are battalion and regimental defensive positions. Special defensive battalions are often formed
for this purpose, and equipped with a high proportion of automatic weapons, medium mortars, and
antitank weapons. (For general discussion of de·
fensive organization see chapter VI.)
a. Battalion defensive position. The infantry battalion can defend a forward position up
to 1 mile in width. However, in strongly fortified
zones the front width is narrowed to 500 yards or
less, and the battalion is echeloned in depth in con·
formity with the lay-out of the strong point and
prepared fortifications. The battalion must be pre·
pared to organize the strong points for all-around
defense, but defensive positions normally contain
a "gorge" exposed to fire from rear positions. This
prevents immediate utilization of the battalion position if captured by the enemy.
In occupying a prepared position, the battalion
commander must analyze the defense plan which
indicates the strength, equipment, and locations of
individual fortifications, strong points, trenches, and
concrete pillboxes to be manned by the battalion
units, as well as the attached infantry support groups
for each casemate. The system of fire, antitank defenses, camouflage requirements, engineer works,
and minefields are also indicated. The first missions
of the battalion commander are to supplement the
existing system of fire with the battalion and attached weapons, and to continue the development
of the position by the construction of supplementary
communications trenches, personnel shelters, observation posts, and switch positions for personnel
and weapons, especially mortars. All battalion, artillery, and attached mortars must be registered on
avenues of approach, on outpost positions, and on
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obstacles. Alternate mortar positions, observation
posts, and command posts are prepared, wired for
signal communication, and registered on critical
areas within the battalion fortified sector in order
to destroy enemy forces in firesacks should the
enemy penetrate into the battalion sector.
Artillery and mortars are organ ized for counterpreparation fire. During enemy artillery preparation, destructive enemy fire against fortifications
and firing positions may be immunized by laying
protective smoke screens. This is done on orders
of the regimental commander. 'When firing positions are neutralized or destroyed, the system of
fire is reorganized by moving forward machine guns
and other weapons to reserve positions. When the
assault phase begins, all destroyed weapons in firing
positions must be replaced by reserve weapons.
Soviet casemates are always provided with a rear
exit and ramp to facilitate rapid movement of
artillery in and out of the position.
During the assault, enemy penetrations are iso·
lated by machine-gun and mortar fire from rear
and flank positions; counterattacking groups then
destroy the isolated enemy. Tanks are engaged by
antitank guns, casemates, and open emplacements.
When tanks break through the forward defensive
position, they are destroyed at the next defensive
position while mortar fire and automatic weapons
separate enemy infantry and tanks by antipersonnel
fire. Revived pillboxes are supported by artillery,
mortar, and machine-gun fire while fortification
support groups and tanks counterattack the enemy
to reestablish the position. Deep enemy penetrations are resisted by maintaining heavy fire against
the enemy flanks and preventing the isolation of
individual strongpoints. Artillery fires from open
positions when necessary, and all weapons deliver
the maximum fire to restrict enemy movement and
to enable regimental reserves to organize an effective counterattack.
h. Regimental defensive position. Although
the battalion organizes strong points for all-around
defense, the regiment is responsible for intermediate defensive positions and switch positions which
may be occupied upon orders from the division
commander. The regimental defensive position is
characterized by extensive development of firesacks
and ambushes, well camouflaged infantry positions,
and highly maneuverable artillery and mortar fire.
The regimental reserve consists of at least one infantry battalion, reinforced by tanks and artillery. The
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reserve is deployed to the rear of the battalion
strong points with the missions of reinforcing the
battalion positions by fire and counterattacking
enemy assault forces which penetrate or by-pass the
forward battalion positions. The regiment must
be prepared for all-around defense if encircled.
The regimental position has considerable defensive
strength, due to minefields and intricate obstacles
erected by the engineers. The regimental smoke·
laying group is organized for screening the position
from observed enemy artillery fire.
Counterpreparation fire by divisional and attached
artillery has been a decisive factor in weakening
large-scale enemy attacks on the fortified zone.
Fortified zones are the key positions which deflect
the attacking enemy into channelized sectors in
which he may be isolated and destroyed. Massed
artillery fire is concentrated on enemy forces which
penetrate between strong points into a firesack.
Then a powerful tank and infantry counterattack
destroys the enemy salient. These tactics are characteristic of the centralized type of defense. A
notable example of this was the destruction of German forces in their attempt to penetrate the fortified
zone of the Kursk salient in 1943.

Section III. CITY WARFARE
1. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

Since the nature of city fighting gives an advantage
to the defense, Soviet doctrine, like U. S. doctrine,
favors isolating and by-passing cities rather than
attacking them directly. Numerous large cities were
encircled by the Red Army during the latter part
of the war, thereby cutting off large enemy field
forces defending them. The organized German
defense of encircled cities continued when the battle
lines of the front were 20 or more miles beyond them.
Soviet doctrine teaches that the rapid and economical assault of defended cities is achieved by
thorough and continuous reconnaissance, and by
isolation of centers of resistance which are reduced
by infantry-artillery assault groups. The attack on
a city may be compared to the assault of a fortified
zone, but with certain advantages. The civilian
population, particularly women and children, imposes a burden on the defending military forces with
respect to food, water, health, and shelter, as well
as providing a negative morale factor. The main
disadvantages of defense derive from the inherent
tactical weakness of city building. Streets constitute
corridors which restrict movement and prevent the
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organization of a continuous system of defense.
Buildings are not uniform)n strength and size, and
many are highly inflammable. In addition, they
afford little opportunity for mutual fire support at
close ranges, impose a perimeter type of defense in
each structure, and can be used as shelters for attack.
ing forces. Further disadvantages to defending
forces are the restricted fields of fire and visibility.
On the other hand, the offense also encounters
disadvantages in city warfare not found in open
terrain. The extreme compartmentation horizontally and vertically makes progress slow and costly.
The rubble of destroyed buildings affords the defenders easily adaptable defensive positions with
excellent camouflage. The ease of mining, boobytrapping, and flooding by the defenders; the presence of traps for armor and artillery; the danger
of collapsing structures-all these factors favor the
defense and must be overcome by specially trained
assault groups. The presence of unsuspected passages, such as subways and sewers, and the ease of
interior communication facilitate infiltration counterattacks and breakout offensives by the defending
forces. Offensive operations also involve difficult
problems of direction and control.
Two basic types of attack are employed: the
systematic attack against continuous defensive lines
in depth, and the accelerated attack against weak
sectors such as large city parks or open spaces.
Seizure of the latter divides the defending forces
into smaller pockets.

a. Reconnaissance. Detailed intelligence must
be prepared concerning the enemy fire plan, the
main fortified city zones, firing positions and principal weapons, and approaches affording the best
cover. The deadly effect of hidden fire in city warfare makes location of enemy firing positions
especially important.
In Red Army practice, combat reconnaissance is
the chief means of obtaining information about
the enemy in cities. In the assault of large cities,
reconnaissance detachments of every arm and of
the combined arms may operate for 6 days prior
to assault. Combat reconnaissance continues during the assault to determine all new firing positions,
especially on the flanks of the penetration. Combat
reconnaissance is supplemented by other methods
of obtaining data. City plans are studied in detail,
particularly with regard to the location of utility
systems, subways, sewers, and the like. Observers
are located at posts which permit overlapping vis-
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ibility; each observer is assigned a sector covering
not more than 15 0 to 20° of vision. Special patrols
are organized to capture prisoners for interrogation.
These patrols consist of a seizure group of seven
men and two support groups of six men, each armed
with grenades and submachine guns. When full
information cannot be obtained by other forms of
reconnaissance, reconnaissance in force is conducted
both day and night to draw enemy fire.
h. Assault formations. The basic operating
unit in city warfare is the rifle battalion, reinforced
with armor and antitank gups. When enemy reo
sistance is intense, one city block is designated as the
objective for each battalion. The variations in
enemy defenses necessitate considerable flexibility
in supporting artillery and armor.
The battalion is deployed for assault in column
formation composed of four distinct groups (fig.
63) • The advance guard or the infiltration group
consists of a rifle company of two or three platoons
and an antitank section. It is armed with automatic weapons, grenades, antitank rifles, and antitank rocket launchers. The second echelon or main
body is the assault group, and is similar in strength
and composition to the regimental assault group
organized for the assault of fortified zones (see section II, part III). It consists of a rifle company,
about half of the battalion heavy weapons, and a detachment of demolition engineers and smoke layers
from the rifle regiment. Supporting weapons are
two to three battalion or regimental direct-fire guns
and a platoon of self-propelled guns. The third
group is the support group which includes the
balance of the battalion heavy weapons, three to four
regimental or divisional direct-fire guns, and one
platoon or medium tanks or self-propelled guns.
The last group is the battalion reserve of one rifle
company, which provides flank-security patrols.
Subgroups of varying size and composition are
detached for separate assault missions on isolated
structures. A typical subgroup consists of seven
submachine g'unners, five engineers, three to four
heavy machine-gun crews, and two antitank riflemen. Two to four regimental or divisional guns
may be placed in support of each subgroup.
c. Conduct of the assault. The two basic arms
on which the burden of city warfare chiefly falls
are the infantry and the artillery. Engineers supplement infantry combat by extensive de-mining
work and by executing demolitions. Tanks use their
mobile fire power to supplement artillery. Prior
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to every assault, coordination plans are developed
between the rifle battalion commander and the commanders of artillery and tank support on the basis
of their combined reconnaissance. Visual and radio
signals are established to indicate when phase lines
are reached and for the subordination of supporting
artillery and tanks to small subgroups.
ASSAULT TECHNIQUES. Specific techniques have
been developed by infantry and supporting arms
in city warfare. In the assault of a strongly defended city block by a rifle battalion, the support
group opens concentrated fire on the windows, doors,
and along the flanks of the buildings. Mortar crews
fire on intersections and areas to the rear of the
block to prevent the enemy from organizing new
firing positions. Automatic weapons direct their
fire on the upper floors and roofs of buildings,
while artillery fire is directed at the lower floors
and cellars (fig. 64). Smoke-laying crews throw
smoke grenades to cover the approach of tanks and
self-propelled guns whose fire is directed toward
the center of the block. As soon as a breach is
made in the center of the block, the infiltration group
dashes through the breach under cover of smoke.
Small parties of the infiltration group expand their
operations in all directions, taking positions inside
the neutralized buildings to ward off counterattacks.
Artillery fire shifts to the enemy position on the
flanks. Tanks and self-propelled guns move into
the neutralized sector out of the line of enemy
direct fire, concentrating their attention on the
corner buildings. The assault group, coordinating
its operations with tanks and self-propelled guns,
enters the remaining buildings· in the block and
destroys the enemy garrison.

An engineer mine-clearing company follows the
rifle battalion into newly occupied positions. Each
platoon consists of special mine-clearing subgroups
organized as follows: a mine-reconnaissance section of five to six men, a mine-clearing section of
eight to ten men, a mine-clearance checking section
of four to five men, and a collecting and storing
section of two to three men. The engineer company
clears one to two large buildings or 20 to 30 small
buildings per day. De-mining assignments are
planned and controlled by the engineer staff of the
formation in charge of the city sector. Tactically important buildings, streets, and blocks are
given work-order priority. Trained engineer crews
double-check all important areas, giving special
attention to time bombs.

TM 30-430

1 Nov 45

mIml.

. I
,

"(

I

o

I
o

Figure 63.

!

1i
•

'

Combat formation of the rifle battalion for ofJensive operations in city warfare.

V-123

1 Nov 45

TM 30-430

: AIR BURST

;.. ,. . . .;:;.....: ;:::\.:~(:. \~.~£:;;'<";

. :.......;;

:···;:·<·::)·;':::~.·:·:::·:i·;:;·;::,~·:. :

'.

;::..:-/ . ;:;;.. ,;.> .... : .. : ...

Figure 64. Fortification and fire attack
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In the event that a block is neutralized and seized
rapidly, the reserve is committed at once to consolidate the position and to carry the assault to the
next block, denying the enemy time to reorgani2!e
his system of fire. The support group is displaced
forward to engage new enemy firing positions, and
the sequence of the operation is repeated. Tanks
and self-propelled guns never move ahead of the
infantry, to avoid entering firesacks or striking land
mines. The signals of de-mining engineers and
infantrymen guide the movements of armor.
ROLE OF ARTILLERY. The mission of light artillery is to destroy enemy firing positions by direct
fire. In the assault of Berlin~ up to 80 percent of all
batteries attached to infantry units conducted direct
fire from open positions. In Budapest, artillery
ranging from 45-mm antitank guns to 203-mm
howitzers fired directly at embrasures, windows, and
every type of firing position. In addition to neutralizing enemy firing positions, direct fire is used
to create breaches in buildings, walls, and barricades.
Guns are displaced forward alternately under
heavy fire cover of other guns and infantry automatic weapons. Large-caliber howitzers, 152-mm
and 203-mm, are used to destroy buildings completely. Tanks with large-caliber guns, self-propelled artillery, and large-caliber howitzers act as
rams to make gaps in the enemy defenses.
Mortars of all calibers cover possible channels
of enemy troop movements, such as street intersections, trenches, and alleys. Mortar firing positions are placed behind walls or inside buildings
-close to their objectives. Their mobility and effective fire from concealed positions provide strong
fire support for the assault groups.
Artillery firing at high angles from concealed positions exercises great care in registration. The
exact locations of friendly troops must be known~
and each burst must be observed in firing for destruction. Registration shifts are made in two to
four graduations from computed firing data,
gradually approaching the target.
Rockets are used in closely congested building
areas where direct artillery fire is restricted. The
Soviets have used improvised launchers for firing
rockets from the second and third floors of buildings.
The mission of the artillery reserve is counterbattery and countermortar fire. Massed fire from
heavy batteries of the artillery reserve is used
against citadels or other strong enemy fortified po-
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sltlOns. Separate missions of the artillery reserve
include interdiction and destruction of enemy supply
dumps, headquarters, communication centers, and
other important objectives. The artillery reserve is
retained under centralized control under the corps
and division artillery commanders.
COORDINATION. For effective coordination, the
regimental command post is placed close to bat·
talion command posts. Battalion combat formations
become broken up to a great extent in city warfare.
Staff officers are therefore given more authority
to make decisions in areas under their control.
Infantry units must be well trained in close-in combat, in the employment of grenades and demolitions,
and particularly in coordinated fire and movement.
To keep command posts constantly informed concerning the progress of local missions and troop
dispositions, radio communication, signal flares, and
messengers supplement and duplicate telephone systems which cannot be relied upon for uninterrupted
operation.
Radio communication is often the only means of
maintaining contact. Each battalion has one radio
set; there are two in the regimental command post;
two are located near the regimental Chief of Staff;
and one set is kept in reserve. Stations are located
on the top floors of buildings or in concealed, open
areas to avoid the interference with transmission.
Wire communication is maintained between the
regimental command post and the battalions operating in the direction of the main effort. For close
coordination, the regimental commander's observation post is at the forward battalion command post.
SECURITY. Convenient interior lines of communication give the defending forces the advantage of
rapid troop concentration for counterattacks and
particularly for large-scale break-out offensives.
Large mobile reserves of infantry, artillery, and
armor must be held in readiness to support any sector which may be assaulted by the enemy, especially
the sectors in the direction of other enemy forces
outside the encircled city. In local actions, every
seized enemy building and block must be completely
cleared of the enemy from cellar to roof, then fortified and protected against enemy counterattacks by
automatic weapons, mines, and supporting fire. A
specially trained security detachment in every assault
group has the specific function of organizing defensive positions in newly captured buildings and
block sectors. Mortar fire and self-propelled guns
are particularly effective in repelling enemy counter·
attacks.
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Figure 65. City defenses in depth.
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DEFENSE OF CITIES

The Red Army has employed highly effective defensive tactics in the defense of cities. The strategically vital cities of Leningrad, Moscow, and Stalingrad were successfully defended despite full-scale
enemy offensive operations. Leningrad was under
heavy long-range artillery fire for 2V2 years, while
Stalingrad was completely destroyed but never fully
occupied by the enemy.

a. Tactical doctrine.

Basic principles characteristic of Red Army tactics in the defense of
cities are the mobilization of the civilian population
for defensive city combat, the development of deeply
echeloned defenses extending far forward from the
city, and the concentration of large bodies of troops
on both flanks of the city (Figure 65).
The civilian population is politically indoctrinated
to take part in the organized and active defense of
the city. Civilian military training in elementary
tactics, rifle marksmanship, and defense against air
attack were organized in peacetime by the Osso·
viahim Society and the Komosomol League. When
the battle front approaches a city, the civilian popu·
lation organized into combat and service units in
accordance ",-ith individual ability, assists in the
construction of field fortifications, street barricades,
and shelters. Intensive counter-intelligence screening of all civilians prevents any subversive activities.
Defenses are organized in depth in order to resist
effectively the enemy massed-tank attacks which
follow extensive air bombardment and artillery
preparation. Particular attention is directed to
antitank defenses consisting of obstacles, traps, and
numerous concealed antitank guns. Heavy losses
are inflicted on the enemy by permitting his forces
to penetrate bet\veen strong points and thereby
channelizing his attack into firesacks. A destroyed
city is even more suited to prolonged and stubborn
defense than one with all its buildings intact, since
the debris offers greater opportunities for camouflage, surprise, and ambush than do standing buildings. Furthermore, debris is not as likely to be affected by subsequent bombardments and is invulnerable to incendiary attack. Troops are taught to
improvise fortified positions among ruins and
charred remains of houses as quickly as possible,
and to provide a number of switch positions which
are interconnected by a system of deep trenches.
The primary mission of troop concentrations on
both flanks of a defended city is to prevent encirclement of the city by reinforcing the flank fortifica-
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tions. Soviet combat experience has demonstrated
that an enemy brought to a halt when already deep
into the city's defenses and forced to wage exhausting combat for a prolonged period is a ready target
for encirclement and destruction by fresh, constantly reinforced flank forces.
h. Defensive technique. The conduct of defense in city warfare is similar to that of fortified
zones. Emphasis is placed on applicable defensive
techniques, such as the elimination of dead spaces
by enfilade fire and mobile groups of submachine
gunners, which operate from under improvised cover
and attack enemy assault groups in the flank and
rear. Large numbers of snipers are used with the
special mission of picking off officers and noncommissioned officers. Evacuation to the rear, as well
as forward movement of supplies, reinforcement,
and replacements, takes place at night.
The principal defensive objective is to force the
enemy to abandon large-scale armored attacks by
making the penetration of the deep defensive positions too costly. Operations will then revert to intense house-to-house combat between relatively
small infantry and engineer assault groups supported by direct-fire artillery, automatic weapons,
demolitions, and flame throwers.
The transformation of individual houses into
strong points involves the following measures:
Digging firing, shelter, and communication
trenches (including at least one hidden
exit trench) in the basement.
Breaking through firing embrasures.
Reinforcing the foundations with earth-andrubble filled buttresses behind chicken
wire, or plank retaining walls.
Constructing safety underpinning as required, and covering the floor of the first
story with a foot of earth for fire- and
splinter-proofing.
The upper stories are used for observations, radio
communications and sniping.
Defensive 'warfare has two overlapping phases,
each with its o\vn system of organization. In the
first phase, prepared defenses which extend throughout the city and its approaches are organized as in
the defense of a, fortified zone, with particular
emphasis on all types of antitank weapons. As
enemy artillery and air attacks destroy city structures, a progressive transition in the organization
of the defense takes place until the city is a continuous mass of rubble. The defenses now consist
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of a complicated tangle of trenches, deep dugouts
under blasted buildings, and strongholds in ruins
or in remains of large and strongly reinforced concrete buildings such as abound in faotory areas.
Large quantities of direct-fire artillery are emplaced
in hidden firing positions to limit the progress of
enemy assault. Rear areas contain many batteries
of heavy artillery which support the city defenses.
The defensive system of Stalin grad was typical of
such an organization and proved that the ruins of a
city can constitute one of the most formidable types
of fortifications in modern warfan~.

Section IV. OPERATIONS AT RIVER
LINES AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERA·
TIONS
1. RIVER CROSSINGS

The Red Army crossed every major river in Europe
between the Volga and the Elbe during the course
of the war. Successive operations of many types
resulted in improved techniques and new methods,
such as the underwater bridge.
a. Basic doctrine. Soviet doctrine in rivercrossing operations places great emphasis on certain tactical measures which differ from U. S. practice, although the general principles of river-crossing
operations are basically identical. All of the most
successful Soviet river assaults in W orId War II
were carried out on broad fronts. By restricting
the crossing area to a narrow front, the Red Army
appreciates, surprise is lost and enemy forces concentrate in the selected area. Diversionary or feint
crossings in considerable strength are normally made
to provide alternate crossing sites to which the main
forces can be diverted, should the main crossings
fail or be held up. The planning of the operation
is detailed and intricate, and orders are given in
wrItmg. Concealment of crossing equipment and
troops is carried out under the strictest discipline.
The greatest single difference between Soviet and
Allied river-crossing operations, however, has been
in large-scale employment by the Red Army of rafts,
bridge sections, and boats or ferries to transport
armor, artillery, and loaded vehicles across water;
whereas Allied forces generally waited until bridges
".-ere built.
Because of its superior accuracy, the Red Army
places far greater reliance on artillery fire than on
air action in river-crossing operations. Considerable artillery strength is concentrated, ranging up
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to 240 to 320 pieces of all calibers-including
120-mm mortars-per miles of front. The greatest
emphasis is placed on the use of local materials for
the construction of boats, rafts, and bridges. The
tempo of river-crossing operations is highly variable,
depending entirely on the tactical location of the
river line with respect to the offensive operations.
Ma j or water barriers were often reached at the end·
of extensive advances; and long periods of preparation were required, due not so much to the lack of
crossing capabilities as to the need for consolidating
the newly won territory and for bringing up troops
and supplies. Rivers within the range of offensive
objectives constituted no serious obstacles and were
usually taken in stride.
h. Role of various arms in river-crossing
operations.
ENGINEERS. Engineers play the dominant role
in river-crossing operations. There is no essential
difference between U. S. and Red Army doctrines
with respect to the command responsibility or the
functions of the engineer arm in the organization,
the assault, or the construction phases. As in the
U. S. Army, the maintenance of bridges, traffic control, and forward displacement of engineer equipment are also engineer functions in the Red Army.
River crossings on broad fronts require the concentration of far more equipment than the organic
engineer units of the formation and attached GHQ
engineer units can provide from their organizational
equipment. The Red Army engineers have the
tremendous task of constructing crossing equipment,
ranging from wooden boats to heavy bridge sections,
out of local materials. For example, 10,000 wooden
boats were built entirely of local materials, except
for nails, in 10 days prior to the crossing of the
Vistula. In such situations infantry units do the
work under engineer supervision. In addition, the
operation of signal .stations and troop regulating
points by Red Army engineers involves operational
control of large bodies of troops and equipment on
a broad front.
ARTILLERY. Artillery has three basic missions in
river-crossing operations: to destroy enemy defenses,
to cover the crossing of troops, and to transport the
artillery across the river. In Red Army practice a
river crossing requires the same amount of artillery
as the assault of a fully developed defensive position.
The density of artillery and 120-mm mortars required is 240 to 320 barrels per mile of front. To
obtain this concentration, about 120 to 200 extra
guns are usually required per mile of front. This
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presents the difficult problem of concentrating large
artillery units and at the same time maintaining surprise. Usually a concentration point is selected 10
to 16 miles from the proposed firing positions of the
guns. Routes to the firing positions are carefully
planned and covered in several night practice
marches by all battery commanders. Strict control
of fire is enforced during the concentration phase
by permitting only two batteries per corps to engage in counterbattery fire, by restricting antiaircraft artillery to a limited number of duty batteries1
and by using roving guns for deception. Great importance is attached to direct artillery fire; 70 to 80
percent of the regimental artillery is used in direct
fire. A considerable portion of the antitank and
regimental guns designated for direct-fire missions
are dug in by night close to the river bank, and
completely concealed by masking with shrubbery or
tarDaulins with sand cover.
The preliminary bombardment of enemy positions by air and artillery is directed against enemy
defenses and firing positions which can interfere
with. crossing operations. The first assault echelon
occupies the line of departure positions 3 to 4 hours
before H-hour.
The full intensity of tht:: bombardment is developed as the first echelon moves its assault boats
to the river for embarkation under cover of directfire artillery. The fire density is two to three bursts
per minute on a front of 10 to 15 yards, lasting from
10 to 20 minutes. This is followed by less intense
bombardment for 30 to 40 minutes, during which
time the first assault echelon crosses to the opposite
bank. The creeping barrage begins on both visual
and radio signals from the assaulting infantry; time
systems are considered unreliable. Forward observers and artillery observation posts direct barrage
lifts of from 50 to 100 yards. The barrage is held
at main objectives, which are usually at about 500to 700-yard intervals, until the advancing infantry
is observed to be 200 to 250 yards from them; then
the barrage creeps forward in short intermediate
lifts to the next objective. Surprise night crossings
are made without artillery preparation. All directfire guns are held in readiness in their firing positions to neutralize enemy weapons, should the crossing be discovered. Supporting medium and heavy
artillery and 120-mm mortars are held in readiness
to fire on previously registered enemy positions and
assembly areas.
Infantry guns and mortars, as well as four addi-

TM 30-430
tional antitank guns per· battalion, are sent across
with the first echelon. Artillery crews are reinforced by 50 percent personnel reserves.
Artillery crosses on ferries and improvised rafts
until the floating bridges are in place, but no more
than one-third of the artillery is ever in motion at
one time. During a pursuit, the time element is
considered to be of such vital importance that forward units never wait for the arrival of bridging
equipment if there is a chance to seize a bridgehead.
All artillery units are trained in ferrying their guns
across rivers by various improvised methods using
local materials.
ARMOR. Armored units carry bridging equipment adequate for crossing rivers up to 300 yards
in width. The motorized infantry generally crosses
first to establish a bridgehead. Tank units enlarge
the bridgehead, and wait until the main forces have
crossed before continuing offensive operations.
Amphibious tanks and ducks accompany the first
infantry assault wave. Tanks approach river lines
on a wide front and avoid concentrations. Reconnaissance for fords and undamaged bridges is always
carried out. On many occasions tank spearheads
and advance reconnaissance detachments have seized
bridges intact as the result of unexpected wide outflanking maneuvers.
ANTIAIRCRAFT ARTILLERY. During the assault
phase, antiaircraft batteries protect the crossing area
from the friendly side of the river; in some cases
antiaircraft guns are mounted on rafts. As soon as
possible, additional batteries are also emplaced on
the far side of the river. Airborne troops have not
been used on a large scale in any Red Army rivercrossing operation. Parachute troops of battalion
size are used against enemy communications 5 to
10 miles from the river to hamper enemy movements,
or are given missions of destroying bridges, flood
gates, locks, etc.
c. The preparation phase. Thorough ground
reconnaissance is organized as soon as a river is
reached. Aerial photographs are continuously made
to supplement ground observation. Engineer reconnaissance gives particular attention to local material
for use in the crossing; to the characteristics of the
river, its banks, and most suitable approaches; and
to enemy obstacles and defensive installations across
the river. Artillery reconnaissance determines the
location and strength of enemy firing positions and
plans the artillery system of fire for the preparation
and assault phases. Observation posts manned by
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officers are usually placed 1,000 yards apart with
mobile observation posts covering intermediate positions. Patrols of specialist troops operate along the
whole front on the enemy side of the river to gain

concentration of forces in the area selected for the
assault. This concentration is never hurried, due
to the extreme emphasis placed by the Soviets on
very thorough concealment.

Figure 66. Deplo:vment of troops prior to crossing operations.

further and more detailed information, and to remove underwater obstacles such as wire entanglements, posts, and mines.
During the preparatory stage~ a period of at least
2 or 3 weeks is required to carry out the necessary
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The organization of troops for the crossing operation follows a definite pattern (figs. 66 and 67).
The division concentration areas lie from 2 to 5
miles from the river, wherever the greatest concealment is available. The forward assembly area is
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situated from 2h to 1 mile from the river bank on
a wide front. Thoroughly concealed dumps of
medium and heavy pontons and bridging materials
are placed from 300 to 900 yards from the river
bank. Assault boats and spare equipment are con-

Figure 67.

assistants are the chief engineers of subordinate
units down to company level. The immediate responsibility of every engineer officer is that sector
of the crossing operation to which his unit is assigned. Three categories of crossing points are

Organization of crossing control.

cealed under foliage or buried in sand in the forward
zone 100 to 200 yards from the water tfig. 681.
The Commander of the entire river-crossing operation is the chief engineer of the formation. The
Commander controls all troop movements from the
forward assembly area to the opposite shore. His

organized within the general crossing area. These
are the assault-boat crossing points, the ferr) ing
points, and the bridge crossing points. Assaultboat equipment is concealed along a wide front,
,..-hile ferrying and bridge equipment are concentrated further to the rear in concealed areas adjacent
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to approach roads leading to the river (figs. 69
and 70).
d. Assault phase. The assault phase is usually
launched at night, although daytime crossings under
smoke cover have also taken place.
The rifle battalion is the basic unit for which
assault-boat crossings are established. One or two
cros~ing points are established per battalion as re-

where slit trenches are dug to conceal them. Trails
marked by tape or wire lead to the assault boat dispersal area and thence to the line of embarkation.
Signal points for regulating the troop movements
from the assembly areas to the line of departure
and to the loading line are operated by engineer
personnel. Engineer guides and signal control stations regulate the movement of each wave in con·
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Figure 68.

Assault·boat crossing point.

quired by the terrain and by taotical considerations.
At the beginning of the assault, boats are placed at
intervals of 15 to 30 yards along the line of embarkation, making the battalion front 200 to 550 yards
wide. Equipment consists of organizational inflated rubber boats, pontons, and folding canvas
boats; local fishing boats; or rafts and boats specially constructed to make up for deficiencies in
requirements.
The organization of battalion personnel in assault
waves is completed in the forward assembly area
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formity with the established assault time schedule.
The first wave loads into the boats which are manned
by engineer crews. Artillery preparation against
enemy defenses and firing positions usually precedes the assault, but on many occasions the element of surprise was considered to be sufficiently
important to attempt silent crossings.
Machine guns, mortars, and light regimental
artillery-as well as pioneers 'with a large supply
of mines-accompany the first echelon. The pioneers clear minefields and wire obstacles, and lay
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their own mines in the most likely approaches for
enemy counterattacks. Upon debarking, the infantry ,,,,,ith their supporting weapons organize to
attack the enemy screening forces. The artillery
barrage across the river moves forward in jumps to
support the assault.
Assault boats crossing a 500-foot river with average current make one round trip in 10 minutes,
with oars; or one round trip in 6 minutes, with
outboard motors. The number of boats required
vanes with the tactical decision concerning the

Use of fords is made wherever possible. Water
depth, and not the character of the river bed, is the
determining factor. If bundles of fascines and rock
fills are not adequate to cover channels, holes, or
soft spots at the proposed fording point, flexible
wooden mats interwoven with rope are sunk in place
by driving short piles along the edges or by weighting the mat down with rock.
e. Ferrying Phase. Ferrying operations begin
after the assaulting infantry consolidates a small
bridgehead-about 600 yards in depth-and con-
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Figure 69. Ferry crossing point.

llumber of assault waves per battalion. The rifle
battalion without its artillery ~,5-ton load) may
cross in a single wave in 36 A-3 large pneumatic
boats or light pontons, in 12 heavy pontons, or
over 9-foot bridge sets of eight sections. The
to-foot footbridge section on four floats can carry
10 men; the light collapsible boats and pneumatic
boats, 12 men; the light pontons, 25 men; and the
heavy ponton sections, 50 men. Amphibious tanks
and other amphibious vehicles accompany the first
assault wave. In the crossing of the Svir River,
U. S. lend-lease ducks were used effectively in the
assault phase. Recent trends in river-crossing operations indicate an increased employment of amphibious vehicles.

tinue during all crossing phases, even after a secure
bridgehead has been established and bridges are in
operation. Ferries supplement bridges in transporting the maximum traffic across the river in the
shortest time, and serve as reserve bridge sections
in repairing combat damage. The ferry point is
organized like the assault-boat crossing point.
The troop assembly area is located 500 yards to
1 mile from the river. A floating equipment dump
is concealed about one-half mile from the river,
and superstructure materials are hidden in a second
dump about one-quarter of a mile from the river.
The approach road or trail to the ferry loading
point is controlled by engineer signal control stations. An upstream ferry construction point is
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Figure 70. Ponton bridge crossing.

selected to supplement the crossing point~ while a
rescue station site is established downstream (fig.
69). Ferries constructed of organizational floating
bridge sections carry from 5- to 16-ton loads for
light ponton sections, and from 16 to 100 tons for
heavy ponton sections. Carrying capacity is increased by adding additional pontons and by coupling two bridge sections. Two-lane coupled bridge
sections on heavy pontons may carry four trucks
or the equivalent weight of tanks or artillery pieces.
Generally, two single-lane bridge sections carrying
two vehicles are used in the initial phases to facilitate the rapid movement of ferries.
Small power launches, outboard motors, poles,
or cables are employed in ferrying operations.
Five round trips can be made per hour across a
SOO-foot river by a motor-drawn ferry as compared
to two to three round trips without power. The
greatest single factor in determining how rapidly a
unit may be transported at anyone ferry crossing
is the ferry capacity. A rifle battalion with its com-
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plete supply train may be loaded in 19 sixteen-ton
ferry loads or 48 five-ton ferry loads. Using the
larger ferries, in a single crossing, the battalion
can cross a SOO-foot river in 75 minutes, ·whereas
using the smaller ferries over 3 hours are required.
A rifle division generally crosses in two echelons~
requiring 2 to 6 hours, depending on the number
of ferry crossings and the size of ferries used.
Ferries are assembled in 15 to 50 minutes depending on their size; docks are constructed in about
20 minutes, and unloading requires 10 to 15 minutes. As in the case of assault boats, extensive
improvisation with local materials has taken place
in the construction of ferries. Tables of buoyancy
for all types of wood, barrels, drums, etc. are carried by engineers to facilitate rapid calculations in
designing improvised ferries.
f. Bridging phase. The bridge crossing sector
is identical in organization to the ferry point sector
with the exception that bridging equipment is concealed farther from the river. The approach road
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is capable of carrying heavy traffic, and runs from
the rear assembly area of the main body (about 3
miles from the river) to the bridge site.
Bridging begins at the earliest possible opportunity, generally when the bridgehead is about 2
miles deep. Initially, the bridging is of light ponton construction to facilitate rapid passage of light
equipment and infantry. Later, heavy ponton
bridges or fixed wooden bridges are constructed by
GHQ engineer troops. Large reserves of bridging
equipment are at hand under the control of special
repair units. Every precaution is taken to insure
the oontinuous flow of troops and equipment across
the river.
Strong mesh wire is hung upstream to stop floating
mines; emergency and rescue stations are located
down stream; look-out stations and flood-warning
posts are placed upstream; alternate ferrying points
and bridge sites are established and cables or
hawsers are stretched across the river at various
points to facilitate supplementary boat and raft
crossings.
Upstream, an emergency patrol station, armed
with machine guns and artillery, is on the alert for
floating mines, floating incendiary materials, and
enemy river gunboats. Camouflaged emergency
floating bridge sections are anchored upstream,
ready to replace a damaged bridge section. On the
downstream side is located a rescue station, equipped
with boats and rafts, as well as a reserve bridge
crossing site. Floating bridge capacities range from
5 tons to 16 tons for light ponton bridges, and from
16 tons to 100 tons for heavy ponton bridges. Construction time varies from 75 minutes for a 450-foot,
5-ton bridge to 4 hours for a 100-ton bridge of the
same length.
Construction time for floating bridges compares
favorably with U. S. practice. Some categories of
heavy ponton bridges are assembled in less time
by the Red Army engineers than comparable U. S.
floating bridges, with the notable exception of the
treadway bridge of U. S. armored units. Red Army
Engineer units use about 50 percent more men for
assembling comparable floating bridges.
With the exception of bridge-laying tanks and the
trestle spans of floating bridges, no prefabricated
organizational fixed bridge equipment has been in
evidence. The Red Army relies entirely on its highly
developed technique of constructing wooden fixed
bridges from materials brought forward, supplemented by lumber found locally. Six hours for the
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construction of a two-lane, 430-foot, 60-ton capacity
bridge is considered normal. The railroad bridge
across the Dniepr at Kiev was built in 12 days, with
7,000 men and women engaged in the construction.
Red Army practice in wooden bridge construction
is unique in its preference for wide piers. Rockfilled wooden cribs, piers formed by inclined trestle
and pile bents, and square trestle piers are common
(figs. 71 and 72). Piles are driven with heavy
cross-lagging in temporary construction, and the
unsupported span is strongly reinforced by inclined
struts anchored on the piers (fig. 73).

g. Underwater bridges. Three types of underwater bridges have been developed by the Red Army
engineers (fig. 74). In one case, four-pile bents
at IS-foot spans were driven with muffled pile
drivers and cut by special underwater saws 4 feet
below the surface. Special caps with metal straps
were then floated out and bolted to the piles. Log
stringers and plank decking were easily bolted to
the caps. All work was done at night so that the
bridge was not discovered by the enemy. Underwater bridges of spans up to 36 feet are built on
underwater rock-filled timber cribs anchored to
corner piles. Steel I-beam stringers rest on the cup,
to which the decking is securely fastened by bolts
running through the guardrails. Short rail struts
support a cable at the water surface to indicate the
edges of the bridge. For shallow-river underwater
bridges, short piles are driven for anchoring timbergrillage (cross layers of trimmed logs) piers to
which stringers weighed down by rock are fastened.
At Voronezh, during the Red Army offensive in
the spring of 1943, the underwater bridge served to
deceive the enemy as to the offensive capabilities of
forces in a relatively small bridgehead to which the
bridge was secretly constructed. Large armored
formations crossed the bridge at night, and surprised
the enemy with a powerful and successful offensive.
h. Crossings of frozen rivers. The techniques for crossing frozen rivers have been thoroughly developed in the Red Army as the result of
years of experimentation on the supporting strength
of ice. Specific regulations are prescribed for allowable loads, spacing of vehicles, and the proper
manner for placing plank roadways to distribute the
load. Thin ice is crossed by infantry on long
boards; loads on flat sleds are pulled across by ropes.
For vehicles and artillery, bridges are quickly built
by driving piles through the ice, using the ice to
support the working crews. Such piles are almost
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Figure 71.

Figure 72.

Grillage-type pier.

Inclined bent type oj support.

always cross-lagged several feet above the point so
that little settling will take place and driving can be
done ,dth large "ooden mauls.
2. DEFE:\SE OF RIVER LINES

In the early years of the war, river lines constituted
a vital part of the Red Army's defensive position~·
·at the most important sectors ··of the front. The
successful defense of the Voron~zh positions along

V-136

the upper Don prevented the enemy from outflanking Moscow from the· south in August 1942. The
historic' defense of Stalin grad and the Volga River
·line for 106 days prevented the enemy from splitting
the Red Army's continuous front in late 1942.
, The outstanding tactical characteristic o.f the Red
Army doctrine in the defense of river lines is that
one or more powerful bridgeheads must be retained
on the enemy side of the river. Such' bridgeheads
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deny the enemy control of the river and restrict the
maneuverability of enemy forces on their side of
the river because of the constant threat of counterattacks from the bridgeheads. River gunboats
supplement the defensive power of artillery and deny
the enemy control of the river. Medium and heavy

FRONT

artillery support the bridgehead defenses across the
river. The units defending the bridgehead have a
large amount of direct-fire artillery as well as tank
support. Replacements and supplies are brought
across the river at night to maintain the maximum
combat strength of the defensive position. Reten-

FRONT

SIDE

SIDE

TOP
Figure 73.

Piles with cross.lagging.

LONGITUDINAL VIEW
Figure 74.

CROSS SECTION
Underwater bridge on piles.
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tion of the bridgeheads makes it possible to build
up a concentration area from which offensive operations can be advantageously launched when the
military situation warrants.
3. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

A number of medium-scale amphibious operations
were successfully carried out by Soviet forces during the war. The outstanding tactical characteristic
of every amphibious operation was coordination of
the assault by sea with an offensive thrust on land
converging on the same objective. The lack of
strong naval support and armored landing craft for
amphibious operation forced the Soviets into complete dependence on the element of surprise. In
the capture of Petsamo, a sudden motor-torpedoboat landing disrupted the shore defense system,
permitting slower craft to land the main body of
the assault units unmolested. The assaults on the
Kerch Peninsular (1942-43) moved across a relatively narrow channel, facilitating surprise. The
most extended amphibious operation took place in
the capture of Constanza. In this operation, demoralized Rumanian units were in full retreat following a breakthrough of the Red Army on a wide
front. The amphibious forces struck when enemy
reserves were committed elsewhere and captured
Constanza, thus outflanking the last defensive position available to the enemy.

Section V. OPERATIONS IN WOODS
AND SWAMPS

Wire communications are used for all but mobile
units. In forward areas whistles and signal lamps
are also used. Because more time is required to
string wire in woods and swamps than in open terrain, wire is not laid to the new position of a command or observation post prior to its displacement.
Maintenance of wire communications is insured by
frequently placed control stations and duplicate
circuits. A signal construction platoon (28 men)
can lay 3 to 4 miles of all-wire circuits per day.
2. USE OF WEAPONS

Combat in woods and swamps is conducted at short
distances, which increases the importance of small
arms and automatic weapons. As a rule, low-trajectory battalion and regimental weapons are assigned piecemeal to rifle companies, or even to rifle
platoons. High-trajectory weapons-such as battalion and regimental mortars, and divisional howitzers-are retained under centralized control as
much as possible. This is imperative not only because the fields of fire of low-trajectory weapons are
so restricted that only high-trajectory weapons are
capable of firing general support missions, but also
because firing general missions requires a substantial expenditure of ammunition, which can at best
be delivered to one or two places suitable for the
deployment of massed artillery. The effectiveness
of heavy weapons in woods and swamps depends not
so much on their numbers as on uninterrupted supply of ammunition.

1. GENERAL

3. TACTICS OF SEPARATE ARMS

Combat in wooded and swampy terrain is conducted
by small self-sufficient Soviet units in a series of local
actions. Tactical objectives are roads, clearings,
road j unctions, small woods, heights, and inhabited
places. Engagements occur at short distances; visibility is limited; observation is difficult; and infiltration by small units is relatively easy. Movement
of large forces is channelized; supply and evacuation
must take place over the same routes. This necessitates strict control of road movements and carefur
planning. The effect of weather on road and ground
cOllditions is magnified by the scarcity of roads and
suitable deployment areas for heavy weapons.
Combat in woods and swamps demands great physical effort from personnel and animals. The employment of motor vehicles for hauling supplies and
pulling heavy equipment is limited to roads; elsewhere, horses and more frequently men have to carry
extra loads and move heavy equipment.

a. Infantry. Soviet infantry divisions with
their light equipment, small daily tonnage requirements, horse-drawn transport, and readily available
motive power {riflemen} are tactically mobile in
woods and swamps. Infantry usually operates in
small self-sufficient units, generally reinforced rifle
companies. Rifle companies attack in a line of
platoons. Reserves are drawn up close to the forward lines. Particular attention is directed toward
the protection of flanks and lines of communications.
Submachine-gun units are used in small groups
(platoons or less) to infiltrate within the enemy
lines, prepare ambushes, and counterattack. Antitank rifles and heavy machine guns, in addition to
their normal employment, are used for sniping.
h. Cavalry. Cavalry is particularly adaptable
to operations in difficult terrain, performing missions
which in open country are generally assigned to
motorized infantry. These missions include distant
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reconnaissance, flank security, wide envelopment,
pursuit, and raids.
c. Tanks. The Red Army considers that the
effort expended in making possible a tank maneuver
in apparently inaccessible terrain is fully recompensed by the surprise achieved by such a maneuver.
After careful terrain and route reconnaissance, engineer and infantry detachments construct river and
swamp bridges, fill holes, and, when necessary, lay
corduroy roads. Tank units are assigned special engineer and infantry detachments which follow the
tanks. A typical tank assault team consists of an
engineer squad, a tank platoon (five light or three
medium tanks) , and from one to two rifle platoons.
Such an assault team is followed by a second wave
which, in addition to riflemen, engineers, and tanks,
has light artillery or self-propelled guns.
4. IMPROVISATIONS

In crossing swamps the Red Army uses locl\l resources as much as possible for the construction of
improvised aids. Many improvisations devised in
the early part of the war have been developed into
standard methods. In crossing swamps the individual soldier uses short branches or bunches of twigs
to make two mats about 2 yards long and 0.5 to 0.8
yards wide. He crosses the swamp by alternately
placing one and carrying the other. A rifle squad
uses two similar mats 3 to 4 yards long. Floating
bridges are constructed from light logs and branches.
A floating bridge made of 2- to 3-yard-long sections
of woven fence will support horses and light antitank artillery when placed on large branches. Diagonally constructed floating corduroy roads 7 to 8
yards wide will support 8 to 10 tons. A similar floating bridge 2 to 3 yards wide can be used by a motorized column. For operations in the Pripet Marshes,
Red Army riflemen were supplied with snow shoes.

elevated gun, command post, and observation post
positions; and communication trenches.

Section VI. WINTER W ARFARE
1. GENERAL

The long and severe winters of the U. S. S. R. have
compelled the Red Army to develop effective doctrines and techniques for winter operations.
The basic tactical principles for the employment
of troops under winter conditions are the same as
those developed for the conduct of operations in
other seasons. However, low temperature, heavy
snowfall, frozen ground, and changes in the relief
and appearance of local objects create additional
problems which the Red Army has successfully
solved, and even capitalized, as testified to by the
success of winter operations against the Germans.
The difficulties of winter conditions do not decrease the activity of the troops. On the contrary,
the Soviets make skillful use of the cold weather and
snow. Fortifications are built of snow and ice, and
frozen rivers are used as airfields. The long nights
in which snow lessens the degree of darkness are
advantageously used for maneuvering and regrouping forces. The logistics-the movement of troops
and supplies-is of greatest influence. The Red
Army successfully employs tracked vehicles in snow,
uses tractor-drawn sled trains and, for light operations and infiltrations: highly mobile motor sleds.
The Soviets are also well aware of the fact that
winter climate increases the effectiveness of persistent chemical agents, keeping them active for several
weeks.
Camouflage is of particular importance; all troops
are issued white camouflage suits. All weapons are
camouflaged either with white paint or by white tape
to break the silhouettes. The concealment of tracks
is particularly emphasized.

5. DEFENSIVE USE OF SWAMPS

Small swamps are integrated into the system of
defensive obstacles. Medium-sized swamps are used
to cover frontal or flank approaches to the main
defensive position. In this case, the line of outposts
is placed within the swamp. Artificial islands of
logs and branches are used to float security detachments and forward observation posts.
Large
swamps may be used in the same manner as medium-sized swamps, or the main defensive position
may be established within the swamp area. From
moss, turf, bushes, or branches, the Soviets construct
corduroy communication roads and branch trails;
10

2. EMPLOYMENT OF ARMS

a. Coordination. Coordination of the various
arms under winter conditions is complicated by the
difficulties involved in the identification of landmarks and, in spite of the increased range of radio
and wire communications in cold weather, in the
utilization of communications equipment.
The rate of movement of tanks, infantry on skis,
and cavalry is equalized to a considerable extent.
As a rule, the maneuvering of troop~ is slowed up hy
the necf'ssity of keeping to the road~.
The joint action of artillery with infantry is nor-
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mally hindered by snow cover, in proportion to its
depth and powdery condition. The cooperation of
infantry with tanks is equally complicated. In pursuit of the enemy, the Soviets consider it is usually
more advantageous to use infantry on skis than to
employ cavalry. The necessity of careful use of
camouflage often exerts retarding influences on the
time factor of operations. In general, transportation, evacuation, and bringing up of supplies are
associated with great difficulties.
The Soviets have found it necessary to make their
operational plans for winter warfare flexible~ providing alternatives to meet sudden changes in
meteorological conditions. The operations culminating in the crossing of the Vistula in the winter
of 1944--45 offer a good illustration of provisions
made for possible changes in weather conditions.
The Red Army developed two plans. One called
predominantly for air support while the other depended mainly on artillery support. When the
heavy overcast completely prevented the employment of aircraft, the second plan was available for
successful execution.
b. Infantry (ski troops). Winter conditions
not only restrict the movement of mechanized equipment, but also generally decrease the mobility of
regular infantry troops. To overcome this difficulty, the Red Army equips part of its infantry with
skis. The bulk of the infantry, however, is left
without skis and depends on the use of good roads
or sled transportation for mobility. A special
adaptation of this principle of transportation is the
use of tank-drawn armored sleds for infantry. Infantry on skis are found either in independent ski
battalions or in ski units which are part of a rifle
division. The normal armament of the ski battalions consists usually of rifles, submachine guns, light.
machine guns, and light mortars in the three rifle
companies; heavy machine guns in the heavymachine-gun company; and antitank rifles in the
antitank-rifle platoon of the battalion. The lack of
heavier mortars is explained by the tendency to
keep the armament light in order to increase the mobility of this specialized unit. Depending on the
particular mission and the combat situation, temporary ski formations of varying strengths are organized.
The use of skis greatly increases the mobility of
the infantry. The individual skier can travel 4.2
to 7.2 miles per hour; small units can travel 2.4 to
5.4 miles per hour. The travel rate of a larger unit
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usually does not exceed 3.6 miles per hour. Ski
troops are also independent of the road net, a fact
which makes ski troops well adapted for independent
missions, such as penetrations to the rear of the
enemy, destruction of installations, and cutting of
communications.
As a rule the Soviets employ small groups of ski
troops for reconnaissance, for raiding parties, for
outflanking maneuvers, and for exploitation immediately after a break-through, when the regular infantry is limited to use of roads.
c. Motor-sled battalions. In addition to the
ski battalions, the Red Army has organized numerous motor-sled battalions, some of which are combat
battalions, while others are employed predominantly
for transportation.
The combat motor-sled battalion is believed to be
organized into three combat motor-sled companies,
each with three platoons. One company has a total
of ten sleds (three sleds per platoon and one for the
company commander). The combat motor sled has
one 7.62-mm machine gun "DT" as fixed armament.
The battalion also has a supply company with ten
transport sleds, three to four trucks, one tractor, and
a maintenance platoon.
Combat motor-sled battalions stage surprise raids
against enemy road columns or against an enemy
who has no opportunity to deploy or to take up positions. They attack the flank or rear of deployed
enemy troops and pursue the retreating enemy· in
cooperation with ski troops. They find employment
as covering forces for troops dismounted from motorsleds, on open flanks of marching units of occupied islands and coastal sectors, and at the junctions
of larger formations. Motor-sled battalions are·
used as reinforcements for motor-sled reconnaissance detachments; for reconnaissance in steppes,
lakes, rivers, and coastal areas; and as lateral patrols
behind their own defensive lines in a wide defensive sector to prevent the infiltration of enemy troops.
In the defense they are committed in cooperation
with infantry transported by sleds against enemy
ski troops attempting outflanking maneuvers. They
also maintain command communications ana provide security for command posts. Their mobility
makes them suitable for combat against enemy parachutists and for exploitation of a breakthrough in
the enemy position, in close coordination with tanks,
infantry, and ski troops.
Motor-sled transport battalions transport infantry cooperating with combat motor-sled units. They
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carry infantry to the rear of the enemy and also
bring up replacements and supplies. The return
trips are utilized for evacuation of casualties and
captured materiel. The transport battalions transport machine-gun, ski, submachine-gun, and close
antitank-combat troops; and provide transportation
for the command personnel of larger formations.
Finally, they are used as searching parties looking
for damaged tanks and planes, and for bringing up
maintenance crews and guards.
The Soviets give careful attention to a wide variety of factors when employing motor sleds. Motorsled battalions must be employed either as a unit or
in not less than company strength. Their employment requires thorough preparation and smooth
coordination with infantry, tanks, aircraft, artillery,
and engineers. Weather and terrain conditions have
to be taken into account. Loose snow decreases the
speed of motor sleds; low temperature makes the
starting of the motors more difficult. At least 4
hours in daylight are required to prepare the sleds
and crews for commitment. Ravines, woods, and
brush land increase operating difficulties.
On the march, the Soviets employ unloaded sleds
at the point of the column to make tracks and mark
the path to be followed. The normal daily travel
capacity of motor sleds is 60 to 72 miles on average
terrain. Forced ma:.ches can achieve daily distances of 120 miles. The Soviets calculate on 12
to 15 miles per hour as an average speed'. when determining the time required for a given distance.
Roads with two-way traffic may not be used by
motor sleds, which are confined to parallel r?ads or
to cross-country movement. The sleds must not be
overloaded when transporting men and material.
The normal load consists of four armed men plus
the driver and 880 pounds of material. The greatest economy of fuel and oil is required. The fuel
tanks should' always be at least one-third full.
d. Artillery. The movement of horse-drawn
and motorized artillery in snow more than 12 inches
deep is usually confined to roads, even though the
Soviet artillery is mounted on sleds. Occasionally
the roads have to be specially prepared with mats
and logs to secure movement of the artillery. Tractors are often equipped with grousers. Occasionally
the infantry helps by hand to bring its supporting
artillery into position.
.
In snow less thari 12 inches deep, cross-country
movement is possible, although engineers often have
to break ~ path.

Mortars, rockets, and pack artillery pieces, having greater mobility than regular artillery, find
extensive employment. Artillery observation is
greatly influenced by the weather. Observation on
clear days is normally good, while in a foggy haze
the range of observation is greatly decreased.
Ground bursts on forward slopes normally show up
as black spots on snow background. Air bursts
are barely visible. Smoke shells are frequently
used for adjustment. Winter conditions llsually
create favorable conditions for the operation of
sound ranging units which the Red Army freely employs to counteract, at least partly, the limitation of
visual observation in foggy weather.
Whenever possible the Soviet troops clear the
ground for their gun positions to avoid displacements when firing.
Tanks. Tanks and self-propelled artillery
may, up to a certain degree, replace field artillery
in supporting infantry because their maneuverability
is less hindered by an equal amount of snow, although it is affected by the character of, the snow.
Ammunition supply, however, is a serious problem.
Heavy and medium tanks are able to pass through
snow 20 to 24 inches deep; equipped with grousers
they can pass through a maximum of 28 inches.
Light tanks can move through snow 12 to 14 inches
deep. Soft snow does not impede tank movement
seriously because it is compressed by the weight of
the tank to below tank-clearance level. Hard snow
breaks under the weight of the tracks, and fol1owing
tanks are suspended wi,thout contact of the tracks
with the ground. Thus, tank movement in column
formation is impossible over deep, hard snow.
The Soviets equip tanks with grousers for movement over slippery terrain. In addition, special
mats are used for movement over snow slopes.
Froze'1 rivers and lakes cease to be an obstacle for
tanks when frozen to a certain thickness: 28 to 40
inches of ice can carry a heavy tank; 24 inches is
necessary for a medium tank; and 12 inches for a
light tank. Infantry can cross on ice 4 inches thick.
Since tank tracks are clearly visible in fresh snow,
the Russians emphasize the movement of tanks in
column, during the night, or in a snow storm. Often
the last tank in the column will drag sleds or trees
~ehind to erase the tracks and create the appearance
of an ordinary trail.
When tanks reach an inhabited populated sector,
they are always well dispersed and are brought into
barns or destroyed buildings, or alongside walls of
buildings. In the open they are covered with snow
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or other natural camouflage material, depending on
the locality. Efforts are made to make warm shelter
available for the tanks. To assure constant combat
readiness in wintertime, tank units are provided with
water and oil heaters and other technical equipment.

f. Engineers. The work of the Soviet engineers
becomes especially important in winter operations.
They are responsible for road repair and construction; the erection of warm shelters for men, horses,
and materiel; employment of special kinds of winter
camouflage; and for other normal engineer responsibilities. One of the main tasks~ however, is the
construction of winter obstacles~ using snow and ice.
The procurement of drinking water ~ particularly for
horses, occasionally presents difficulties.
g. Cavalry. Under winter conditions. the
Soviets often encounter great difficulties in employing their cavalry units as prescribed by Red Army
doctrine; that is, in combination with supporting
tanks and artillery as an independent striking force
in terrain not accessible to motorized equipment.
In deep snow the mobility of cavalry is often reduced
to 2.4 to 3 miles per hour; movement is often restricted to roads or to the tracks made by tanks. In
snow up to 12 inches deep, cavalry attacks of brief
duration are possible after thorough terrain reconnaissance. Successful operations have been conducted jointly by infantry on skis and cavalry.
The Soviets are well aware of the special care that
horses require during winter operations. They
therefore make as much use as possible of inhabited
communities for bivouac.
In uninhabited regions they construct protective shelters from local
materials.
3. RECONNAISSANCE

_Thorough ground reconnaissance, the Red Army
teaches, is of the greatest importance for winter operations. Reconnaissance must, in addition to its
normal missions, reconnoiter the terrain in regard
to special weather and visibility conditions. The
Soviets normally assign this mission to ski infantry
units, although cavalry and motorized units may also
be used when the terrain conditions permit. Cavalry
and motorized units are usually limited to reconnaissance along roads.
Distances considered to be within the capabilities
of units of varying strength assigned to reconnaissance missions are: 21 to 30 miles for a strong reconnaissance detachment of approximately battalion
strength; 9 to 18 miles for reconnaissance com-
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panies; up to 6 miles for reconnaissance platoons;
up to 1.8 to 3 miles for reconnaissance sections. In
snowstorms, the distances are shortened by one-half
because of the difficulties of observation and
reporting.
Aerial reconnaissance in wintertime is considered
extremely effective and furnishes valuable information as to the locations of enemy installations, obstacles, and troop concentration, and the enemy disposition on the front.
4. OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS

The objectives of offensive operations in winter remain the same as in other seasons, though the seizure
of inhabited areas and road nets is of increased importance.
In the early part of the war the Soviets carried
out attacks against the enemy lines of communication. This was facilitated by the German defense.
Soviet infiltration in force by units up to a cavalry
corps in size was possible through wide gaps between strongly fortified centers of defense. In the
latter part of the war, when German defenses ~re
organized in continuous lines of defensive positions
built up in depth~ the Red Army was forced to develop its offensives into operations of combined arms
\fith all the characteristics of well planned and largp.
scale attacks.
The Soviets carefully time their offensive operations. They do not hesitate to conduct their attacks
during blinding snowstorms which promote overwhelming surprise. In East Prussia, the Soviets
outflanked the strongly fortified German position
with large tank formations, which they moved across
the ice during a heavy snowstorm, attacking the
German position from the flank next to the sea,
where they were least expected. 111 the interest of
achieving surprise, the Soviets also do not hesitate to
begin their attacks during the night.
Characteristic of Red Army winter offensives is
the proximity of the line of departure to the front
lines to avoid tiring the troops before contacting the
enemy. Infantry on skis normally advances first,
supported by heavy infantry weapons mounted on
skis or sleds and by artillery and tanks which, however, are often limited in their advance to existing
roads and sections of favorable terrain. Other ski
units, cavalry, and tanks are used whenever possible
for outflanking maneuvers, in order to block the exits
of inhabited areas and thereby prevent the enemy
from destroying bases useful for further operations
by friendly main forces.
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5. DEFENSIVE OPERATIONS
The same organization of stabilized defense is used
throughout the year. However, extensive use of
snow and ice obstacles is made in constructing defensive positions in wintertime. The selection of
the defensive area is influenced by the location of
inhabited areas, forests, and groves, which, with
adaptations, may become important strong points.
The Soviets also emphasize the necessity of adequate
shelter for the troops to keep them warm and maintain their combat efficiency. They make extensive
use of dummy installations, which they secure with
mines and booby traps.
The Red Army prepares heavy weapons for unubserved fire into previously registered areas, covering the gaps between strongpoints to avoid successful enemy offensive operations during periods
of limited observation. When the enemy succeeds
in breaking into the Soviet defensive zone, with the
intention of seizing built-up areas, the Soviets strive
to halt him by previously adjusted artillery fire and
by counterattacks.
During an enemy attack, artillery tries to slow his
advance by forcing him off the roads and thus compelling him to advance crosscountry. Counterattacks are carried out in previously studied and prepared directions, usually on the flanks of the enemy
units. Whenver possible, the Soviets counterattack
with skiers, who move downhill, with the wind and
sun in the face of the enemy. Counterattacks with
shock troops without skis and supported by heavy
infantry weapons and artillery, are carried out only
for short distances.
When enemy pressure forces the Soviets to withdraw from action, they try to disengage themselves
from the enemy during the night. In daytime they
make extensive use of smoke. Ski troops are normally assigned as covering forces.

Section VII. MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS
1. BASIC PRINCIPLES
The tactical employment of troops, weapons, and
equipment in mountain warfare is dictated by terrain
and weather conditions, and the attendant logistical
problems. Operations in the mountains impose
great strain on men, animals, and materiel. Rapidly
changing weather, road and soil conditions, and
mountain altitudes necessitate the issuance of special
equipment, additional clothing, and increased rations. Greater organizational weights and the
decreased loads which can be carried by men and
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animals require larger unit trains. Whenever terrain conditions permit, narrow-gauge railroads are
built for divisions and higher organizations. Tractors are assembled along the route to haul supplies
over difficult areas. When other forms of transportation fail, air transport is used. Regimental and
divisional supply and evacuation installations are
placed closer to forward units. The divisional field
hospital and service area must not be more than 2
hours' journey from the corresponding regimental
installations. Contrary to normal Soviet practice,
signal communications for the purpose of regulating
traffic are established along supply routes 111
mountains.
Antiaircraft plays a prominent part in mountain
operations. Both in the offensive and defensive,
antiaircraft guns are placed at critical positions
where traffic is channelized. Organic antiaircraft is
supplemented by GHQ units which are assigned for
duration of the mountain operations. Searchlight
units are assigned for the defense of important railheads and supply dumps.
Mountain combat lacks the unity which characterizes combat on rolling terrain; the inaccessibility of certain areas and the lack of sufficient roads
prevent the organization of continuous fronts.
Combat in the mountains assumes a piecemeal character, resolving itself into separate, more-or-Iess
isolated conflicts by small, self-sufficient units difficult to retain under centralized control. This necessitates initiative, within the expressed intentions of
the higher command, on the part of subordinate
commanders, as the appropriate actions of even
individual units and elements often lead to decisive
tactical success.
There are often gaps between friendly front sectors which may be occupied by the enemy. The
appropriate disposition of second echelon and reserve troops is of utmost importance for coping with
enemy attempts at envelopment, outflanking, and infiltration. Up to one-sixth of the entire infantry
forces and up to one-fourth of cavalry should be
designated for this purpose.
The abundance of dead spaces and areas of nonvisibility in the mountain lowers the effectiveness
of arms for grazing fire at far and average distances,
and gives added importance to high-trajectory
weapons (howitzers and mortars). Snipers and
submachine gunners play an important role in preparing ambushes and infiltrating through enemy
lines. Direct fire, interdictory fire, bayonets, and
hand grenades are used to great advantage.
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2. CONTROL OF COMBAT
For uninterrupted control of combat in the mountains, command posts must be located closer to the
troops. The security of command posts is provided
for by advance and fla~k detachments which occupy
heights commanding approaches to them.
In order for the commander to maintain constant
contact with rapidly changing mountain combat
conditions, he must not leave his command observation post unless under the severest necessity. For
uninterrupted personal observation of battle progress, the commander moves forward to a new command observation post immediately after the seizure
of crests and spurs obstructing his observation.
When direct communication bet\reen command
posts and operating units is impossible, forward
message centers are moved out along the axis of
communications.
In spite of dead spaces and periodic bad reception due to mountain relief and atmospheric conditions, radio is the basic means of communication
in the mountains, especially for communication with
isolated units and aviation. The Red Army increases the employment and reliability of radio in
mountain operations hy careful training in the selection of frequencies, the siting of radios, and the
adjustment of antennas. Visual sigllalling is also
widely used because of the simplicity of setting up
posts and stations. Liaison planes, foot and
mounted messengers~ and dogs (for communication
over distances up to 1 to 2 miles i are also used.
Lse of wire is limited by such factors as time consumed in laying it (t\,-O times that on rolling terrain), possibilities of enemy tapping, damage to
wire due to weather conditions, and difficulties of
replacing damaged circuits.
3. THE OFFENSIVE

The offensive in mountains resolves itself into a
series of attacks on successive objectives such as
heights, ridges, passes, and valleys. The plan of
maneuver generally consists of the isolation of
separate tactical objectives and their annihilation by
double or single envelopment; thus, the main effort must generally he suppleinented by several secondaryefforts. Successive displacement of supporting weapons hetm"en succpssiye phase lines is imperati\'e. In attackillg enemy positions arranged
ill altitudinal leyels. the fire of all ,,-eapons is first
concentrated on tJw lmn'st level. ~Thile infantry
attacks that le\'el. artillf'ry and Illortars shift their
fire to the firing positions of the ~xt level.
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The offensive in the mountains is conducted either
along the mountain chain or across it.
An offensive along a ridge combines a breakthrough in the valley with an encircling maneuver
over the mountains, and the seizure of commanding
heights and road junctions in the enemy rear and
flanks. The break-through is accomplished by a
heavy concentration of artillery, tanks, and aviation.
In the development of the hreak-through by mobile
formations, the seizure of road junctions in the
enemy rear may lead to the surrounding and defeat
of his forces on important sectors of the front. In
continuing the advance along a valley, friendly flanks
and rear must be' secured by airborne troops and
mountain-infantry units who seize heights commanding the valley. Advancing troops must support flank
security units by aerial attacks, artillery fire, and
maneuvers into the rear of the enemy defending the
heights; at the same time, these flank security units
assist the advancing main body by fire and maneuver
in the flank and rear of enemy units barricading the
valley.
An offensive across a ridge is based on the possession of mountain passes. Mountain passes may be
secured by the seizure of heights commanding them,
by attacking the enemy's rear on the reverse side of
the ridge in a rapid outflanking maneuver, by landing airborne troops in the rear of enemy units
defending the pass, and, simultaneously with these
actions, by launching an aggressive frontal as~ault,
usually in coordinatio'n with aviation. Offensive
operations assume the characteristics of close
combat.
4. THE DEFENSE

Mountain terrain provides favorable locations for
defensive positions ,,,,,hile at the same time irregular
relief, deep and hidden approaches, and the isolation
of commanding heights and crests facilitate outflanking and enveloping maneuvers by the enemy.
A successful defense depends on thorough reconnaissance, well organized outpost zone action, and timely
and sudden counterattacks by second echelon and
reserve troops to prevent these maneuvers.
Ohservation posts are established up to 9 to 12
miles from the defensive front line; communication
with them is maintained by radio and visual signalling-relay points are established when necessary.
In the outpost zone, security elements cut off roads
and approaches; secure flanks, intervals between defensive positions, and salients; and hold the enemy
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until the approach of support troops. Support
troops in the outpost zone parry enemy outflanking
maneuvers; destroy small groups attempting infiltration; and, when necessary, cover the withdrawal of
friendly elements. In defense of the outpost
zone, ambushes and flank fire barrages are used
extensively.
The main defensive positions may be organized
, either along or across the mountain ridge; in either
case the front line is situated on forward slopes, although a portion of the forces must be disposed on
reverse slopes. Firing positiolls are echeloned ver:.
tically as well as in depth. In defending a mountain valley, strong points are echeloned on adjacent
heights to cover the valley with cross fire. In
wooded terrain, defens'ive positions are organized
at the front edge of the woods or on commanding
heights. In the latter case, the woods are used as a
natural obstacle to trap the enemy. Elevated platforms are built in trees for heavy machine guns and
observation posts. In all cases, antitank and antipersonnel mines, obstacles of all types, and artificial
rock and landslides are widely employed.
The artillery and infantry antitank fire plan is
developed to cover approaches to defensive positions and dead spaces by both frontal and flanking
fire. Divisional artillery is always centralized when
operating in broad valleys and foothills. It is partially centralized in support of the main defensive
positions, and decentralized in support of secondary
defensive positions. Submachine-gun teams are a~
signed to each artillery and mortar position for
protection against infiltrating enemy units.
Even if the enemy succeeds in breaking into the
defensive zone and begins developing his initial
success, isolated heights must be firmly held. The
second echelons of the army (corps) and divisional
(brigade) reserves, in cooperation with tanks, then
counterattacks to support threatened points as soon
as the enemy drives over the crest; at this point his
observation is limited and he is deprived of artillery
support.
.
5. ROLES OF THE VARIOUS ARMS
a. Infantry. The infantry carries the chief
weight of combat in the mountains. Under conditions where the support of other arms cannot always
be relied upon, and where units often operate with
open flanks and even without rommunication ,,,ith
adjacent units, unsupported infantry is best adapted
to conduct successful mountain warfare. It is cap-
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able of filtering
through enemy d e. independently
.
fenses; reachmg hIS flanks and rear from the most
unexpected and weakly defended areas; and, by
using bayonets, hand grenades, and point-blank
fire, of destroying him.
To provide for uninterrupted artillery support
when possible, the infantry must assist it in getting
through inaccessible sectors and, by the seizure of
heights, provide it with necessary observation.
:for combat in high mountain ~ectors, where the
reli~f is sharply cut and communications are unreliable, special mountain elements may be attached
to regular infantry. Often, infantry units which
have received special training-orientation in fog,
night, and snow; camouflage techniques; construction of light defensive fortifications-and have special attached equipment .are designated for combat
in high mountain areas. If road conditions are
bad, or roads are lacking altogether, infantry must
be strongly reinforced with engineers and additional
pack animals.
h. Cavalry. Cavalry is the mobile arm in mountain operations. It usually operates offensively,
most often in meeting engagements and in attack.
It often conducts mobile defense, using ambushes
and surprise attacks, but is used only in special instances for stable defense.
Specifically, it is well 'adapted to surrounding
enemy main groupings; developing a break-through
made by the infantry by disrupting enemy attempts
to stabilize the front; and pursuing the enemy 'with
the intention of reaching rear areas and blocking
his retreat. It is capable of supporting army operations by covering the concentration and deployment
of forces; seizing and holding especially important
tactical features before the approach of the main
forces; securing flanks; covering retreat in the most
threatened areas; and conducting reconnaissance
and partisan activities in the enemy rear.
Cavalry divisions, assigned to armies or infantry
corps, usually function independently for the exe~ cution of _specific missions to which they are adapted.
In sectoi~; along wide valleys and in low mountains,
larger cavalry units may be used. Cavalry is reinforced ,dth tanks, infantry, artillery, and special
units according to the mission assigned to it.
In areas in the enemy rear or where there are not
sufficient roads, forage and provisions are supplied
by air transport.
c. Artiller~·. Mountaill relief f('stricts the
movement of artilleq and limits its flexibility of
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fire. Artillery is, therefore, attached directly to the
individual units it is to support. Regimental antitank artillery and, in certain instances, divisional
artillery guns are employed by platoon or even
separate pieces in direct support of infantry groups.
Infantry and pioneer commands are assigned to artillery units to secure their movement. Pack mountain batteries accompany infantry in high mountain
areas.
An extensive network of vertical and lateral observation posts must be set up to ensure wide fields
of observation. Command observation posts are
moved out to forward units and located not only
within their own sectors but, if necessary, also in
adjacent sectors. Reserve observation posts are
located in close proximity to the firing positions.
Radio and visual signals are used for communication between observation posts and firing positions.
Mountain terrain and sharp changes in the direction and speed of wind hinder the use of artillery
jnstrumental reconnaissance. Observation by paired
observers is widely practised for determining the
exact location of targets, and aviation is used for
reconnaissance of enemy batteries and adjustment
of fire.
The choice of firing positions for light field artillery batteries is governed not only by the minimum
range of the guns but also by the fact that dead areas~
ahundant in mountain terrain, must be avoided as
far as possible. Thus, firing positions are located on
adjacent sectors and heights for flanking fire, and
are moved back to use other trajectories.
Firing positions for high-trajectory guns (mortars
and howitzersl may be located behind high natural
covers and in deep valleys, thus bringing into range
areas which are inaccessible to other batteries and
permitting fire over the heads of advancing friendly
infantry for longer periods. Firing positions and
approaches to them should be carefully camouflaged
by engineers.
Since the lower atmospheric pressure in high
areas strongly affects the flight of shells, special auxiliary firing tables must be provided.

d. Tanks and armored cars. Tanks may
operate in mountainous terrain if slopes do not exceed 30°. In areas not permitting the massing of
tanks, they are distributed among infantry and cavalry units. The employment of tanks must be
preceded by terrain and route reconnaissance. Special obstacle-dearing groups are assigned to each
tank unit.
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The basic mission of tanks in the mountains is the
direct support of infantry. In close cooperation
with infantry, and together wi~h artillery and aviation, tanks operate as part of the main forces or on
the flanks and in the rear of the enemy as part of
outflanking units. Tanks also seize phase lines, inhabited points, defiles, road j unctions, and passes;
pursue the enemy; and cover the withdrawal of
friendly units. Light tanks may be used in small
independent groups.
One and one-half to two times the normal amount
of fuel and lubricating oil is required in the mountains. Each tank must be provided with spare fuel
drums; tractors are used to drag them on steep slopes
and across wide passes to conserve fuel. Reserve
spare parts must be provided. Two crews for each
tank are necessary to eliminate overfatigue.
Armored cars are used on hard soil or wherever
passable to them. They execute reconnaissance;
seize inhabited points~ narrow passes~ road junctions, and crossings; and guard rear roads and
communications.
e. Engineers. Each independent unit or element, regardless o'f its composition, must be reinforced with engineers for assistance in overcoming
terrain obstacles, for building bridges, laying corduroy and other types of roads, forcing rivers, getting
through swamps, conducting terrain reconnaissance,
etc.

f. Airborne troops. Airborne troops (especially parachute troops) are used effectively for
mountain operations in the enemy rear and on his
flanks in coordination with land forces. Even small
airborne groups equipped with automatic weapons
and explosives can often decide the outcome of battle
by seizing commanding heights and passes and disrupting the enemy system of communications.
Where level plateaus and valleys are not available
for landing airborne troops of other types, parachutists are used. Landings must be preceded by
careful and secret terrain reconnaissance.
Support aviation cooperates with airborne troops
and parachute groups by bombing mountain roads
and mobile enemy units.
Due to the lack of sufficient roads, combat with
enemy airborne troops is chiefly the mission of support aviation, which destroys enemy equipment and
personnel at their loading airdromes or attacks th~
('nem) in the air before troops can land amI
disembark.

